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Abstract
This thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first part of the thesis explores various
deniable signature schemes and their applications. Such schemes do not bind a unique
public key to a message, but rather specify a set of entities that could have created the
signature, so each entity involved in the signature can deny having generated it. The main
deniable signature schemes we examine are ring signature schemes.
Ring signatures can be used to construct designated verifier signature schemes, which
are closely related to designated verifier proof systems. We provide previously lacking
formal definitions and security models for designated verifier proofs and signatures and
examine their relationship to undeniable signature schemes.
Ring signature schemes also have applications in the context of fair exchange of signa-
tures. We introduce the notion of concurrent signatures, which can be constructed using
ring signatures, and which provide a “near solution” to the problem of fair exchange.
Concurrent signatures are more efficient than traditional solutions for fair exchange at the
cost of some of the security guaranteed by traditional solutions.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the security of two-party key agreement
protocols. It has traditionally been difficult to prove that a key agreement protocol satisfies
a formal definition of security. A modular approach to constructing provably secure key
agreement protocols was proposed, but the approach generally results in less efficient
protocols.
We examine the relationships between various well-known models of security and in-
troduce a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for key agreement
protocols in such security models. Our approach simplifies the proof process, enabling us
to provide proofs of security for several efficient key agreement protocols in the literature
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This thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first part of the thesis explores various
non-standard digital signature schemes. The signature schemes we examine differ from
standard digital signature schemes in the sense that they do not bind a unique public key
to a message. Rather, the signature schemes that we consider specify a set of entities that
could have created the signature. Such a signature therefore binds the set of public keys to
the message being signed, and no single entity (or public key) is implicated as the signer.
We say that such signatures are deniable since the identity of the signer is “hidden” in
a group of possible signers, and therefore each entity involved in the signature can deny
having generated it. We examine various types of deniable signature schemes and ways in
which they may be used.
The most common deniable signature schemes (i.e. signature schemes satisfying the
above properties) are ring signature schemes, and indeed all the other deniable signature
schemes that we consider can be derived from ring signature schemes.
The original motivation for ring signature schemes was to be able to leak information
without being held accountable. An entity could sign some declaration in such a way that
he is not implicated by the signature, but rather a group of entities of his choice (including
the signer) is implicated. In this way, the real signer is able to “hide” his involvement
within a group of possible signers, and can therefore deny any involvement in producing
the signature.
Although this is an interesting application, ring signature schemes also possess some
additional properties in the two-party case. In this case the ring signature could have been
produced by either of two parties but where it is infeasible for a third party to determine
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which of the two possible signers generated the signature. Both possible signers can deny
having produced the signature to a third party, but the two parties involved both know
who created the signature. The signer knows that he created the signature, and the other
party (the non-signer) knows that that he did not create the signature and can therefore
uniquely identify the signer.
Two party ring signature schemes can be used to construct designated verifier signature
schemes. The goal of designated verifier signature schemes is for a signer to prove to a
specific verifier (called a designated verifier) that they have signed a message. However
the verifier should not be able to prove this to a third party. Two-party ring signature
schemes exactly meet this requirement, although there are also other ways to construct
designated verifier signatures.
We also examine the related notion of designated verifier proof systems. Here the
goal is not to sign a message, but rather to prove the validity of some statement to a
designated verifier. A designated verifier proof could have been created by the prover or
the designated verifier, so the verifier cannot transfer the proof to a third party since he
himself could have generated it. Designated verifier proofs are usually used in the context
of undeniable signature schemes, so we consider them in this context as well.
The last type of deniable signature schemes that we consider are introduced in the
context of fair exchange of signatures. The goal of a fair exchange protocol is to allow
two entities to exchange signatures in a fair way. By this we mean that by engaging in a
protocol, either each party obtains the other’s signature, or neither party does. It should
not be possible for one party to terminate the protocol at some stage leaving the other
party committed when they themselves are not.
Existing techniques for solving this problem either involved a timed release of signa-
tures or the use of a special purpose trusted third party. Timed release of signatures is
highly interactive and cannot always guarantee complete fairness, and in practice, suitable
trusted third parties can be difficult to find. We therefore introduce the notion of concur-
rent signature schemes which provide an efficient (partial) solution to the problem of fair
exchange of signatures that does not require a trusted third party, but which forfeits some
of the security guarantees normally expected from a full fair exchange solution.
In order to construct a concurrent signature scheme, we require a special type of
deniable signature, which we call a non-transferable signature. Non-transferable signatures
can be constructed using ring signature schemes of a specific form.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the study of key agreement protocols.
10
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Since the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [50] which allowed two parties to generate
a shared secret key without having any previous shared secret, the study of key agreement
protocols using asymmetric techniques has been very fertile.
It is difficult to design secure cryptographic primitives, and particularly so for key
agreement protocols. The literature contains many attempts at constructing secure key
agreement protocols, many of which turned out to be insecure.
Unlike many other cryptographic primitives such as encryption and digital signature
schemes, the correct definition of a secure key agreement protocol is still debated. Further-
more, assuming a suitable definition of security has been found, constructing a proof that
the concrete key agreement protocol concerned meets the required definition of security is
usually very difficult.
The later chapters of this thesis consider various well-known models of security (and
corresponding security definitions) for key agreement protocols. We examine what security
guarantees the various definitions in fact provide, and we analyze what concrete properties
various security definitions demand.
The identification of certain necessary requirements for a protocol to be secure allows
us to develop a modular method by which a certain class of key agreement protocols may
be proven secure. If protocols cannot be proven secure in their current form, our modular
technique often identifies the cause of the problem, and in many cases the problem is easily
addressed by making some small modifications to the protocol. The proof techniques
developed greatly simplify the proof process and we are able to provide proofs of security
for various previously unproven protocols.
1.2 Overall Structure
Part I In Chapter 2, we cover the nomenclature and definitions that are relevant for the
subsequent chapters in Part I of the thesis. Here we define the concept of a digital signature
scheme and security for digital signatures. We also introduce the topic of provable security,
random oracles, and proof techniques for the signature schemes in later chapters.
In Chapter 3, we introduce ring signature schemes. We give a formal definition of ring
signature schemes and their security, and we present an efficient concrete ring signature
scheme.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the notions of non-interactive designated verifier (NIDV)
proof systems and undeniable signature schemes (which use NIDV proofs). We provide
11
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formal definitions for these schemes and their security. We go on to provide a concrete
undeniable signature scheme using NIDV proofs. We then introduce the notion of desig-
nated verifier signature schemes and present formal definitions for these schemes and their
security. We show that secure two-party ring signatures are in fact also secure DV signa-
tures, and we present two concrete designated verifier signature schemes (one of which is
a ring signature scheme, and the other of which is derived from an NIDV proof), and we
provide proofs of security for these concrete schemes.
In Chapter 5, we introduce concurrent signature schemes, giving formal definitions of
concurrent signature schemes and their security. We go on to show how a specific two
party ring signature scheme can be used to construct a concurrent signature scheme. We
provide a proof of security for the resulting concrete scheme.
Part II In Chapters 6 and 7 we introduce the nomenclature and relevant background
for the second part of the thesis which is concerned with key agreement protocols. We
also introduce the topic of provable security for key agreement protocols as well as various
security models and definitions of security for key agreement protocols.
In Chapter 8 we analyze certain of the security models presented in Chapter 7, and
present our modular techniques for constructing proofs of security for key agreement pro-
tocols in these security models. We then consider various key agreement protocols in
the literature which lack proofs of security (or complete proofs of security) and use our
techniques to construct full proofs of security for these protocols in appropriate security
models.
1.3 Publications
This thesis contains certain material that was previously published with L. Chen [39, 40],
material that was published with K.G. Paterson [73, 74] as well as material that was
published with L. Chen and K.G. Paterson [41].
The content of [74] forms a basis for Chapter 4, the content of [41] forms a basis for
Chapter 5, and the content of [73] forms a basis for the content of Chapter 8. In addition,









The goal of complexity theory is to provide mechanisms by which computational problems
may be classified in terms of the resources required to solve them. The resources measured
are usually time, and occasionally storage space. We now define some of the terminology
required.
An algorithm is a computational procedure which takes a variable input and terminates
with some output. If an algorithm follows the same execution path each time it is executed
with the same input, then we say that the algorithm is deterministic. By contrast, a
randomized algorithm’s execution path differs each time it is executed on the same input
since its decisions rely on a supply of random bits.
The running time of an algorithm on a particular input is the number of steps or
primitive operations executed before the algorithm terminates.
The worst-case running time of an algorithm is an upper bound on the running time
of an algorithm for any input. This is usually expressed as a function of the input size.
The expected running time of an algorithm is the average running time of an algorithm
over all inputs of a specific size. This is usually expressed as a function of the input size.
Since the exact running time of an algorithm is often difficult to derive, we often rely
on approximations of the running time. In particular, we often refer to the order of the
asymptotic upper bound of the running time of an algorithm using the big-O notation.
Definition 2.1 For two functions f(l) and g(l), we say that f(l) = O(g(l)) if there exists
a positive constant c and a positive integer lc such that for all l > lc, 0 ≤ f(l) ≤ cg(l).
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Two frequently used concepts in cryptology are the notions of negligible functions and
polynomial time algorithms. We define these as follows.
Definition 2.2 A function ²(l) is negligible in parameter l if for all c ≥ 0, there exists an
integer lc > 0 such that for all l > lc, ²(l) < l−c.
Definition 2.3 A polynomial time algorithm is an algorithm whose worst-case running
time is of the form O(lc) where l is the input size and c is a constant. An algorithm whose
running time cannot be bounded in this way is called a non-polynomial time algorithm.
In general, we regard polynomial time algorithms as being efficient, and non-polynomial
time algorithms as being inefficient. We call a problem that cannot be solved in polynomial
time intractable or infeasible.
The complexity of algorithms is always measured with respect to some parameter l.
For cryptographic algorithms, we call this parameter the security parameter. By manip-
ulating the size of this parameter, we can change the key lengths and group sizes of the
cryptographic scheme, and this in turn affects the security of the scheme.
2.1.2 Abstract Algebra
We let the set of natural number be denoted by N, and the set of integers be denoted by Z.
For any positive integer n, we denote the ring of integers modulo n by Zn = {0, 1, .., n−1}.
We denote the group of units of Zn (that is, elements relatively prime to n and therefore
having an inverse under multiplication) by Z∗n, and we denote by φ(n) the number of
integers in {1, .., n} that are relatively prime to n. The function φ is called the Euler
totient function.
We recall that if n is prime, then φ(n)=n−1, and if n = p.q where p and q are relatively
prime, then φ(n) = φ(p).φ(q).
Let G be a group with binary operation ∗.
Definition 2.4 The number of elements in group G is denoted by |G| and is called the
order of G. Group G is called finite if |G| is finite.
Definition 2.5 A group G is called cyclic if there exists an element g ∈ G such that for
each element a ∈ G, there exists an integer i such that a = gi. Such an element g is called
a generator of G.
Theorem 2.1 [106] If p is prime, then Z∗p is a cyclic group.
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If H is a non-empty subset of group G and H itself is a group, then we call H a
subgroup of G. If a ∈ G, then the set of all powers of a forms a cyclic subgroup of G and
is denoted by 〈a〉. If 〈a〉 = G, then a is a generator of G. The order of a ∈ G is defined to
be the least positive integer t such that at = 1. So if the order of a is t, then |〈a〉| = t. If
no such integer t exists then the order of a is defined to be ∞.
Theorem 2.2 (Lagrange) If G is a multiplicative group of order n, and a ∈ G, then the
order of a divides n.
Corollary 2.3 If G is a multiplicative group, and a ∈ G has order t, then the order of ak
is t/gcd(t, k).
Theorem 2.4 [106] If p is prime, then an integer α ∈ Z∗p is a generator of Z∗p if and only if
αφ(p)/q 6= 1 mod p for each prime divisor q of φ(p) and therefore Z∗p has φ(φ(p)) = φ(p−1)
generators.
Theorem 2.4 provides us with an efficient method for testing whether a given element
is indeed a generator for Z∗p if we know the factorization of p−1. For example, if p = 2q+1,
where p and q are prime, then φ(p) = p − 1 = 2q, and Z∗p has φ(2q) = φ(2).φ(q) = q − 1
generators. If α is a generator of Z∗p, then by Corollary 2.3, α2 has order q and therefore
generates the subgroup of Z∗p of order q.
2.1.3 The Discrete Logarithm and Diffie-Hellman Problems
We define here the computational problems on which the security of our cryptographic
schemes are based. We start by defining the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 2.6 We say that an algorithm ParamGen is a discrete logarithm (DL) param-
eter generator if, for input a security parameter l ≥ 1, ParamGen runs in polynomial time
and generates a prime q as well as the description of a finite cyclic group G of prime order
q. ParamGen outputs the description of group G.
We assume that the description of the group G contains the group order q. We also
assume that the group operations can be performed efficiently, group elements can effi-
ciently be sampled with uniform distribution, and that group membership and equality of
group members can be tested efficiently.
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Definition 2.7 Let G be a group of prime order q which was output by ParamGen(l), and
let g be a random generator of G. Given a random element a ∈ G, the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) in G is to find a w ∈ Zq such that a = gw.
Such a w is called the discrete logarithm of a in G, also denoted DL(a, g). We say that
an algorithm A has advantage ² in solving the DLP in G if
Pr[A(a, g) = DL(a, g)] ≥ ²
This probability is measured over the random choices of a, g ∈ G and the random inputs
of A, if any.
The DL assumption states that no polynomial time algorithm A has non-negligible
advantage (in l) in solving the DLP for G generated by ParamGen(l).
The Diffie-Hellman problem [87] is closely related to the DLP and is the basis for the
security of many cryptographic primitives.
Definition 2.8 Let G be a group of prime order q which was output by ParamGen(l), and
let g be a random generator of G. Given g and the random elements ga and gb in G, the
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) in G is to find gab ∈ G.
We say that an algorithm A has advantage ² in solving the CDHP in G if
Pr[A(ga, gb) = gab] ≥ ²
This probability is measured over the random choices of g, ga, gb ∈ G and the random
inputs of A, if any.
The CDH assumption states that no polynomial time algorithm A has non-negligible
advantage (in l) in solving the CDHP for G generated by ParamGen(l).
If we suppose that the DLP can be efficiently solved, then one can solve the CDHP
as follows. Given g and the random elements ga and gb in G, find a from ga by solving
the DLP, and then compute (gb)a = gab. Whether the two problems are in fact equiva-
lent remains unresolved in general, although they are known to be equivalent in certain
circumstances [20, 42, 45, 48, 80, 82].
Closely related to the CDHP are the decisional Diffie-Hellman and Gap Diffie-Hellman
problems.
Definition 2.9 Let G be a group of prime order q which was output by ParamGen(l), and
let g be a random generator of G. Given g and the random elements ga, gb and gc in G,
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) in G is to determine if gab = gc.
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Definition 2.10 Let G be a group of prime order q which was output by ParamGen(l).
The Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDHP) in G is to solve the CDHP in G given a hypo-
thetical polynomial time subroutine, or oracle, that solves the DDHP in G.
2.1.4 Additional Notation
We now define some additional notation and terminology that is used in this thesis.
Definition 2.11 Let a, b be integers. Then a divides b if there exists an integer c such
that b = ac. If a divides b, then this is denoted by a|b.
For any group G, we defined |G| to be the order (or size) of the group. Similarly, if X
is any set, then |X| denotes the number of elements in X, or the size of X.
We let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all bitstrings of unspecified length. For any string
s ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote the bitlength of s by |s| and we denote the concatenation of strings
s and t by s‖t. If s and t are not strings, then s‖t denotes the concatenation of the bit
representation of s and t in the appropriate endian.
2.2 Public Key Cryptography
2.2.1 Basic Terminology and Cryptographic Goals
We start by defining some basic terminology which we require when discussing cryptogra-
phy and its goals. An entity (or party) is someone or something which sends, receives or
manipulates information. It may be a person, or it may be some computing device.
When two parties communicate, we refer to the channel as the means of conveying
information from one entity to another. We call the legitimate transmitter of information
the sender, and the intended recipient of the information the receiver.
The objective of cryptography is to provide security for information using mathematical
techniques. This objective is usually broken down into four key goals:
• Confidentiality which is concerned with keeping data secret from all but those
authorized to access it.
• Data integrity which is concerned with being able to detect the manipulation of
data by unauthorized entities.
• Authentication which is related to identification, of both entities and data. It is
therefore subdivided into two classes: entity authentication, which is concerned with
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verifying the identity of entities, and data origin authentication, which is concerned
with verifying the origin of data (which implicity provides data integrity as well).
• Non-repudiation which is concerned with preventing entities from denying previ-
ous commitments or actions.
We now define some of the mechanisms used to achieve security goals or objectives.
Definition 2.12 A (cryptographic) scheme is a set of algorithms used to provide some
cryptographic service. For example, a signature scheme may be used to provide authenti-
cation.
Definition 2.13 A (cryptographic) protocol is a distributed algorithm defined by a se-
quence of steps specifying the actions required by two or more entities to achieve a specific
security objective.
Technically, all schemes can be called protocols, however we will reserve the term
protocol for mechanisms that specifically demand interaction (or communication) between
parties.
A cryptographic primitive is a basic tool used to provide some security functionality.
For example, a signature scheme may be used as a cryptographic primitive within some
protocol.
2.2.2 Key Infrastructures
The study of cryptography can be divided into the areas of symmetric cryptography and
asymmetric cryptography. Usually, entities that wish to securely communicate using cryp-
tographic techniques have to first share a secret key. The security of the communications
depends on this key, and the key has to be kept secret from all other entities for as long
as the communication is to remain secure.
A fundamental problem in symmetric key cryptography is that the secret keys must
be distributed between the relevant entities before secure communication can commence.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [50] revolutionized cryptography by providing a solution to
this problem via the notion of asymmetric cryptography, also known as Public Key Cryp-
tography (PKC).
In a public key setting, each entity I has two distinct keys, a public key PKI , and
a private key SKI , which the entity can generate locally. The private key must be kept
19
2.2 Public Key Cryptography
secret, but the public key can be widely distributed without compromising the secrecy of
the private key.
The fundamental idea of PKC is that, in order to securely communicate with an entity,
one need only know the public key of that entity. However before using a public key, one
must be entirely convinced that the public key does in fact belong to the correct entity.
So PKC transforms the problem of securely distributing secret keys into the problem of
distributing authentic public keys.
A security infrastructure designed to distribute and subsequently manage public keys is
called a public key infrastructure (PKI). The traditional method of distributing public keys
in an authentic manner is to use a trusted authority (TA). The most common approach
is for an entity to register their public key with the TA, who authenticates the entity and
attests to the authenticity of the public key by issuing a digital certificate binding the
entity’s identity with their public key. Such a TA is called a certification authority (CA).
An alternative approach to managing public keys is enabled by the use of identity-based
cryptography [18, 100]. In this environment, an entity’s public key is derived directly from
an entity’s identity (or identifying information, e.g. their email address), eliminating the
requirement for a certificate binding the entity’s identity to their public key. Although
certificates are no longer required, an entity must still contact a TA in order to obtain
their private key. The TA must authenticate the entity, generate the private key from the
given public key (or identity) and securely deliver the private key to the authenticated
entity. Such a TA is often referred to as a Key Generation Centre (KGC).
For the remainder of this thesis, we will assume that the public keys being used are
authenticated using some PKI.
2.2.3 Digital Signature Schemes
We now introduce the concept of a digital signature scheme, which is one of the most
important cryptographic primitives enabled by PKC. Digital signature schemes are the
focus of the first part of this thesis, and are fundamental in providing various cryptographic
services such as entity authentication, data origin authentication, data integrity, and non-
repudiation.
Informally, digital signature schemes provide a means by which entities can bind their
identity (or public key) to a piece of information (usually referred to as a message).
A digital signature scheme is defined via the following algorithms [87]:
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Setup(l): which takes as input security parameter l and outputs a set of parameters
params.
KeyGen(params): which takes as input the public parameters params and outputs a
public key PK and a private key SK.
Sign(m,SK): which takes as input a message m and a private key SK and produces a
signature σ for the message m.
Verify(m,PK, σ): which takes as input a message m, a public key PK and a signature σ,
and outputs either accept or reject.
Suppose that an entity I has public and private key pair 〈PKI , SKI〉. We say that
entity I signs a message m if I runs Sign on input (m,SKI) to produce a signature σI .
We then call σI entity I’s signature on message m.
If Verify outputs accept when run on input a message m, a public key PK and a
signature σ, then we say that σ is a valid signature for entity I on message m.
Informally, we require the following properties from a digital signature scheme:
1. Signatures produced by the Sign algorithm should be valid (that is, accepted by
Verify).
2. It should be computationally infeasible for any entity other than I to produce a valid
signature for I on any message m.
In particular, the second property is one of the requirements for a digital signature
scheme to provide non-repudiation. We will provide a more formal definition of security
for digital signature schemes after having introduced the topic of provable security.
2.3 Provable Security
It is very difficult to design secure cryptographic schemes. This is illustrated by the
number of cryptographic schemes that have been proposed over time and in which flaws
have subsequently been discovered. These flaws may be due to new attacks which were not
previously known, or simply due to inadequate security analysis on the part of the scheme’s
designers. It is therefore crucial to rigorously analyze a scheme for possible security flaws
before it is implemented and used in practice.
Traditionally, a cryptographic scheme was analyzed by constructing convincing argu-
ments that a scheme was immune to the best currently known attack methods because
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the resources required were greater than those of any reasonable attacker. Such analysis is
called heuristic analysis and schemes that survive such analysis are said to have heuristic
security.
However heuristic security is only a measure of security against currently known at-
tacks. It gives little assurance that a scheme is in fact secure since it cannot guarantee
that no previously undiscovered attack cannot compromise the scheme’s security.
In 1984, Goldwasser and Micali [61] introduced the paradigm of provable security and
lead the way for far more rigorous treatments of cryptographic schemes by developing
precise definitions and appropriate “models” of security for various cryptographic primi-
tives. Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [63] were the first to formalize a notion of security
for digital signature schemes. They also presented a scheme that satisfied their definition
under reasonable assumptions.
In order to analyze cryptographic primitives, we introduce some useful terminology.
An adversary or attacker of a cryptographic scheme is an entity which tries to defeat the
intended security objective of the scheme. A passive adversary is one which only monitors
communication channels. An active adversary is one which attempts to delete, add, or in
some way modify the transmissions on a channel. When reasoning about cryptographic
schemes under attack, the entities involved in such schemes, as well as the attacker(s) are
modelled as interactive Turing machines, which can be seen as abstractions of modern
computers. In general, these Turing machines are probabilistic, meaning that they have
access to a supply of random bits.
Giving a precise definition of security is an important step when analyzing the secu-
rity of a cryptographic scheme. Firstly, the objectives of the scheme need to be clearly
understood. Then we need to define what it means for the adversary to break the scheme,
that is, what the adversary’s goal is in attacking the scheme. Finally, we need to define
the adversarial model, or the resources to which the adversary has access when attacking
the scheme.
Once an appropriate definition of security has been formulated, a mathematical proof of
security for a given scheme can then be derived. This usually takes the form of a reduction:
assuming that a successful adversary of the scheme exists, then one shows that such an
adversary can be used to solve some underlying problem. If this problem is believed to be
intractable, then no such adversary can exist, and the scheme is assumed to be secure.
We note that a proof of security (for an appropriate definition of security) does not
guarantee security in an unconditional sense. Rather, it clearly identifies one or more
22
2.3 Provable Security
underlying assumptions (usually related to a well-studied problem) which must be violated
in order to subvert the security of the scheme. In addition, the security of a scheme is
usually only defined within certain bounds. For example, an attacker is usually assumed
to have clearly defined and polynomially limited resources. If these bounds are breached,
then the proof of security becomes inapplicable.
In the context of digital signature schemes, the goal of the adversary is to forge signa-
tures. However there are different criteria for what it means to break a signature scheme.
1. Total break: An adversary is able to produce signatures on arbitrary messages as
if he were the true signer. This is akin to recovering the private key of the signer.
2. Selective forgery: An adversary is able to produce a valid signature for a message
of his choice.
3. Existential forgery: An adversary is able to create a valid signature for at least
one message. In this case the adversary may have no control over the message
corresponding to the signature obtained.
An adversary may launch different types of attacks against a digital signature scheme
depending on the resources to which he has access. We distinguish between the following
types of attack:
1. Key only attack: An adversary knows only the signer’s public key.
2. Known message attack: An adversary has access to signatures on messages known
to the adversary, but not chosen by him.
3. Chosen message attack: An adversary has access to signatures on a chosen list
of messages before attempting to break the signature scheme. This attack is non-
adaptive since the adversary must choose the list of messages to be signed before any
of the signatures are obtained.
4. Adaptive chosen message attack: An adversary is able to use the signer as an
oracle, meaning that the adversary may request signatures on messages of his choice,
and these message may depend on the signer’s public key, on previous messages or
on previous signatures obtained.
The designers of digital signature schemes would like the security of their schemes to be
as strong as possible. This means that the scheme should resist even the weakest types of
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forgery against an adversary with the most resources. If this is the case, then the scheme
will certainly be secure against more serious forgeries by adversaries with more limited
resources. It is therefore common to evaluate the security of a digital signature scheme by
its resistance to existential forgeries under an adaptive chosen message attack.
We now present a formal definition for the security of a digital signature scheme.
2.3.1 Security Definition for Digital Signatures
Security for digital signature schemes is defined via the following two notions.
Correctness
A digital signature scheme is correct if, for any σ produced by running Sign on message m
and private key SK (where PK is the corresponding public key), then Verify(m,PK, σ)
outputs accept.
Unforgeability
We define the strongest notion of unforgeability for a digital signature scheme, namely
existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack [63]. This is defined via the
following game between a challenger C and an adversary E.
Initialization: C runs Setup on security parameter l to generate the public parameters
params. C also runs KeyGen to obtain a public key PK and a private key SK. C
gives the parameters params and the public key PK to E.
Sign: E may request a signature on any message m. C computes σ=Sign(m,SK), and
gives σ to E.
Output: E outputs a signature σ∗ and a messagem∗. E wins the game if Verify(m∗, PK, σ∗)
outputs accept, and no previous Sign query was made on m∗.
Definition 2.14 We say that a digital signature scheme is existentially unforgeable un-
der an adaptive chosen message attack if the probability of success of any polynomially
bounded adversary in the above game is negligible (as a function of the security parameter
l).
We notice that it is possible to obtain a slightly stronger definition of unforgeability
by extending the model presented above. In the unforgeability game presented above,
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we make the restriction (in the output conditions) that the adversary cannot have made
any previous Sign query on m∗. In the extended model, we could relax these conditions
by making the restriction that the signature σ∗ cannot previously have been output by a
Sign query on m∗. This modification means that an adversary could win the extended
unforgeability game by requesting signatures onm∗, and finally outputting a new signature
on m∗ which is different from those output from previous Sign queries on m∗. In the
extended model, this is considered to be a valid attack on the signature scheme.
If the digital signature scheme is deterministic, then such an attack is impossible, so in
this case, the two models of unforgeability are equivalent. However if the digital signature
scheme is non-deterministic, then there may be many valid signatures for each message,
and such an attack may be possible.
Although the extended model captures these additional attacks and therefore results in
a slightly stronger definition of unforgeability, we do not consider such attacks to be useful
since the attack does not commit the signer to any message to which he is not already
committed. We therefore choose to model the unforgeability of our signature schemes
in Chapters 3 to 5 in the model presented above. An additional advantage of using the
simpler model of unforgeability is that we are able to directly apply certain useful proof
techniques (e.g. the Forking Lemma, which is presented in Section 2.3.4), which in turn
enable simpler proofs of security.
2.3.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions (hereafter simply referred to as hash functions) play a fun-
damental role in cryptography. Hash functions create a short “fingerprint” of the input
data, and if the data is altered, in general the fingerprint will no longer be valid. In
this way, hash functions can be used to provide assurance of data integrity, and therefore
play a vital role in the construction of most signature schemes, as well as many other
cryptographic schemes and protocols.
Definition 2.15 A hash function H is an efficient algorithm that maps an input x of
arbitrary finite bitlength (i.e. x ∈ {0, 1}∗) to an output H(x) in a finite set D.
Since a hash function is a many-to-one function, the existence of collisions (that is,
pairs of inputs which map to the same output) is unavoidable. However for cryptographic
use, we require that such collisions are computationally difficult to find. The following
notions informally describe different levels of security for hash functions [87].
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Preimage resistance: For essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally in-
feasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., given any y for which
no corresponding input is known, it is infeasible to find any preimage x such that
H(x) = y.
2nd preimage resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any second input
which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given x, it is infeasible to find
a 2nd-preimage x′ 6= x such that H(x′) = H(x).
Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x,
x′ which hash to the same output, i.e., such that H(x) = H(x′). (Note that here
there is free choice of both inputs.)
The output set D of H is commonly the set of all strings of some fixed bitlength n, i.e.
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, and in this case, H acts as a compression function. However if the
output space D has a more complex structure (e.g. an algebraic group), then H may be
relatively complex, requiring intermediate mapping functions and deterministic encoding
operations. For example, in a particular application H may need to map arbitrary strings
to elements of a group G. Suppose G is a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q and let
g be a generator of G. Such a hash function may be constructed by using a standard hash
function to map the input to a bitstring representing an integer, reducing that integer
modulo p and then raising the result to the power (p− 1)/q modulo p.
In practice, it is very difficult to design secure hash functions, and recent work has
shown that many common hash functions are weaker than previously thought [15, 113,
114, 115, 116].
2.3.3 The Random Oracle Model
Hash functions play an important role in the design of many cryptographic schemes, and
therefore also have a major influence over the security of such schemes. Many crypto-
graphic primitives have efficient designs using hash functions, but in general it is very
difficult to obtain security arguments (or proofs of security) for such schemes.
If a hash function H is well designed, then it should be infeasible to compute H(x)
without evaluating H on x. This should be the case even if many other hash values
H(x1),H(x2), .. have been computed. Bellare and Rogaway [11] therefore advocated an
idealized model for hash functions, which attempts to capture the concept of an ideal hash
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function. This model is commonly referred to as the random oracle model, and involves
modelling hash functions as random functions.
In the random oracle model, hash functions are replaced by random oracles, which
output truly random values for each new input. Obviously, if the same input is submitted
to the random oracle twice, then identical outputs should be obtained. It is argued that
proofs of security in this model attest to the security of the overall scheme as long as the
hash function used has no weakness.
Proofs of security in the random oracle model are often far easier to construct than
proofs in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles), and we find that schemes
proven secure in the standard model tend to be less efficient than schemes that employ
hash functions and which can be proven secure in the random oracle model. The random
oracle model has therefore become a very popular tool in the construction of security
proofs for a variety of schemes.
Recent works [7, 60, 81, 90] have demonstrated that for certain schemes, proofs of
security in the random oracle model do not translate into security for the actual scheme
when the random oracle is instantiated by a hash function. However most of the examples
given use hash functions in a completely unnatural way, and it is unclear whether proofs
of security in the random oracle model are adequate in general. Despite doubts that have
been cast over the use of random oracles, proofs of security in the random oracle model
are still widely accepted.
2.3.4 Rewinding Oracles and the Forking Lemma
An example of a proof technique enabled by the random oracle model, we present a result
by Pointcheval and Stern [96] known as the Forking Lemma. This lemma is a useful tool
in constructing proofs of unforgeability for a large class of digital signature schemes.
Informally, the Forking Lemma applies to signature schemes that make use of a hash
function, which will be modelled as a random oracle. We assume that adversary E is a
polynomial time Turing machine which interacts with a random oracle and the challenger
of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1, and runs with some random tape which it uses
as its source of randomness.
The rationale for the Forking Lemma is that, if E has non-negligible probability η
of forging a signature σ in the unforgeability game, then by “rewinding” E and running
E again on the same random tape, but with a different random oracle, we can obtain a
second (related) forgery with non-negligible probability.
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There are two restrictions which apply when using the Forking Lemma. Firstly, the
model of unforgeability used should be equivalent to the one presented in Section 2.3.1.
Secondly, the digital signature scheme should be of a particular form, namely on input a
message M , the signature scheme should produce a signature of the form (r1, h, r2) where
r1 takes its value randomly from a large set, h is the hash of M and r1, and r2 depends
only on r1,M and h. In particular, no value r1 can appear with probability greater than
2/2l where l is the security parameter. We call such a digital signature scheme a generic
digital signature scheme.
If the two conditions above are met, then the Forking Lemma is as follows.
Lemma 2.5 (The Forking Lemma [96]): Suppose E is a polynomial time Turing
machine with input only public data which produces, in time τ and with probability
η ≥ 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ)/2l (where l is a security parameter) a valid generic signature
(M, r1, h, r2). Here µ is the number of random oracle (hash) queries made by E, and
µs is the number of signature queries made by E. Suppose also that triples r1,M, r2
are simulatable with indistinguishable probability distribution without knowledge of the
secret key. Then there exists an algorithm A, which controls E and replaces E’s interaction
with the signing oracle and random oracle by a simulation, and which produces two valid
generic signatures (M, r1, h, r2) and (M, r1, h′, r′2) such that h 6= h′ in expected time at
most τ ′ = 120686µsτ/η.
Since E may need to be “rewound” multiple times before outputting an appropriate
second forgery, we find that the expected time for E to produce two related forgeries is
much larger than τ . Details of the proof of the Forking Lemma can be found in [95, 96].
By examining the proof of the Forking Lemma in [96], we notice that the value r1 of
a generic signature scheme does not need to be chosen randomly from a large set, but
must be indistinguishable from a value chosen randomly from a large set. For instance,
r1 may depend on some public parameters (or even M) together with some value chosen
randomly from a large set. In addition, the computation of r2 may also depend on values
other than r1,M and h (e.g. r2 may also depend on public parameters or public keys). It
is also not necessary for r2 to be uniquely determined by r1,M and h.
Since none of the above modifications to the definition of a generic signature scheme
affect the proof of the Forking Lemma, we will include these modifications into the defini-
tion of a generic signature scheme and we will use this more general definition of generic
signature schemes in the rest of the thesis.
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2.3.5 The Non-Generic Forking Lemma
In Chapters 4 and 5, we will need to apply a modified version of the Forking Lemma
which we introduce now. Since we will need to apply the forking lemma to signature
schemes that do not exactly match the format required, we present a modified version
of the forking lemma for signature schemes which take as input an additional parameter,
which we denote T . The value T simply acts as a placeholder value, and has no real
affect on the proof of the forking lemma, but will be used in the security proofs of certain
non-standard digital signature schemes in later chapters.
This modified version of the Forking Lemma applies to digital signature schemes which
on input a message M and a value T produce signatures of the form (r1, h, r2). Here r1
randomly distributed in a large set, h is the hash of M and r1, and r2 depends on r1,M
and h. As before we require that no value r1 can appear with probability greater than
2/2l where l is the security parameter. We call such digital signature schemes non-generic
digital signature schemes.
The unforgeability model for non-generic (NG) signature schemes is identical to the
unforgeability model for generic signature schemes (presented in Section 2.3.1) except
that Sign queries take an additional value T as input. The analogous output conditions
require a valid signature for some M and T and forbid an adversary from making previ-
ous Sign queries on M,T . We call the resulting unforgeability model the NG signature
unforgeability model.
As in the more general definition of a generic signature scheme, the value r1 of an
NG signature scheme does not need to be chosen randomly from a large set, but must be
indistinguishable from a value chosen randomly from a large set. For instance, r1 may
depend on some public parameters (or even M and T ) together with some value chosen
randomly from a large set. We also explicitly allow the computation of r2 in a non-generic
signature scheme to depend on values other than r1,M and h (e.g. r2 may also depend on
public parameters or public keys). We also do not require r2 to be uniquely determined
by r1,M and h.
Lemma 2.6 (The NG Forking Lemma): Suppose E is a polynomial time Turing
machine with input only public data which produces, in time τ and with probability η ≥
10(µs+1)(µs+µ)/2l (where l is a security parameter) a valid NG signature (M,T, r1, h, r2)
(in the NG unforgeability model). Here µ is the number of random oracle (hash) queries
made by E, and µs is the number of signature queries made by E. Suppose also that
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tuples r1,M, T, r2 are simulatable with indistinguishable probability distribution without
knowledge of the secret key. Then there exists an algorithm A, which controls E and
replaces E’s interaction with the signing oracle and random oracle by a simulation, and
which produces two valid NG signatures (M,T, r1, h, r2) and (M,T ′, r1, h′, r′2) such that
h 6= h′ in expected time at most τ ′ = 120686µsτ/η.
Proof:
The proof of this lemma follows almost exactly the proof of Lemma 2.5 (Theorem 3 in
[96]), which is broken up into two steps. As in [96], we first require the following lemma
which deals with adversaries in a no-message attack (Theorem 1 in [96]).
Lemma 2.7 (The No-Message Attack NG Forking Lemma): Suppose E is a poly-
nomial time Turing machine with input only public data, and suppose that E produces,
in time τ and with probability η ≥ 7µ/2l (where l is a security parameter) a valid NG
signature (M,T, r1, h, r2), where µ is the number of random oracle (hash) queries made
by E. Then there exists an algorithm A, which controls E and which produces two valid
NG signatures (M,T, r1, h, r2) and (M,T ′, r1, h′, r′2) such that h 6= h′ in expected time at
most τ ′ = 84480µτ/η.
Proof: This lemma is proven in exactly the same way as Theorem 1 in [96] since the
changes in the structure of the signature (i.e. the differences between generic and non-
generic signatures) have no effect on the proof in [96]. ¤
As in the proof of Theorems 1 and 3 in [96], we consider an algorithm B such that
B executes E and responds to E’s random oracle queries. However in addition, in a
chosen-message attack, B must also answer E’s signature queries on input a message M
and a value T . However since tuples r1,M, T, r2 are simulatable with indistinguishable
probability distribution without knowledge of the secret key, B is able to adequately
answer these queries.
The rest of the proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 3 in [96] since once
again the structure of the non-generic signatures and Sign queries have no effect on the
proof, and the risk of random oracle collisions is exactly the same as before if no value r1
can appear with probability greater that 2/2l where l is the security parameter.
¤
We will require the NG version of the Forking Lemma to prove the security of certain
non-standard signature schemes in Chapters 4 and 5. As long as the signature scheme
can be rewritten in the appropriate form and the model of unforgeability (when rewritten
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in the appropriate form) is equivalent to the one presented in Section 2.3.1 (or the NG





The notion of ring signatures was first formalized by Rivest et al. [97]. A ring signature
specifies a set (or ring) of possible signers without revealing which member actually pro-
duced the signature. Ring signatures require no co-ordination between the ring members:
any member can choose any set of possible signers that includes himself and can sign any
message using his private key and the public keys of the other ring members.
Rivest et al. proposed various applications for ring signatures. A verifier of a particular
ring signature should be convinced that a member of the ring created the signature, but
cannot determine which of the ring members is the actual signer. Ring signatures therefore
provide an elegant and efficient way to leak information or secrets in an anonymous way.
Ring signatures can also be used as a building block to create group signature schemes
[38]. In fact, ring signature schemes had previously been generated for this purpose [26, 38],
but the distinct notion of ring signatures was only distilled in [97].
Since it is impossible to distinguish which ring member actually produced a particular
ring signature, we find that the actual signer (and in fact all the ring members) can deny
having produced the signature. Ring signatures therefore do not have the property of
non-repudiation.
3.2 Preliminaries
We call a set of possible signers a ring. We call the ring member who actually produced
a specific signature the signer and each of the other ring members are called non-signers.
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3.3 Ring Signature Definitions
We now define a (1 out of n) ring signature scheme. We assume that each member I of
the ring possesses a public and private key pair (PKI , SKI) from some digital signature
scheme, and that each member is associated with their public key via some PKI or certifi-
cate. This public key defines this member’s signature scheme and specifies his verification
key. We denote the corresponding private key as SKI .
Definition 3.1 A ring signature scheme is defined via the following algorithms:
RingSign: (m,R, sig, SKsig) which produces a ring signature σ for the message m, given
the list of public keys R = {PK1, PK2, .., PKn} which constitute the ring, and the
private key SKsig of the member in position sig in R (who is the signer).
RingVerify: (m,R, σ) which takes as input a message m, a list of public keys R, and a
signature σ, and outputs either accept or reject.
We note that in addition to the above algorithms each member I will have a key
generation algorithm (and possibly some setup algorithm) to set up the public and private
key pair (PKI , SKI). However these algorithms are specific to each member and must be
run before an entity can be a ring member, so we do not consider them as part of the ring
signature definition.
We also note that the size of the ring (n) may vary for each ring signature produced.
In other words, the number of public keys taken as input by RingSign may vary each time
the algorithm is run.
3.3.1 Related Work
We note that a ring signature scheme is set-up free, meaning that the signer does not
require any assistance or co-ordination with other ring members in order to generate a
ring signature. He only needs to know their public keys. This also means that the public
keys of the various ring members need not be of the same type. Such a ring signature
scheme is called separable.
Some ring signature schemes (e.g. [2, Appendix A]) require that the public keys of all
ring members be related. For example, they may all require the same public parameters,
and in this case, explicit initialization algorithms would be required. For such schemes,
a Setup algorithm would be required to generate the necessary public parameters from
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a security parameter, and a KeyGen algorithm would be required to generate public and
private keys from the public parameters. The public parameters would also be taken as
input to RingSign and RingVerify. Such a ring signature scheme is called non-separable
and can offer some efficiency advantages over separable ring signature schemes.
The concept of ring signatures has also been extended to the identity-based setting by
Zhang and Kim [117] and also by Herranz and Sa´ez [66]. Bresson et al. [25] introduce the
concept of threshold ring signature schemes, where instead of a single signer being able to
create a ring signature for a ring of size n, a threshold number of signers (say t ≤ n) must
cooperate to create a ring signature.
In [65], Herranz and Sa´ez formalize the notion of generic ring signature schemes, and
provide some techniques for proving the security of such schemes. Informally, they provide
a version of the Forking Lemma [96] adapted for ring signatures and use this to analyze
the security of certain schemes.
3.4 Security Model
The security of ring signature schemes is defined via the following notions.
3.4.1 Correctness
A ring signature scheme is correct if, for anym,σ where σ was output by RingSign on input
m, a list of public keys R = {PK1, PK2, .., PKn} and secret key SKsig (sig ∈ {1, .., n}),
then RingVerify(m,R, σ) outputs accept.
3.4.2 Anonymity
Anonymity ensures that it is impossible to distinguish which member of a ring has gener-
ated a given signature, and is defined via the following game between a challenger C and
an adversary E.
Initialization: C firstly generates a set S = {(PKi, SKi)}n(l)i=1 of public and private keys
using key generation algorithms of its choosing, where n is a polynomial function of
the security parameter l, and gives this set to E. The set of public keys is set to be
R = {PKi}n(l)i=1 .
Challenge: E finally produces a message m, and a ring R ⊆ R. C chooses some PKsig
at random from R, computes σ=RingSign(m,R, sig, SKsig), and gives σ to E.
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Output: E outputs some PKj ∈ R. E wins the game if PKsig = PKj .
Definition 3.2 We say that a ring signature scheme is anonymous if no polynomially
bounded adversary has advantage non-negligibly greater than 1/R of winning in the above
game. We say that a ring signature scheme is perfectly anonymous if all adversaries have
probability exactly 1/R of winning the above game.
3.4.3 Unforgeability
Unforgeability ensures that no-one other than a ring member can create a valid ring sig-
nature for that ring. Unforgeability is defined via the following game between a challenger
C and an adversary E.
Initialization: C firstly generates a set S = {(PKi, SKi)}n(l)i=1 of public and private keys
using key generation algorithms of its choosing, where n is a polynomial function of
the security parameter l, and the list of public keys R = {PKi}n(l)i=1 is given to E.
RingSign Queries: E may request a signature on any message m, for any ring R ⊆ R,
with any public key PKsig ∈ R. C computes σ=RingSign(m,R, sig, SKsig), and
gives σ to E.
Corrupt Queries: E may request the private key SKi corresponding to any public key
PKi.
Output: E finally outputs a message m∗, a ring R∗ ⊆ R, and a signature σ∗. E wins
the game if RingVerify(m∗, R∗, σ∗) outputs accept, no public key PK ∈ R∗ has been
corrupted, and no previous RingSign query was made on m∗ and R∗.
Definition 3.3 We say that a ring signature scheme is unforgeable if the probability of
success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible.
3.4.4 Notes on the Security Definitions for Ring Signatures
Anonymity: This definition of anonymity is very strong since the adversary knows the
private keys of all members of the ring. We present this definition since it appears
to be the strongest definition of anonymity, and the concrete ring signature scheme
that we present later in this chapter is able to meet this definition.
Many papers in the literature do not rigorously define what they mean by anonymity,
and those that do often propose weaker notions of anonymity. Bender et al. [14]
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give a good overview of different definitions although they do not consider the def-
inition above. Weaker definitions restrict the adversary’s access to the private keys
of members of the ring R.
Unforgeability: Our definition of unforgeability is also stronger than usual. In particu-
lar, we allow the adversary to make Corrupt queries on all public keys except those
involved in the forged ring signature. We also allow the adversary to stipulate which
private key it wishes to be used when making a RingSign query even though, if the
ring signature scheme is anonymous, it should make no difference to the adversary
which private key is used to generate the ring signature.
We include these additional adversarial resources in our model of unforgeability in
order to make our security definitions as strong as possible, and also to ensure that
our models of security for ring signatures are compatible with models of security for
other cryptographic schemes presented in later chapters.
3.5 A Concrete Scheme
Since we only require a non-separable ring signature scheme in later chapters, we present
the non-separable ring signature scheme of [2, Appendix A] which is defined by the fol-
lowing algorithms.
Setup: For some security parameter l, let p and q be large primes, where q|(p − 1). Let
G be a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q and let g be a generator of G. We
also assume that H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq is a cryptographic hash function. The public
parameters are params = 〈p, q, g,H〉.
KeyGen: This algorithm takes as input public parameters params = 〈p, q, g,H〉. A private
key x is chosen at random from Z∗q , and the corresponding public key is computed
as X = gx mod p.
RingSign: Given a message m, a list of public keys R = {X1, X2, .., Xn}, and a private
key xsig which corresponds to a public key Xsig in position sig of R, select random
t, hi ∈ Zq for i = 1, .., n, i 6= sig, and compute
z = gtΠni=1,i 6=sigX
hi
i mod p
h = H(X1, .., Xn,m, z)
hsig = h− (h1 + ..+ hsig−1 + hsig+1 + ..+ hn) mod q
s = t− xsig · hsig mod q
The signature is σ = 〈s, h1, .., hn〉.
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RingVerify: Given a message m, a list of public keys R = {X1, X2, .., Xn}, and a signature
σ = 〈s, h1, .., hn〉, compute
h = H(X1, .., Xn,m, gsXh11 · · ·Xhnn mod p)
h′ =
∑n
i=1 hi mod q.
If h = h′ then output accept, otherwise output reject.
We notice that the 1-party version of the ring signature scheme above is in fact equiva-
lent to the Schnorr signature scheme [99]. The Schnorr signature scheme was proven to be
unforgeable in [96] (using the Forking Lemma presented in Section 2.3.4), and we will show
that the unforgeability of this ring signature scheme in fact relies on the unforgeability of
the Schnorr signature scheme.
3.6 Security of the Concrete Scheme
Proofs of security for the above scheme are omitted in [2]. However work in later chapters
relies on the security of this scheme, so we now present security results for the above ring
signature scheme.
Theorem 3.1 The ring signature scheme presented in Section 3.5 is perfectly anonymous
assuming that H is a random oracle.
Proof: Consider any ring signature σ = 〈s, h1, .., hn〉 produced by RingSign on input
a message m, a list of public keys R = {X1, X2, .., Xn}, and a private key xsig which
corresponds to a public key Xsig in position sig of R.
Each hi for i 6= sig is selected randomly from Zq, so these values are distributed
uniformly at random in Zq. Now hsig depends on an output from H, but since H is a
random oracle, the outputs ofH are distributed uniformly at random overG, and therefore
hsig is uniformly distributed over Zq. Since s depends on randomly selected t, s also has
uniform distribution on Zq.




hi mod q = H(X1, .., Xn,m, gsXh11 · · ·Xhnn mod p)
However this equation holds for all valid signatures and the inputs all have equal
distributions, so any two valid signatures generated by RingSign on R and m are indistin-
guishable, irrespective of which private key was used in each case. Therefore no adversary
has advantage greater than 1R of winning the anonymity game of Section 3.4.2. ¤
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We note that if we assume that the outputs of H are only computationally indistin-
guishable from random, then our concrete ring signature is anonymous (but not perfectly
anonymous).
Theorem 3.2 The ring signature scheme presented in Section 3.5 is unforgeable, assuming
the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature scheme [99].
Proof:
Suppose that H is a random oracle and there exists an algorithm E that makes at
most µ queries to the random oracle H, at most µs RingSign queries, and wins the
unforgeability game of Section 3.4.3 in time at most τ with non-negligible probability η
in the security parameter l. We now show that there exists an algorithm B that uses E,
and which has a non-negligible chance of forging a Schnorr signature.
Unforgeability for a Schnorr signature scheme is defined in the same way as unforge-
ability for a standard digital signature scheme in Section 2.3.1. Since B attempts to forge
a Schnorr signature, we assume that B in turn interacts with a challenger C in the un-
forgeability game of Section 2.3.1. Since the Schnorr signature scheme is essentially the
same as the 1-party version of our ring signature scheme, the algorithms Setup and KeyGen
for the two schemes are identical. C therefore initializes the unforgeability game in the
same way as a challenger in the unforgeability game for ring signatures, except that C
only generates a single public and private key pair 〈X,x〉. C gives B the public key X
and the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, and access to the random oracle H.
C will also answer B’s Sign queries on any messageM , and will respond with a Schnorr
signature σ′ = 〈s′, h′〉 where h′ = H(M, gs′Xh′). We note that the message M may be of
any form and of any length.
B in turn initializes an unforgeability game (for ring signatures) for E. B gives the
public parameters params = 〈p, q, g〉 to E. B also sets the number of participants to be
n(l), where n is a polynomial function of the security parameter l, and picks a random
j ∈ {1, .., n(l)}. B generates a set S = {(Xi, xi)}n(l)i=1,i6=j of public and private keys using
KeyGen. B sets public key Xj = X, and the list of public keys R = {Xi}n(l)i=1 is given to
E. B now simulates a challenger for E by simulating all the queries which E can make as
follows:
H-Queries: B passes all of E’s random oracle queries to C and returns C’s response to
E.
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RingSign Queries: E may request a signature on any message m, for any ring R where
R = {X1, .., Xk} ⊆ R, and with any public keyXsig ∈ R. IfXj /∈ R then B computes
σ=RingSign(m,R, sig, xsig) and outputs σ. The running of RingSign requires a single
call to the random oracle H.
If Xj ∈ R then B sets message M = X1, .., Xk,m, makes a Sign query on M to
C, and receives a response σ′ = 〈s′, h′〉. For each Xi ∈ R where Xi 6= Xj , B
picks a random value hi ∈ Zq. B computes hj = h′ −
∑
i6=j hi mod q and s =
s′ −∑i6=j xihi mod q. B sets σ = 〈s, h1, .., hk〉 and outputs σ.
Corrupt Queries: E can make a Corrupt query on any public key Xi. If Xi = Xj , then
B aborts and terminates E. Otherwise B returns the appropriate private key xi.
Output: On termination, with non-negligible probability E outputs a signature σ∗ = 〈s∗,
h∗1, .., h∗k〉, a ring R∗ = {X∗1 , .., X∗k} ⊆ R and a messagem∗, where RingVerify(m∗, R∗,
σ∗) outputs accept, and no previous RingSign query was made on m∗ and R∗.
If Xj /∈ R∗ then B aborts. Otherwise we assume that Xj ∈ R∗, which occurs with
probability |R∗|/n (and in this case, B would not have had to abort on any Corrupt
query since E cannot have corrupted any public key in R∗).






i mod q and sets h
′′ = h∗j . B outputs σ
′′ = 〈s′′, h′′〉 as
a forgery to C on message M = X∗1 , .., X∗k ,m
∗. Since σ∗ is a valid ring signature, σ′′ is a
valid Schnorr signature, and since E made no previous RingSign query on m∗ and R∗,
B made no previous Sign query on M .
Therefore B has forged a Schnorr signature in time τ and with non-negligible proba-
bility η′ = η|R∗|/n, making at most µs Sign queries and at most µ + µs random oracle
queries.





Verifier Proofs and Their
Applications
4.1 Introduction
Undeniable signatures were first presented in 1989 by Chaum and van Antwerpen [37], and
were designed to have the property that signatures could be freely distributed, but were not
self-authenticating. More precisely, undeniable signatures should not be verifiable without
the cooperation of the signer. However, any party wrongly accused of having produced
the signature can deny his involvement. The true signer may prove his authorship of
an undeniable signature by running a confirmation protocol with a verifier, and a falsely
implicated signer may deny his involvement by running a denial protocol with a verifier.
The confirmation (and possibly also the denial) proofs must be non-transferable, mean-
ing that they must be convincing only to the intended recipient. A verifier should not be
able to pass on (or transfer) the proof to other parties, since otherwise the signature can
be verified without the cooperation of the signer. Obviously, only the true signer should
be able to successfully complete a confirmation protocol. Moreover the true signer should
be unable to successfully complete a denial protocol for any of his signatures. Therefore
the true signer cannot deny having produced his signatures.
The confirmation and denial protocols for the undeniable signature scheme of [37]
were made zero-knowledge in [35], and this goes some way to ensuring that the signer has
control over who can verify an undeniable signature. However, as was pointed out in [49],
even though the confirmation protocol is zero-knowledge, the signer may still not always
be able to control who is able to verify the validity of a signature if a group of verifiers
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cooperate. The undeniable signature scheme in [37] is also vulnerable to a blackmailing
attack [68]. Jakobsson et al. [70] provided a solution to such attacks, called designation
of verifiers, to ensure that only a specified verifier can confirm an undeniable signature.
Informally, a designated verifier (DV) proof is a proof of correctness of some “state-
ment” that either the prover or some designated verifier could have produced. If the prover
created the proof, then the “statement” is correct. However a designated verifier can sim-
ulate a valid proof without a correct “statement”. Therefore since a third party cannot
determine whether a given DV proof was generated by the prover or by the designated
verifier, they cannot determine whether the corresponding “statement” is correct or not.
A DV proof should convince the designated verifier of the correctness of the “state-
ment” since the designated verifier knows that he did not create the proof himself, and
therefore the proof must have been generated by the prover. However no other party will
be convinced of the validity of the proof since the designated verifier could have simulated
it. In the context of undeniable signatures, a DV proof can be used to convince (only)
the designated verifier of the validity of the undeniable signature. We refer to undeni-
able signature schemes that use DV proofs as their confirmation and denial proofs as DV
undeniable signatures.
Although the authors of [70] did not give a formal definition of DV proofs, they provided
concrete examples of such proofs. The construction of DV proofs in [70] used trapdoor
commitment schemes [24]. It was also shown there that the DV proofs could be made
non-interactive. Such proofs are called NIDV proofs and can in turn be used to construct
NIDV undeniable signatures. However a flaw in the concrete NIDV proof of [70] was
recently discovered by Wang [112], whereby a cheating signer can create a “non-standard”
undeniable signature which the signer can prove valid via the NIDV confirmation proof
and later deny via the denial proof. Wang proposed two ways to repair the scheme of [70],
but did not offer any proofs of security.
For normal undeniable signature schemes, unforgeability and invisibility (or anonymity)
are usually considered to be the key notions of security. As for the security of confirmation
and denial proofs, the literature suggests that most authors have been content to simply
prove that they are zero-knowledge and sound. This may suffice for the case where zero-
knowledge confirmation and denial proofs are used, but it is unclear whether these notions
of security are satisfactory for NIDV confirmation and denial proofs.
A concept related to DV proofs is what is commonly referred to as DV signatures
[75, 77, 98]. DV signature schemes and DV proofs are commonly confused in the liter-
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ature, although they are quite distinct notions. Informally, a DV signature can be seen
as an NIDV proof, but instead of proving the validity of some statement (e.g. that a
certain undeniable signature is valid), it is simply associated with some message. DV
signatures retain the property of non-transferability (that we find with DV proofs) since
a DV signature could have been created by the signer or by the designated verifier.
Some authors have proposed formal definitions [75, 77] and security notions [77] for
DV signatures. It has also been noted that in fact secure two-party ring signatures satisfy
the definition of DV signatures and that the security requirements for DV signatures and
ring signatures are essentially the same [75, 98].
In Section 4.2 we present a formal definition for NIDV proof systems which we believe
are of independent interest. Our formal definition is compatible with the concrete scheme
of [70]. In Section 4.3 we propose a formal model of security for NIDV proof systems.
In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 we present a formal definition for NIDV undeniable signature
schemes as well as a security model which models the security of both the core signature
scheme and the NIDV confirmation and denial proof systems with which it is composed.
Essentially, two NIDV proof systems are required to construct an NIDV undeniable sig-
nature scheme. The NIDV proof systems are for complementary languages, one providing
confirmation proofs and the other denial proofs for the core signature scheme.
We go on to repair the NIDV proofs of [70], producing secure NIDV proof systems
suited to combination with the full domain hash variant of Chaum’s undeniable signature
scheme [35, 37]. The NIDV proofs we obtain are actually a little shorter than those in
[70]. Our work confirms that one of the fixes proposed by Wang [112] does indeed repair
the NIDV proofs of [70]. The result is a concrete and efficient NIDV undeniable signature
scheme.
For completeness, in Sections 4.8 and 4.9 we provide a formal definition of DV sig-
natures as well as a security model for DV signatures which closely follows our model of
security for ring signatures in Section 3.4.
We also discuss how DV signature schemes can be constructed from both 2-party ring
signature schemes and NIDV proofs, and we give a concrete example demonstrating how
one of our concrete NIDV proofs may be modified to create a DV signature scheme. The
chapter concludes with some open problems and ideas for further extensions of our work.
Our work in this chapter represents the first time that a formal security model for
NIDV undeniable signatures has been developed. The model does not require the signature
scheme to be randomized. It is also a multi-party model, reflecting the fact that designated
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verifier proofs naturally involve more than one party (and therefore involve more than one
secret keys), and that a party may play different roles at different times. For example, an
entity A may generate NIDV proofs for some designated verifier B, and at the same time
be a recipient of an NIDV proof (i.e. play the role of designated verifier) from B. It is
therefore important to model such interaction and interchanging of roles in the security
model.
We consider NIDV proofs and NIDV undeniable signatures separately. One reason
for doing so is that, in any application, undeniable signatures may exist independently of
proofs. For example, a prover may generate a signature as a commitment to a message but
only later provide an NIDV proof of its correctness, or a prover may generate many proofs
for different designated verifiers on the same signature. A second reason is that NIDV
proofs may also be useful in contexts other than undeniable signatures. One possible
application of NIDV proofs is to deniable proofs of knowledge, in particular, proofs of
knowledge of a private key. For example, when registering a public key with certification
authority C, A could demonstrate knowledge of the appropriate private key by presenting
C with an NIDV proof of knowledge of the private key of A.
4.1.1 Related Work and Notions
As we mentioned before, there is some confusion in the literature between DV proofs,
NIDV proofs and DV signatures, and these terms are often used interchangeably. In much
of the literature on DV signature schemes [75, 77, 98], the authors ascribe the term DV
signatures to [70] and describe the concrete NIDV undeniable signature scheme of [70] as
a DV signature scheme. In fact, this terminology was never used in [70]. Despite this
incorrect association, the works of [75, 77, 98] are in fact concerned with DV signatures.
Although most authors do acknowledge that unforgeability and non-transferability are
necessary properties for a secure DV signature scheme, most authors do not formalize these
notions. Lipmaa et al. [77] are the first to examine the security properties of DV signature
schemes more formally. In their work, they formalize and extend the attack of Wang [112]
on [70] to DV signatures. They then propose two additional security properties which are
required for secure DV signatures, namely non-delegatability and non-disavowability. In
Section 4.9.4 we contrast our model of security with theirs and discuss how the notions of
non-delegatability and non-disavowability relate to our security definitions.
Another related notion is that of strong designated verifier (SDV) proofs and signatures
[70, 98, 109], which provide stronger security guarantees than DV signatures and NIDV
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proofs. SDV signatures provide similar properties to DV signatures except that only the
designated verifier is able to verify the signatures produced, since the verification algorithm
makes use of the private key of the designated verifier. By contrast, DV signatures (and
NIDV proofs) are universally verifiable, but only convincing to the designated verifier.
Another notion is that of universal designated verifier (UDV) signatures [75, 104, 105].
Although at first glance these appear to be similar to NIDV undeniable signatures, they
are quite different. UDV signature schemes produce signatures which are universally
verifiable. However any party in possession of a valid UDV signature on message M from
signer S can provide (to any verifier of their choice) a designated verifier proof that they
possess a valid UDV signature on M by S. In comparison, NIDV undeniable signatures
are not universally verifiable, and only the signer is able to produce designated verifier
proofs of a signature’s validity.
4.2 NIDV Proofs
We now present a formal definition for NIDV proof systems. This formal definition was
previously lacking in [70] but our definitions are compatible with the concrete scheme of
[70].
Unless explicitly stated, we will denote the public key of a participant I by XI , and
the private key of I by xI . P will in general represent a prover, and V a verifier.
A non-interactive designated verifier (NIDV) proof system is defined with respect to
some family of languages L. The goal of an NIDV proof system is to prove the membership
of elements e in a language L ∈ L. An NIDV proof system consists of the following
algorithms:
Setup(l): A probabilistic algorithm which takes a security parameter l as input and re-
turns the system parameters params and a description of a family of languages L.
Amongst the public parameters params are descriptions of the following spaces: a
public key space PK, a private key space SK, an element space E and a proof space
P. E contains all elements e ∈ L for all languages L ∈ L.
KeyGen(params): A probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters
params and returns a key pair (x,X) where x ∈ SK is a private key and X ∈ PK
is the corresponding public key.
PGen(XP , XV , xP , e): A (possibly probabilistic) proof generation algorithm which takes
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as input XP , XV ∈ PK, XP 6= XV , xP ∈ SK, and e ∈ E , and produces an NIDV
proof pi ∈ P for e.
PVerify(XP , XV , e, pi): A verification algorithm which takes as inputXP , XV ∈ PK, XP 6=
XV , e ∈ E and pi ∈ P, and outputs accept or reject.
Note that we parameterize the languages L ∈ L by public keys, and for any public key
X ∈ PK, L(X) ⊆ E . This parametrization will be needed for the proof systems required
for use with undeniable signatures, but is not necessary in general.
4.3 Security for NIDV Proofs
We say that an NIDV proof system is secure if it satisfies the notions of correctness,
non-transferability and soundness. These are defined as follows.
4.3.1 Correctness
An NIDV proof system is correct if when PGen is run on any input 〈XP , XV , xP , e〉 where
XP , XV ∈ PK, XP 6= XV , xP ∈ SK, e ∈ L(XP ), and outputs some pi ∈ P, then PVerify on
input 〈XP , XV , e, pi〉 outputs accept.
4.3.2 Non-transferability
We say that an NIDV proof system is non-transferable if there exists a polynomial time
algorithm FakePGen that on input a tuple 〈XP , XV , xV , e′〉, where XP , XV ∈ PK, XP 6=
XV , xV ∈ SK, e′ ∈ E , but where e′ is not necessarily in L(XP ), produces a proof pi′ ∈ P
such that 〈XP , XV , e′, pi′〉 is accepted by PVerify. In addition, if pi is produced by PGen
when run on inputs 〈XP , XV , xP , e〉 where e ∈ L(XP ), then if e and e′ are indistinguish-
able, then the distributions of proofs pi′ and pi must be polynomially indistinguishable.
4.3.3 Soundness
Soundness of an NIDV proof system is defined via the following game between a challenger
C and an adversary E:
Initialize: C firstly runs Setup for a given security parameter l to obtain the public
parameters params, and a description of a family of languages L. C runs KeyGen
to generate the public and private keys XI and xI for each participant, where the
number of participants is bounded by n, where n is a polynomial function of l. We
45
4.3 Security for NIDV Proofs
define the set of all participants’ public keys to be X . E is given params,L and X
while C retains the private keys.
E can make the following types of query to the challenger C:
EGen Queries: E can request an element of a particular language (or its complement).
On input a public key XI and a bit b (and possibly some seed), if b = 1 then C
outputs an element e ∈ L(XI), otherwise C outputs an element e /∈ L(XI).
PGen Queries: E can request an NIDV proof for input 〈XP , XV , e〉 where XP , XV ∈ X ,
XV 6= XP and e ∈ E . C runs PGen(XP , XV , xP , e) to produce an NIDV proof pi ∈ P.
If PVerify(XP , XV , e, pi) outputs accept then C outputs pi. Otherwise C outputs
invalid.
FakePGen Queries: E can request a fake NIDV proof on input 〈XP , XV , e′〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , and e′ ∈ E . C runs FakePGen(XP , XV , xV , e′) to produce
an NIDV proof pi′ ∈ P. C outputs pi′.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key XI ∈
X . C outputs the corresponding private key xI .
Output: Finally E outputs 〈X∗P , X∗V , e∗, pi∗〉, where X∗P , X∗V ∈ X , X∗P 6= X∗V , X∗V is
uncorrupted, e∗ ∈ E and pi∗ ∈ P. E wins if 〈X∗P , X∗V , e∗, pi∗〉 is accepted by PVerify,
no FakePGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V , e∗〉, and either:
1. X∗P is uncorrupted and no PGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V , e∗〉, or
2. e∗ /∈ L(X∗P ).
Definition 4.1 We say that an NIDV proof system is sound if the probability of success
of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible (as a function of
the security parameter l).
4.3.4 Notes on the Security Definitions for NIDV Proof Systems
Non-transferability: The existence of FakePGen that can be run by V to create an
NIDV proof for any element e (not necessarily in L) ensures that no-one besides V
will be convinced by an NIDV proof for e.
We note that we do not require the elements e and e′ to be indistinguishable for non-
transferability; rather only the proofs pi and pi′ are required to be indistinguishable.
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If an outside party can already distinguish elements in L(XP ) from elements not in
L(XP ), then they have no need of NIDV proofs for L(XP ). However an NIDV proof
for an element e should not give any extra information regarding e to parties other
than the designated verifier.
Soundness: The soundness definition guarantees that if an uncorrupted verifier receives
a valid NIDV proof, then it was created using the private key xP and e ∈ L(XP ).
So a prover cannot cheat. Soundness also guarantees that no-one other than P
can convince an uncorrupted designated verifier that e ∈ L(XP ). In the context of
undeniable signatures, this means that a verifier must cooperate with the real signer
in order to verify an undeniable signature since no-one other than the real signer is
able to produce an NIDV proof of a valid undeniable signature that will be accepted
by an uncorrupted designated verifier.
Although not immediately obvious, the soundness definition also guarantees that
if PGen is run on 〈XP , XV , xP , e〉 where e /∈ L(XP ), and outputs some pi ∈ P,
then PVerify on input 〈XP , XV , e, pi〉 outputs reject. If this is not the case, then
E could generate an element e /∈ L(XP ), generate a proof pi using PGen which is
accepted by PVerify, and output pi. E would win the game since e /∈ L(XP ). This
observation, together with the correctness property, means that an entity with public
key XP can determine whether an element e is in L(XP ) or not by running PGen on
〈XP , XV , xP , e〉 for some XV and then PVerify. PVerify outputs accept if and only if
e ∈ L(XP ). This is in fact used when answering PGen queries.
We note that EGen queries allow E to stipulate some “seed” to be used. This is
necessary in the context of undeniable signatures where EGen queries correspond
to signature queries, and the message to be signed corresponds to the seed.
The existence of FakePGen from Section 4.3.2 also enables C to answer FakePGen
queries. We consider it important to model such queries since an adversary may
have access to such “fake” NIDV proofs that are produced by dishonest verifiers
using FakePGen.
The model for soundness is multiparty, reflecting the fact that NIDV proofs naturally
involve more than one party, and that a party may play different roles at different
times.
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4.4 NIDV Undeniable Signatures
As mentioned earlier, the main application of NIDV proofs has historically been in unde-
niable signatures, even though the current security models for undeniable signatures (in
particular the definitions of soundness) do not to support NIDV proofs. We now present
a formal definition for NIDV undeniable signature schemes.
Definition 4.2 An NIDV undeniable signature scheme consists of a core signature scheme
as well as NIDV confirmation and denial proof systems. The core signature scheme consists
of the following algorithms:
Setup(l): A probabilistic algorithm which takes a security parameter l as input and returns
the system parameters params. Amongst the public parameters are descriptions of
the following spaces: a public key space PK, a private key space SK, a message
space M and a signature space S.
KeyGen(params): A probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters
params and returns a key pair (x,X) where x ∈ SK and X ∈ PK.
USign(x,m): A (possibly probabilistic) signature generation algorithm which on input
x ∈ SK,m ∈M, produces an undeniable signature σ ∈ S.
The core signature scheme defines a language L(X) for each public key X, where L(X) =
{(m,σ) : σ = USign(x,m)}. In other words, L(X) is the language of all possible valid
message and signature pairs for public key X and L(X) is the language of all invalid
message and signature pairs for public key X. The family of languages L is defined as
L = {L(X) : X ∈ PK} and L is defined as L = {L(X) : X ∈ PK}.
The families of languages L and L parameterize the confirmation and denial proofs.
The confirmation proof is an NIDV proof system C for L, and the denial proof is an NIDV
proof system D for L. The setup algorithms for C and D use the public key space PK, the
private key space SK, and set the element space E to be M×S. The proof spaces for C
and D are denoted PC and PD respectively. The following algorithms then make up the
confirmation and denial proofs.
ConfGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ): A confirmation proof generation algorithm which, on input
XP , XV ∈ PK,XP 6= XV , xP ∈ SK, (m,σ) ∈ E runs PGen of C on 〈XP , XV , xP , (m,σ)〉.
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ConfVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, piC): A confirmation proof verification algorithm which, on in-
put XP , XV ∈ PK, XP 6= XV , (m,σ) ∈ E and piC ∈ PC runs PVerify of C on
〈XP , XV , (m,σ), piC〉.
DenyGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ): A denial proof generation algorithm which, on inputXP , XV ∈
PK, XP 6= XV , xP ∈ SK, (m,σ) ∈ E runs PGen of D on 〈XP , XV , xP , (m,σ)〉.
DenyVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, piD): A denial proof verification algorithm which, on input XP ,
XV ∈ PK,XP 6= XV , (m,σ) ∈ E and piD ∈ PC runs PVerify ofD on 〈XP , XV , (m,σ),
piD〉.
4.5 Security for NIDV Undeniable Signatures
In analyzing the security of NIDV undeniable signatures, we consider the security of the
confirmation and denial proofs being used, and their composition with the core signature
scheme.
Definition 4.3 The confirmation (denial) proof of an NIDV undeniable signature is secure
if C (respectively D) is a secure NIDV proof system for L (respectively L). That is, C
(respectively D) is correct, non-transferable and sound.
4.5.1 The Security of the Core Signature Scheme
The security of the core signature scheme is defined via the notions of unforgeability and
invisibility.
4.5.1.1 Unforgeability
Unforgeability of an NIDV undeniable signature scheme is defined via the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary E:
Initialize: C firstly runs Setup for a given security parameter l to obtain the public
parameters params. C runs KeyGen to generate the public and private keys XI and
xI for each participant, where the number of participants is bounded by n, where n
is a polynomial function of l. We define the set of all participants’ public keys to be
X . E is given params and X while C retains the private keys.
E can make the following queries to the challenger C:
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USign Queries: E can request an undeniable signature for input 〈XI ,m〉 where XI ∈ X ,
and m ∈M. C takes the private key xI corresponding to XI and runs USign(xI ,m)
to produce σ ∈ S, where xI is the private key corresponding to XI . C outputs σ.
Conf/Deny Queries: E can request a confirmation or denial proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉
where XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈ M and σ ∈ S. C takes the private key xP
corresponding to XP and proceeds as follows. C runs ConfGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to
produce an NIDV proof piC ∈ PC . If ConfVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, piC) returns accept,
then C outputs piC . Otherwise C runs DenyGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to produce an
NIDV proof piD ∈ PD which it outputs. C informs E which case has occurred.
FakeConf Queries: E can request a fake confirmation proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉
where XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M and σ ∈ S. C takes the private key xV corre-
sponding toXV and runs FakePGen of the NIDV proof system C on 〈XP , XV , xV , (m,σ)〉
to produce an NIDV proof piC ∈ PC , which C outputs.
FakeDeny Queries: E can request a fake denial proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M and σ ∈ S. C takes the private key xV correspond-
ing to XV and runs FakePGen of the NIDV proof system D on 〈XP , XV , xV , (m,σ)〉
to produce an NIDV proof piD ∈ PD, which C outputs.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key XI ∈
X . C outputs the corresponding private key xI .
Output: Finally E produces X∗I ∈ X , m∗ ∈M and σ∗ ∈ S, where X∗I is uncorrupted and
no USign query was previously made on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉. E wins the game if (m∗, σ∗) ∈
L(X∗I ).
Definition 4.4 We say that an NIDV undeniable signature scheme is unforgeable if the
probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negli-
gible in l.
4.5.1.2 Invisibility
Invisibility of an NIDV undeniable signature scheme is defined via the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary E:
Initialize: This is as in the Unforgeability game above.
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Phase 1: The adversary can make USign, Conf/Deny, FakeConf, FakeDeny and
Corrupt queries, and these are all answered as in the Unforgeability game.
Challenge: E produces m∗ ∈ M, X∗I ∈ X , where X∗I is uncorrupted. In addition, if the
USign algorithm is deterministic, then E should not have previously made a USign
query on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉 in Phase 1. C chooses a random bit β and if β = 0, C sets σ∗ = r
where r is randomly chosen from S, otherwise C sets σ∗=USign(x∗I ,m∗). C gives σ∗
to E.
Phase 2: Again E can make queries as in Phase 1, except that E cannot corrupt X∗I
and E cannot make a Conf/Deny query on 〈X∗I , XV ,m∗, σ∗〉 for any XV . If the
signature algorithm USign is deterministic, E is also forbidden from making aUSign
query on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉.
Output: Finally E outputs a bit β′ and wins the game if β′ = β.
Definition 4.5 We say that an NIDV undeniable signature scheme is invisible if the
difference between the success probability of any polynomially bounded adversary and
1/2 in the above game is negligible in l.
Definition 4.6 We say that an NIDV undeniable signature scheme is secure if the con-
firmation and denial NIDV proofs systems C and D with which it is composed are secure,
and the core signature scheme is unforgeable and invisible.
4.5.2 Notes on the Security Definitions for Undeniable Signatures
Correctness: Although we do not explicitly define correctness for NIDV undeniable sig-
natures, correctness is ensured by the correctness of proof systems C and D.
Unforgeability: Our model of unforgeability differs from security models for normal un-
deniable signatures in two main ways. Firstly it is multiparty due to the multiparty
nature of the NIDV confirmation and denial proofs. Secondly, we allow the adver-
sary to make FakeConf and FakeDeny queries. We consider these to be necessary
since an adversary may conceivably have access to such “fake” proofs produced by
dishonest designated verifiers.
In answering Conf/Deny queries, C can determine whether a given message and
signature pair (m,σ) is in the language L(XP ) or not by generating an NIDV proof
that (m,σ) ∈ L(XP ) using ConfGen. The resulting proof will be accepted by Con-
fVerify if and only if (m,σ) ∈ L(XP ). This is guaranteed by the soundness of the
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underlying NIDV proof. Alternatively, if USign is deterministic, then C could run
USign to generate the unique signature σ′ on m and compare this to σ. In this case
(m,σ) ∈ L(XP ) if and only if σ = σ′.
Invisibility: We use the notion of invisibility in our model of security rather than anonymity.
Anonymity for NIDV undeniable signatures, which could be defined in a similar way
to [55], captures the notion that an adversary cannot determine which of two possi-
ble signers created a given undeniable signature. Analogous results to those in [55]
would show that our definition of invisibility implies anonymity for NIDV undeniable
signatures and so is the stronger notion. Moreover, we feel that the stronger defini-
tion of invisibility is appropriate for NIDV undeniable signatures since we model the
existence of fake NIDV proofs and their corresponding (possibly fake) signatures.
This means that random (invalid) signatures (with corresponding NIDV proofs) can
appear in the adversary’s game, and these should be indistinguishable from true
signatures (and their corresponding NIDV proofs). Therefore true signatures should
be indistinguishable from random strings, which corresponds to the stronger notion
of invisibility.
Determinism: Our definitions of unforgeability and invisibility encompass both deter-
ministic and non-deterministic undeniable signatures. In either case, signers can
identify their own valid signatures using ConfGen and ConfVerify.
We note that in the deterministic case, invisibility actually implies unforgeability,
since an adversary who can forge signatures can trivially win the invisibility game.
However for randomized signatures, these properties are distinct. We keep the prop-
erties distinct when proving the security of a deterministic undeniable signature
scheme later in the paper because it simplifies the proof process. We first prove
unforgeability of our concrete scheme and then use this result to simplify the proof
of invisibility, thus avoiding a single, highly complex proof.
However it should be noted that deterministic schemes have distinct weaknesses,
and that in practice, non-deterministic undeniable signature schemes should always
be used. Although the scheme presented in the next section is deterministic, it can
easily be made non-deterministic by adding a random salt into the hash function
and distributing the random salt with the signature.
Overall security: We argue that the definition of security that we present for NIDV
undeniable signatures does indeed capture the security properties that we require
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for NIDV undeniable signatures.
Unforgeability guarantees that no-one can forge undeniable signatures without the
appropriate private key, and invisibility guarantees that no-one can verify a given
undeniable signature (or associate it with a certain public key) without the assistance
of the signer.
When interacting with the signer, the soundness of the confirmation proof ensures
that it is convincing. In other words, if the confirmation proof is valid, then the un-
deniable signature was indeed created by the signer. However the non-transferability
of the confirmation proof guarantees that the verifier cannot prove the authorship
of the undeniable signature to a third party.
When falsely accused of creating a given undeniable signature, the denial proof
allows a party to deny having created an undeniable signature. The soundness of
the denial proof ensures that it is convincing. In other words, if the denial proof is
valid, then the undeniable signature was not created by the accused party. However
the non-transferability of the denial proof guarantees that the verifier cannot prove
this to a third party.
4.6 A Concrete NIDV Undeniable Signature Scheme
We present the full domain hash variant of the undeniable signature scheme of Chaum
[35] with NIDV confirmation and denial proofs.
4.6.1 The Core Signature
Setup(l): For some security parameter l, let p and q be large primes, where q|(p − 1).
Let G be the multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q and let g be a generator of
G. We also assume that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G is a cryptographic hash function. We
set PK = S = G, M = {0, 1}∗ and SK = Z∗q . The public parameters params are
〈p, q, g,H1〉 as well as descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M and S.
KeyGen(params): To set up a user’s public and private keys, the private key x is chosen
at random from Z∗q , and the corresponding public key is X = gx mod p.
USign(xI ,m): On input xI ∈ Zq, and m ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute σ = H1(m)xI mod p, and
output σ.
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4.6.2 The Confirmation and Denial Proofs
The USign algorithm defines a language L(XI) = {(m,σ) : σ = USign(xI ,m)} for
each public key XI . For the above signature scheme, we can write L(XI) = {(m,σ) :
DL(σ,H1(m)) = DL(xI , g) in G}. In other words, L(XI) is the language of all possible
message and signature pairs (m,σ) where the discrete logarithm of σ to the base H1(m)
equals the discrete logarithm of XI to the base g modulo p. The family of languages L is
defined as L = {L(XI) : XI ∈ G}.
We can now define confirmation and denial proofs with respect to the languages L(XI).
Confirmation proof: The confirmation proof requires a secure NIDV proof system C for
L. Informally, C must prove the equality of two discrete logarithms (EDL).
Denial proof: The denial proof requires a secure NIDV proof system D for L. Informally,
D must prove the inequality of two discrete logarithms (IDL).
4.6.3 A Concrete NIDV EDL Proof System
The NIDV proof we present is a modification of the scheme of Jakobsson et al. [70]. The
modification repairs a flaw in the original proof, which was discovered by Wang [112].
Since our NIDV EDL proof will be used with the above undeniable signature scheme,
the Setup algorithm will be identical to that in Section 4.6.1 except that in addition we
require another cryptographic hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, and we define the spaces
E = M × S and P = Z4q . KeyGen will be exactly as in Section 4.6.1. The family of
languages will be defined by the USign algorithm of the concrete scheme as described
above in Section 4.6.2. We still need to define the PGen and PVerify algorithms.
NIDV EDL PGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , xP ∈ SK, m ∈
M and σ ∈ S, the algorithm picks random w, r, t ∈ Zq and computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gt mod p
D = H1(m)t mod p
h = H2(c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV )
d = t− xP (h+ w) mod q
The algorithm outputs pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉.
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NIDV EDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , message m ∈
M, signature σ ∈ S, and proof pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉 ∈ P, the algorithm computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gdX(h+w)P mod p
D = H1(m)dσ(h+w) mod p
and verifies that h = H2(c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV ). If the last equation holds, then the
algorithm outputs accept, otherwise it outputs reject.
Comparison to the scheme of Jakobsson et al.
The main difference is that we include the values σ, XP and XV in the input of H2. Our
proof pi also has one less element than the NIDV EDL proof of [70].
4.6.4 A Concrete NIDV IDL Proof System
Our denial proof is an NIDV version of the proof of inequality of discrete logarithms in
[28].
Our Setup and KeyGen algorithms are as above in Section 4.6.3 for the NIDV EDL
proof scheme except that now P = G× Z4q .
NIDV IDL PGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , xP ∈ SK,





The algorithm then constructs a designated verifier proof to demonstrate knowl-
edge of some α and β such that C = H1(m)ασ−β mod p and 1 = gαXP−β mod p.
The algorithm sets α = xP t mod q and β = t, picks random w, r, r1, r2 ∈ Zq and
computes:
C = H1(m)ασ−β mod p
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gr1(XP )−r2 mod p
D = H1(m)r1σ−r2 mod p
h = H2(C, c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV )
d1 = r1 − α(h+ w) mod q
d2 = r2 − β(h+ w) mod q
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The algorithm outputs pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 as the NIDV proof to verifier V that
DL(σ,H1(m)) 6= DL(XP , g).
NIDV IDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , m ∈ M, σ ∈ S,
and pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 ∈ P. The algorithm first checks that C 6= 1. If C = 1,
then the algorithm outputs reject and halts. Otherwise it computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gd1X−d2P mod p
D = Ch+wH1(m)d1σ−d2 mod p
and verifies that h = H2(C, c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV ). If the last equation holds, then
the algorithm outputs accept, otherwise it outputs reject.
4.7 Security of the Concrete Scheme
4.7.1 Security of the NIDV EDL proof system
Theorem 4.1 The NIDV EDL proof system of Section 4.6.3 is correct.
Proof: It is trivial to verify that if NIDV EDL PGen is run on input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m, σ〉
where (m,σ) ∈ L(XP ) and produces a proof pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉, then NIDV EDL PVerify on
input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ, pi〉 will output accept. ¤
Theorem 4.2 The NIDV EDL proof system of Section 4.6.3 is non-transferable.
Proof: We define algorithm NIDV EDL FakePGen as follows. On input 〈XP , XV , xV ,m, σ′〉,
where XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , xV ∈ SK, m ∈ M and σ′ ∈ E , NIDV EDL FakePGen
produces proof pi′ ∈ P as follows:
NIDV EDL FakePGen chooses random d′, α, β ∈ Zq and calculates:




D′ = H1(m)d(σ′)−β mod p
h′ = H2(c′, G′, D′,m, σ′, XP , XV )
w′ = β − h′ mod q
r′ = (α− w′)x−1V mod q
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NIDV EDL FakePGen outputs pi′ = 〈w′, r′, h′, d′〉. It is easy to check that 〈XP , XV ,m, σ′,
pi′〉 will be accepted by NIDV EDL PVerify. We now show that pi′ is indistinguishable from
any pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉 produced by running NIDV EDL PGen on input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m, σ〉.
Examining the proof pi′ output by NIDV EDL FakePGen and a proof pi produced by
running NIDV EDL PGen on input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m, σ〉, we find that:
• Since r is chosen randomly from Zq, and r′ depends on the random value α, r and
r′ are uniformly distributed in Zq, and therefore indistinguishable.
• Since w′ depends on the random value β ∈ Zq and w is chosen randomly from Zq,
w and w′ are uniformly distributed in Zq and therefore indistinguishable.
• Since d′ is chosen randomly from Zq and d depends on the random value t ∈ Zq, d
and d′ are uniformly distributed in Zq and therefore indistinguishable.
In proof pi (respectively pi′), w, r and d (respectively w′, r′ and d′) are independent
since each depends on a randomly chosen value (or is randomly chosen itself). Now h and
h′ are both outputs from the same hash function on indistinguishable inputs (if (m,σ)
and (m,σ′) are indistinguishable), therefore h and h′ are indistinguishable, and the distri-
butions of pi and pi′ are indistinguishable. ¤
In order to analyze the soundness of our NIDV EDL proof, we first need to introduce
a related non-generic (NG) signature scheme. We recall that generic signature schemes
are simply digital signature schemes (as defined in Section 2.2.3) that take a certain
form (which is described in Section 2.3.4). In addition, we recall from Section 2.3.5 that
NG signature schemes are identical to generic signature schemes except that instead of
generating signatures on a message M , NG signature schemes take an additional value T
as input when generating or verifying a signature.
Our concrete NG signature scheme is defined as follows.
• The Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those of the concrete NIDV EDL
scheme except that the hash function H1 is not required.
• The Sign algorithm for some public key X ∈ PK takes as input a message M where
M may be of one of two forms:
1. M = m,σ,X,XV where (m,σ) ∈ L(X) and XV ∈ PK. The signing algorithm
also has as inputs a value T ∈ G and the private key x ∈ SK corresponding to
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X. The algorithm runs in an identical way to NIDV EDL PGen(X,XV , x,m, σ)
except that T replaces H1(m) in producing a proof pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉. The algo-
rithm sets r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and r1 = gwXrV mod p, gdXh+wP mod p, T dσh+w mod p,
and outputs σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
2. M = m,σ,XP , X where m ∈ M, σ ∈ S and XP ∈ PK. The signing algorithm
also has as inputs a value T ∈ G and the private key x ∈ SK corresponding toX.
The algorithm runs in an identical way to NIDV EDL FakePGen(XP , X, x,m, σ)
except that T replaces H1(m) in producing a proof pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉. The algo-
rithm sets r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and r1 = gwXrV mod p, gdXh+wP mod p, T dσh+w mod p,
and outputs σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
• The Verify algorithm on input M = m,σ,XP , XV , a value T ∈ G and a signature
σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where XP = X or XV = X and r2 = 〈w, r, d〉, sets pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉
and runs in an identical way to NIDV EDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi) except that T
replaces H1(m) in the verification process.
Security for NG signature schemes is defined in the same way as security for digital
signature schemes (in Section 2.3.1) except that the model is adapted to accommodate
the additional value T . We refer to the above scheme as the NIDV EDL NG signature
scheme.
Theorem 4.3 The NIDV EDL proof system is sound in the random oracle model assum-
ing the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in G.
Proof: We suppose that H1 and H2 are random oracles and there exists a polynomial
time algorithm E that makes at most µi queries to the random oracles Hi, i = {1, 2}, at
most µp PGen and µf FakePGen queries, and wins the soundness game of Section 4.3.3
in time τ with non-negligible probability η′ (in security parameter l) where the number
of participants is bounded by ρ. We assume that η′ > 10ρ(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l where
µs = µp + µf .
In Step 1 of the proof, we show how E can be used to construct an algorithm B
that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2, at most µs Sign queries to its
challenger C, and wins the NG version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1 for
the NIDV EDL NG signature scheme in time at most τ with non-negligible probability
η = η′/ρ where η > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
In Step 2 of the proof, we then replace C with an algorithm C ′ that uses B to solve
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the discrete logarithm problem in G. Step 2 of the proof will make use of Lemma 2.6, the
NG Forking Lemma.
Step 1 We will show that there exists an algorithm B that uses E to forge an NIDV
EDL NG signature with non-negligible probability when interacting with a challenger C
in the NG version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1.
The challenger C initializes the NG unforgeability game for B and gives B the public
key X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P, and
access to the random oracle H2.
B can make H2 as well as Sign queries on any message M = m,σ,XP , XV (where
m ∈ M, σ′ ∈ S, XP , XV ∈ PK, and XP = X or XV = X), and a value T ∈ G. B
must eventually output a message M∗, a value T ∗, and an NIDV EDL NG signature
σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins the game if 〈M∗, T ∗, σ∗NG〉 is accepted by Verify and no Sign
query was previously made on M∗, T ∗.
In order to win the above game, B in turn simulates an NIDV soundness game for E.
NIDV Soundness Simulation:
B gives the parameters 〈g, p, q〉 and the descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P to
E. B generates a set of participants U , where |U | = ρ(l) and ρ is a polynomial function
of the security parameter l. For some random participant J , B sets XJ = X, and for each
I 6= J , B runs KeyGen to generate a private key xI and public key XI . We define the set
of all participants’ public keys to be X . E is given X .
B now simulates the challenger by simulating all the queries which E can make as
follows:
H1-Queries: E can query the random oracle H1 at any time. B simulates the random
oracle by keeping a list LH1 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉. When the oracle is queried with an
input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, B responds as follows:
1. If the string str is already in LH1 in the tuple 〈str = stri, ri〉, then B outputs
gri mod p.
2. Otherwise B selects a random r ∈ Zq, outputs gr mod p and adds 〈str, r〉 to
LH1 .
H2-Queries: E can query any string str on the H2 oracle. If str = r1,M where r1 ∈ G3
and M = m,σ,XP , XV where m ∈ M, σ ∈ S, XP , XV ∈ X and XV 6= XP , then B
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first queries m on H1. B then simulates the H2 oracle by passing all H2 queries to
C and passing C’s response back to E.
EGen Queries: E can request an element of a particular language L(XI) (or its com-
plement). On input a public key XI , a bit b and message m ∈ M, B proceeds as
follows. If XI 6= XJ then B runs USign(xI ,m) to produce a signature σ ∈ S such
that (m,σ) ∈ L(XI). If XI = XJ then B queries m on the H1 oracle and receives
some gri as response. B retrieves the value ri from LH1 and sets σ = X
ri
I mod p. If
b = 1 then B outputs 〈m,σ〉, otherwise B picks a random σ′ ∈ S where σ′ 6= σ and
outputs 〈m,σ′〉. Since USign is deterministic, if σ′ 6= σ, then (m,σ′) /∈ L(XI).
PGen Queries: E can request an NIDV EDL proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M and σ ∈ S.
B queries m on H1 and receives some H1(m) = gri . B retrieves the value ri from
LH1 and computes σ
′ = XriP mod p. If σ
′ 6= σ then B outputs invalid.
If σ′ = σ and XP 6= XJ , then B runs NIDV EDL PGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to produce
a proof pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉, and B outputs pi to E.
If σ′ = σ and XP = XJ , then B sets M = m,σ,XP , XV and T = H1(m) and makes
a Sign query to C on M and T . C responds with an NIDV EDL NG signature
σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈w, r, d〉. B sets pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉 and outputs pi to E.
FakePGen Queries: E can request a fake NIDV EDL proof on input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ′〉
where XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M, and σ′ ∈ S.
If XV 6= XJ then B runs NIDV EDL FakePGen(XP , XV , xV ,m, σ) to produce a proof
pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉, and B outputs pi to E.
If XV = XJ then B setsM = m,σ,XP , XV and T = H1(m) and makes a Sign query
to C on M and T . C responds with an NIDV EDL NG signature σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉
where r2 = 〈w, r, d〉. B sets pi = 〈w, r, h, d〉 and outputs pi to E.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key XI ∈
X . If XI = XJ , then B aborts and terminates E. Otherwise B returns the appro-
priate private key xI .
Output: Finally E outputs 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗, pi∗〉, where X∗P , X∗V ∈ X , X∗P 6= X∗V , X∗V
is uncorrupted, m∗ ∈ M, σ∗ ∈ S and pi∗ ∈ P. E wins if 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗, pi∗〉
is accepted by PVerify, no FakePGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉, and
either:
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1. X∗P is uncorrupted and no PGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉, or
2. (m∗, σ∗) /∈ L(X∗P ).
B takes E’s output pi∗ where pi∗ = 〈w∗, r∗, h∗, d∗〉, and sets M∗ = m∗, σ∗, X∗P , X∗V ,
T ∗ = H1(m∗) and σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉 where
r∗1 = g
w∗X∗V
r∗ mod p, gd
∗
X∗P




and r∗2 = 〈w∗, r∗, d∗〉.
B outputsM∗, T ∗ and σ∗NG to C. If E satisfied output condition 1, then E never made
any FakePGen or PGen queries on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉. If E satisfied output condition 2
then E never made any FakePGen queries on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉 and B would have output
invalid for any PGen queries on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉 E had made. In either case, B never




The only way that E could detect an inconsistency in the game is if B aborts or if B
incorrectly answers any PGen query. We therefore have to check that B’s simulation of
these queries is indistinguishable from that output by a real challenger.
We notice that any PGen query on 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 will output invalid if and only if
(m,σ) /∈ L(XP ). We therefore need to check that if algorithm NIDV EDL PGen is run
on 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 to produce a proof pi, then 〈XP , XV ,m, σ, pi〉 will be accepted by NIDV
EDL PVerify if and only if (m,σ) ∈ L(XP ).
The correctness of the NIDV EDL scheme guarantees that if (m,σ) ∈ L(XP ) then
NIDV EDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi) will output accept. It is also trivial to verify that if
(m,σ) /∈ L(XP ) then NIDV EDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi) will output reject. We leave the
details to the reader. Therefore E can detect no inconsistency in B’s simulation of an
NIDV soundness game unless B aborts.
The probability that B does not have to abort, E wins the game, and that either
X∗V = XJ , or X
∗
P = XJ , is η
′/ρ, which is non-negligible in security parameter l if η is. In
this case, B would not have had to abort, and B wins the NG unforgeability game with
probability η = η′/ρ making at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2, and at most
µs = µp + µf Sign queries to C.
Step 2 We now define an algorithm C ′ that replaces B’s challenger C and uses B to
solve the discrete logarithm problem in G. C ′ will simulate the random oracle H2 and
the challenger in an NG unforgeability game with B. C ′’s goal is to solve the discrete
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logarithm problem on input 〈g,X, p, q〉, that is to find x ∈ Zq such that gx = X mod p,
where g is of prime order q modulo prime p and generates group G.
NG Unforgeability Simulation:
C ′ initializes the NG unforgeability game for B as follows. C ′ gives B the public key
X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P as they are
defined in NIDV EDL Setup, and access to the random oracle H2.
C ′ now simulates all the queries which B can make as follows:
H2-Queries: B can query the random oracle H2 at any time. C ′ simulates the random
oracle by keeping a list LH2 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉. When the oracle is queried with an
input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, C ′ responds as follows:
1. If the string str is already in LH2 in the tuple 〈str = stri, ri〉, then B outputs
ri.
2. Otherwise B selects a random r ∈ Zq, outputs r and adds 〈str, r〉 to LH2 .
Sign Queries: C ′ will also answer Sign queries made by B. All of B’s queries are on
messages M = m,σ,XP , XV where XP = X or XV = X, and values T ∈ G. C ′
picks random w, r, h ∈ Zq and computes
r1 = gwXrV mod p, g
dXh+wP mod p, T
dσh+w mod p.
C ′ constructs the string str = r1,M , and adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 . C ′ then
sets r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 which it outputs to B.




P = X or
X∗V = X, a value T
∗ and an NIDV EDL NG signature σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins
the game if 〈M∗, T ∗, σ∗NG〉 is accepted by Verify and no Sign query was previously
made on M∗, T ∗.
Since H2 is a random oracle, C ′ can simulate NIDV EDL NG signatures that are indistin-
guishable from true NIDV EDL NG signatures, so B can detect no inconsistency in the
game.
From Step 1, we know that B that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle
H2, at most µs = µp + µf Sign queries, and wins the above game in time at most τ with
non-negligible probability η = η′/ρ where η > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
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By Lemma 2.6, (the NG Forking Lemma), C ′ can rewind B (and therefore also E)
with the same random coins and repeat its simulation with a different random oracleH2 so
that B outputs another NG signature σNG = 〈r∗1, h, r2〉 onM∗ = m∗, σ∗, X∗P , X∗V , together
with a value T , where h 6= h∗, r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and
r∗1 = g
wX∗V
r mod p, gdX∗P
h+w mod p, T dσ∗h+w mod p.
However we know that in Step 1, B was constructed in such a way that T ∗ = H1(m∗)
and T = H1(m∗) where H1 is simulated by B. In each case B is run on the same
random coins and therefore simulates H1 in the same way until the H2 query on r∗1,M∗ =
m∗, σ∗, X∗P , X
∗
V is made. Therefore since B will always query m
∗ on H1 before making the
corresponding H2 query on r∗1,M∗, we know that T ∗ = T .














∗+w∗) = T ∗dσ∗(h+w) mod p. (4.3)
We now need to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether E wins the
NIDV soundness game (simulated by B) by satisfying output condition 1 or 2. If E wins
the game by satisfying condition 1, then we say that E is a Type-1 adversary, otherwise
we say that E is a Type-2 adversary.
Case 1. We suppose that E is a Type-1 adversary. In this case, X∗P and X
∗
V were
both uncorrupted in the NIDV soundness game, and we could have that X∗P = X or that
X∗V = X. We now consider two subcases, depending on whether r
∗ 6= r or r∗ = r. If
r∗ 6= r then if X∗V = X then C ′ can solve (4.1) for the discrete logarithm of X∗V = X. The
probability that X∗V = X is 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen randomly from X and we know
that X∗V = X or X
∗
P = X. If r
∗ = r, then w∗ = w. If X∗P = X then since h
∗ 6= h we have
that h∗ + w∗ 6= h + w, so C ′ can solve (4.2) for the discrete logarithm of X∗P = X. The
probability that X∗P = X is 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen randomly from X and we know
that X∗V = X or X
∗
P = X.
Case 2. We suppose that E is a Type-2 adversary. In this case, we know that X∗V is
uncorrupted and that (m∗, σ∗) /∈ L(X∗P ). Since X∗V is uncorrupted we could have that
X∗V = X. As in Case 1, if r
∗ 6= r and X∗V = X then C ′ can solve (4.1) for the discrete
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logarithm of X∗V = X. The probability that X
∗
V = X is at least 1/2 since XJ = X
was chosen randomly from X and we know that X∗V = X or X∗P = X. If r∗ = r, then
w∗ = w. But since h∗ 6= h we can rewrite equations (4.2) and (4.3) as X∗P = g
d−d∗
h∗−h and
σ∗ = T ∗
d−d∗
h∗−h . But this contradicts our assumption that (m∗, σ∗) /∈ L(X∗P ).
In cases 1 and 2, since the NG Forking Lemma produces a second appropriate signa-
ture with expected time at most τ ′ = 120686µsτ , we find that C ′ can solve the discrete
logarithm problem in time at most τ ′ and with probability at least η/2. If η′ is non-
negligible, then η is also non-negligible, and this contradicts the hardness of the discrete
logarithm problem. Therefore no algorithm B as defined in Step 1 can have non-negligible
probability of winning the NG unforgeability game, and in turn no polynomially bounded
adversary E can have non-negligible probability of winning the soundness game of Section
4.3.3. ¤
4.7.2 Security of the NIDV IDL proof system
Theorem 4.4 The NIDV IDL proof of Section 4.6.4 is correct.
Proof: It is trivial to verify that if NIDV IDL PGen is run on input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m, σ〉
where (m,σ) /∈ L(XP ) and produces a proof pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉, then NIDV IDL PVerify
on input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ, pi〉 will output accept. ¤
Theorem 4.5 The NIDV IDL proof of Section 4.6.4 is non-transferable.
Proof: We define algorithm NIDV IDL FakePGen as follows. On input 〈XP , XV , xV ,m, σ′〉,
where XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , xV ∈ SK, m ∈ M and σ′ ∈ E , NIDV IDL FakePGen
produces proof pi′ ∈ P as follows:
NIDV IDL FakePGen chooses random y′ ∈ Z∗q , and checks that H1(m)y
′ 6= σ′. If
H1(m)y
′
























h′ = H2(C ′, c′, G′, D′,m, σ′, XP , XV )
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w′ = s′ − h′ mod q
r′ = (u′ − s′ + h′)x−1V mod q
NIDV IDL FakePGen outputs pi′ = 〈C ′, w′, r′, h′, d′1, d′2〉. It is easy to check that
〈XP , XV ,m, σ′, pi′〉 will be accepted by NIDV IDL PVerify. We now show that pi′ is in-
distinguishable from any pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 produced by running NIDV IDL PGen on
input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m, σ〉.
Examining proofs pi′ and pi we find that:
• C and C ′ are both computed as some power of H1(m) multiplied by σ−1 mod p, all
to some random power in Z∗q , and are therefore indistinguishable.
• Since w is chosen randomly from Z∗q , and w′ depends on the random value s′ ∈ Z∗q ,
w and w′ are uniformly distributed in Z∗q and therefore indistinguishable.
• Since r is chosen randomly from Z∗q , and r′ depends on the random value u′ ∈ Z∗q , r
and r′ are uniformly distributed in Z∗q and therefore indistinguishable.
• Since d1 depends on the random value r1 ∈ Z∗q , and d′1 is chosen randomly from Z∗q ,
d1 and d′1 are uniformly distributed in Z∗q and therefore indistinguishable.
• Since d2 depends on the random value r2 ∈ Z∗q , and d′2 is chosen randomly from Z∗q ,
d2 and d′2 are uniformly distributed in Z∗q and therefore indistinguishable.
In proof pi (similarly pi′), C,w, r, d1 and d2 (similarly C ′w′, r′, d′1 and d′2) are indepen-
dent since each depends on a randomly chosen value (or is randomly chosen itself). Now
h and h′ are both outputs from the same hash function on indistinguishable inputs (if
(m,σ) and (m,σ′) are indistinguishable), therefore h and h′ are indistinguishable, and the
distributions of pi and pi′ are indistinguishable. ¤
As for the NIDV EDL proof, in order to analyze the soundness of the NIDV IDL proof,
we first need to introduce a related non-generic (NG) signature scheme, which we refer to
as the NIDV IDL NG signature scheme. Our concrete NIDV IDL NG signature scheme is
defined as follows.
• The Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those of the concrete NIDV IDL
scheme except that the hash function H1 is not required.
• The Sign algorithm for some public key X ∈ PK takes as input a message M where
M may be of one of two forms:
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1. M = m,σ,X,XV where (m,σ) /∈ L(X) and XV ∈ PK. The signing algorithm
also takes as input a value T ∈ G and the private key x ∈ SK corresponding to
X. The algorithm runs in an identical way to NIDV IDL PGen(X,XV , x,m, σ)
except that T replaces H1(m) in producing a proof pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉. The
algorithm sets r2 = 〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉 and r1 = C, gwXrV mod p, gd1X−d2P mod
p, Ch+wT d1σ−d2 mod p, and outputs σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
2. M = m,σ,XP , X where m ∈ M, σ ∈ S and XP ∈ PK. The signing al-
gorithm also takes as input a value T ∈ G and the private key x ∈ SK
corresponding to X. The algorithm runs in an identical way to NIDV IDL
FakePGen(XP , X, x,m, σ) except that T replaces H1(m) in producing a proof
pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉. The algorithm sets r2 = 〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉 and r1 =
C, gwXrV mod p, g
d1X−d2P mod p, C
h+wT d1σ−d2 mod p, and outputs σNG = 〈r1,
h, r2〉.
• The Verify algorithm on input M = m,σ,XP , XV , a value T ∈ G and a signature
σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where XP = X or XV = X and r2 = 〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉, sets pi =
〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 and runs in an identical way to NIDV IDL PVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, pi)
except that T replaces H1(m) in the verification process.
Theorem 4.6 The NIDV IDL proof of Section 4.6.4 is sound in the random oracle model
assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in G.
Proof:
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, so we highlight the
areas of the proof that differ, and where the proof is highly duplicated, we leave the details
to the reader.
As before, we suppose thatH1 andH2 are random oracles and there exists an algorithm
E that makes at most µi queries to the random oracles Hi, i = {1, 2}, at most µp PGen
and µf FakePGen queries, and wins the soundness game of Section 4.3.3 in time at
most τ with non-negligible probability η′ (in security parameter l) where the number of
participants is bounded by ρ and η′ > 10ρ(µp + µf + 1)(µp + µf + µ2)/2l.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.3 we divide the proof into two steps. In Step 1, we show
how E can be used to construct an algorithm B that makes at most µ2 queries to the
random oracle H2, at most µs = µp+µf Sign queries to its challenger C, and wins the NG
version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1 for the NIDV IDL NG signature scheme
in time at most τ with non-negligible probability η = η′/ρ > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
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In Step 2, we then replace C with an algorithm C ′ that uses B to solve the discrete
logarithm problem in G. Step 2 of the proof will make use of Lemma 2.6, the NG Forking
Lemma.
Step 1 We will show that there exists an algorithm B that uses E to forge an NIDV
IDL NG signature with non-negligible probability when interacting with a challenger C in
the NG version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1.
The challenger C initializes the NG unforgeability game for B and gives B the public
key X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P, and
access to the random oracle H2.
B can make H2 as well as Sign queries on any message M = m,σ,XP , XV (where
m ∈ M, σ′ ∈ S, XP , XV ∈ PK, and XP = X or XV = X), and a value T ∈ G.
B must eventually output a message M∗, a value T ∗, and an NIDV IDL NG signature
σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins the game if 〈M∗, T ∗, σ∗NG〉 is accepted by Verify and no Sign
query was previously made on M∗, T ∗.
In order to win the above game, B in turn simulates an NIDV soundness game for E.
NIDV Soundness Simulation:
B initializes the game for E exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, and answers the
H1,H2 andCorrupt queries exactly as before. The other queries are answered as follows.
EGen Queries: B answers these queries as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, except that in
this case if b = 0 then B outputs a valid signature, otherwise B picks a random
invalid signature and outputs this.
PGen Queries: E can request an NIDV EDL proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M and σ ∈ S.
B queries m on H1 and receives some H1(m) = gri . B retrieves the value ri from
LH1 and computes σ
′ = XriP mod p. If σ
′ = σ then B outputs invalid.
If σ′ = σ and XP 6= XJ , then B runs NIDV IDL PGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to produce
a proof pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉, and B outputs pi to E.
If σ′ = σ and XP = XJ , then B sets M = m,σ,XP , XV and T = H1(m) and makes
a Sign query to C on M and T . C responds with an NIDV IDL NG signature
σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉. B sets pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 and
outputs pi to E.
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FakePGen Queries: E can request a fake NIDV proof on input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ′〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈M, and σ′ ∈ S.
If XV 6= XJ then B runs NIDV IDL FakePGen(XP , XV , xV ,m, σ) to produce a proof
pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉, and B outputs pi to E.
If XV = XJ then B setsM = m,σ,XP , XV and T = H1(m) and makes a Sign query
to C on M and T . C responds with an NIDV IDL NG signature σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉
where r2 = 〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉. B sets pi = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉 and outputs pi to E.
Output: Finally E outputs 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗, pi∗〉, where X∗P , X∗V ∈ X , X∗P 6= X∗V , X∗V
is uncorrupted, m∗ ∈ M, σ∗ ∈ S and pi∗ ∈ P. E wins if 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗, pi∗〉 is
accepted by NIDV IDL PVerify, no FakePGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉,
and either:
1. X∗P is uncorrupted and no PGen query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉, or
2. (m∗, σ∗) ∈ L(X∗P ).
B takesE’s output pi∗ where pi∗ = 〈C∗, w∗, r∗, h∗, d∗1, d∗2〉, and setsM∗ = m∗, σ∗, X∗P , X∗V ,





r∗ mod p, gd
∗
1X∗P






and r∗2 = 〈C∗, w∗, r∗, d∗1, d∗2〉.
B outputs M∗, T ∗ and σ∗NG to C. The rest of Step 1 follows in the same way as in
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Once again we find that the probability that B does not have to abort, E wins the
game, and that either X∗V = XJ , or X
∗
P = XJ , is η
′/ρ, which is non-negligible in security
parameter l if η is. In this case, B would not have had to abort, and B wins the NG
unforgeability game with probability η = η′/ρ making at most µ2 queries to the random
oracle H2, and at most µs = µp + µf Sign queries to C.
Step 2 We now define an algorithm C ′ that replaces B’s challenger C and uses B to
solve the discrete logarithm problem in G. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, C ′ will simulate
the random oracle H2 and the challenger in an NG unforgeability game with B. C ′’s goal
is to solve the discrete logarithm problem on input 〈g,X, p, q〉, that is to find x ∈ Zq such
that gx = X mod p, where g is of prime order q modulo prime p and generates group G.
NG Unforgeability Simulation:
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The challenger C ′ initializes the NG unforgeability game for B exactly as before,
giving B the public key X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces
PK,SK,M,S,P, and access to the random oracle H2.
C ′ now simulates the challenger exactly as before except for Sign queries which C ′
simulates as follows.
Sign Queries: C ′ will also answer Sign queries made by B. All of B’s queries are on
messages M = m,σ,XP , XV where XP = X or XV = X, and values T ∈ G.







r1 = C, gwXrV mod p, g
d1X−d2P mod p, C
h+wtd1σ−d2 mod p.
C ′ constructs the string str = r1,M , and adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 . r2 =
〈C,w, r, d1, d2〉 and σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 which it outputs to B.
Since H2 is a random oracle, C ′ can simulate NIDV IDL NG signatures that are
indistinguishable from true NIDV IDL NG signatures, so B can detect no inconsistency
in the game.
From Step 1, we know that B that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle
H2, at most µs = µp + µf Sign queries, and wins the above game in time at most τ with
non-negligible probability η = η′/ρ > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
By Lemma 2.6, (the NG Forking Lemma), C ′ can rewind B (and therefore also E)
with the same random coins and repeat its simulation with a different random oracleH2 so
that B outputs another NG signature σNG = 〈r∗1, h, r2〉 onM∗ = m∗, σ∗, X∗P , X∗V , together
with a value T , where h 6= h∗, r2 = 〈C∗, w, r, d1, d2〉 and
r∗1 = C
∗, gwX∗V
r mod p, gd1X∗P
−d2 mod p, ∗Ch+wT d1σ∗−d2 mod p.

















2 = C∗h+wT ∗d1σ∗−d2 mod p. (4.6)
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Once again, we distinguish between two cases, depending on whether E wins the NIDV
soundness game (simulated by B) by satisfying output condition 1 or 2. If E wins the
game by satisfying condition 1, then we say that E is a Type-1 adversary, otherwise we
say that E is a Type-2 adversary.
Case 1. We suppose that E is a Type-1 adversary. In this case, X∗P and X
∗
V were
both uncorrupted in the NIDV soundness game, and we could have that X∗P = X or that
X∗V = X. Now if r
∗ 6= r then if X∗V = X then C ′ can solve (4.4) for the discrete logarithm
of X∗V = X. The probability that X
∗
V = X is 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen randomly
from X and we know that X∗V = X or X∗P = X. If d2 6= d∗2 and X∗P = XJ then C ′ can
solve (4.5) for the discrete logarithm of X∗P = X. The probability that X
∗
P = X is 1/2
since XJ = X was chosen randomly from X and we know that X∗V = X or X∗P = X.
Alternatively, if r∗ = r and d2 = d∗2, then w = w∗ and d1 = d∗1. However this is impossible
since h 6= h∗.
Case 2. We suppose that E is a Type-2 adversary. In this case, we know that X∗V is
uncorrupted and that (m∗, σ∗) ∈ L(X∗P ). As in Case 1, if r∗ 6= r and X∗V = XJ then C ′
can solve (4.4) for the discrete logarithm of X∗V = X. The probability that X
∗
V = X is
at least 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen randomly from X and we know that X∗V = X or
X∗P = X. If r = r
∗, then w = w∗, and therefore h + w 6= h∗ + w∗ (since h 6= h∗). By
equation (4.6) we find that d1 6= d∗1 or d2 6= d∗2, and by equation (4.4), we find that d1 6= d∗1









Since C∗ 6= 1 and C∗ is raised to a non-zero power, this contradicts our assumption that
(m∗, σ∗) ∈ L(X∗P ).
In cases 1 and 2, since the NG Forking Lemma produces a second appropriate signa-
ture with expected time at most τ ′ = 120686µsτ , we find that C ′ can solve the discrete
logarithm problem in time at most τ ′ and with probability at least η/2. If η′ is non-
negligible, then η is also non-negligible, and this contradicts the hardness of the discrete
logarithm problem. Therefore no algorithm B as defined in Step 1 can have non-negligible
probability of winning the NG unforgeability game, and in turn no polynomially bounded
adversary E can have non-negligible probability of winning the soundness game of Section
4.3.3.
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4.7.3 Application to the core signature scheme
Since our NIDV EDL and IDL proof systems are secure, they can be composed with
our concrete scheme to form secure NIDV confirmation and denial proofs for the NIDV
undeniable signature scheme. All that remains for the whole NIDV undeniable signature
scheme to be secure is to show that the core signature scheme satisfies the unforgeability
and invisibility properties.
Theorem 4.7 The core signature scheme of Section 4.6.1 is unforgeable in the random
oracle model assuming the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G.
The proof of Theorem 4.7 is similar to the proof of unforgeability in [92] (corrected in
[91]), although we use a slightly different security model and therefore provide our own
proof of security.
Proof: We suppose that H1 and H2 are random oracles, and suppose there exists an
algorithm E in a game with at most ρ participants that makes at most µi queries to the
random oracles Hi, i = {1, 2}, at most µs USign queries, and at most µc Conf/Deny
queries, and wins the unforgeability game of Section 4.5.1.1 in time at most τ with prob-
ability at least η, where η is non-negligible in security parameter l.
We show how to construct an algorithm B that uses E to solve the computational
Diffie-Hellman problem. B will simulate the random oracles and the challenger C in a
game with E. B’s goal is to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem on input
〈g, ga, gb, p, q〉, that is to find gab ∈ Zq, where g is of prime order q modulo prime p.
Simulation: B initializes the game using Setup and the parameters g, p and q. B gives
the parameters 〈g, p, q〉 and the descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P to E. B
generates a set of participants U , where |U | = ρ(l) and ρ is a polynomial function of the
security parameter l. For some random participant J , B sets XJ = ga mod p, and for each
I 6= J , B runs KeyGen to generate a private key xI and public key XI . We define the set
of all participants’ public keys to be X . E is given X . In addition, B randomly chooses
bit β ∈ {0, 1} and an integer k ∈ {1, .., µ1}.
H1-Queries: B simulates the random oracle by maintaining a list LH1 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉.
When H1 is queried with an input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, B responds as follows:
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1. If the query str is already in LH1 then it must be contained in some tuple
〈str = stri, ri〉. If this is the kth tuple on the list, then B outputs (gb)ri mod p.
Otherwise B outputs gri mod p.
2. If str is not already in LH1 , B selects a random r ∈ Zq. If str is the kth distinct
H1 query then B outputs (gb)r mod p and adds 〈str, r〉 to LH1 . Otherwise B
outputs gr mod p and adds 〈str, r〉 to LH1 .
H2-Queries: B simulates the H2 oracle in the same way as the H2 oracle in the proof of
Theorem 4.3.
USign Queries: E can request an undeniable signature for input 〈XI ,m〉 where XI ∈ X ,
and m ∈M. If XI 6= XJ then B runs USign(xI ,m) to produce a signature σ ∈ S. If
XI = XJ then B queries m on the H1 oracle and receives some response gri . If the
tuple on LH1 containing m is the kth tuple, then B aborts. Otherwise B retrieves
the value ri from the tuple containing m on LH1 and computes σ = X
ri
I mod p. B
outputs σ.
Conf/Deny Queries: E can request a confirmation or denial proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m,
σ〉 where XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈ M and σ ∈ S. B keeps a list LCD of all
distinct Conf/Deny queries that E makes.
Case 1 If XP 6= XJ then C takes the private key xP corresponding to XP and
proceeds as follows. C runs ConfGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to produce an NIDV proof
piC ∈ PC . If ConfVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ, piC) returns accept, then C outputs piC . Other-
wise C runs DenyGen(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ) to produce an NIDV proof piD ∈ PD which
it outputs.
Case 2 If XP = XJ then B queries m on the H1 oracle. If the tuple 〈m, ri〉 on LH1
containing m is not the kth tuple, B retrieves the value ri from the tuple on LH1
and computes σ′ = XriI mod p.
Case 2a If σ′ = σ then B simulates ConfGen by simulating an NIDV EDL proof as
follows. B picks random w, r, t, h ∈ Zq and computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gdX(h+w)P mod p
D = H1(m)dσ(h+w) mod p
If the H2 oracle has previously been queried on input c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV , then B
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starts again by picking new w, r, t, h. Otherwise B sets str = c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV ,
adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 , and outputs piC = 〈w, r, h, d〉.
Case 2b If XP = XJ , and σ′ 6= σ or 〈m, ri〉 is the kth tuple on LH1 , then B proceeds
as follows.
If 〈m, ri〉 is the kth tuple on LH1 , then B selects some random value y ∈ Z∗q and
computes σ′ = gbriy = H1(m)y mod p. If σ′ = σ, then B starts again by picking a
new y.
Now B has some value σ′ 6= σ (generated at the beginning of Case 2 or in Case 2b)
and B simulates DenyGen by simulating an NIDV IDL proof as follows. B picks





c = gwXrV mod p
G = gd1X−d2P mod p
D = Ch+wH1(m)d1σ−d2 mod p
If the H2 oracle has previously been queried on input C, c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV , then
B starts the DenyGen simulation again by picking new t, w, r, h, d1, d2. Otherwise
B sets str = C, c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV , adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 , and outputs
piD = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉.
A denial proof may be incorrect if XP = XJ and 〈m, ri〉 is the kth tuple on LH1 .
However we deal with this possible inconsistency later in the proof.
FakeConf Queries: E can request a fake confirmation proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉
where XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈ M and σ ∈ S. If XV 6= XJ then B runs
FakePGen of the NIDV EDL proof system on input 〈XP , XV , xV ,m, σ〉 to generate a
fake NIDV EDL proof pi′C which B outputs. If XV = XJ then B simulates an NIDV
EDL proof as follows. B picks random w, r, t, h ∈ Zq and computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gdX(h+w)P mod p
D = H1(m)dσ(h+w) mod p
If the H2 oracle has previously been queried on input c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV , then B
starts again by picking new w, r, t, h. Otherwise B sets str = c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV ,
adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 , and outputs pi′C = 〈w, r, h, d〉.
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FakeDeny Queries: E can request a fake denial proof for input 〈XP , XV ,m, σ〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP , m ∈ M and σ ∈ S. If XV 6= XJ then B runs FakePGen of
the NIDV IDL proof system on input 〈XP , XV , xV ,m, σ〉 to generate a fake NIDV
IDL proof pi′D which B outputs. If XP = XJ then B simulates an NIDV IDL proof







c = gwXrV mod p
G = gd1X−d2P mod p
D = Ch+wH1(m)d1σ−d2 mod p
If C = 1 or H2 has previously been queried on input C, c,G,D,m, σ,XP , XV ,
then B starts again by picking new y, t, w, r, h, d1, d2. Otherwise B sets str =
C, c,G,D,m, σ,
XP , XV , adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 , and outputs pi′D = 〈C,w, r, h, d1, d2〉.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key XI ∈
X . If XI = XJ , then B aborts and terminates E. Otherwise B returns the appro-
priate private key xI .
Output: Finally E produces X∗I ∈ X , m∗ ∈M and σ∗ ∈ S, where X∗I is uncorrupted and
no USign query was previously made on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉. E wins the game if (m∗, σ∗) ∈
L(X∗I ).
We know that E produces a valid forgery on some message m with probability at least
η and in time at most τ . Unless E queries the random oracle H1 on m at some point
in the game, then E’s advantage is negligible. Since E’s probability of winning the game
is non-negligible, we assume that E queries H1 on m at some point during the game.
Therefore the probability that E produces a valid forgery σ′ for public key XJ and on
message m = m′ where m′ is in the kth tuple (say 〈m′, r〉) on LH1 , is at least η/(µ1ρ).
From now on we assume that E has produced a valid forgery σ′ for XJ on m′ (this
occurs with non-negligible probability at least η/(µ1ρ) and in time τ).
If β = 0 then B outputs (σ∗)r−1 where the tuple 〈m∗ = m′, r〉 on LH1 is the kth tuple.
If β = 1 then B randomly picks a Conf/Deny query made by E of the form 〈m′, σ〉 and
outputs σr
−1
where 〈m′, r〉 is the kth tuple on LH1 . If no such Conf/Deny query was
made by E, then B proceeds as if β = 0.
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If at any stage in the game, E made a Conf/Deny query on input 〈XJ , XV ,m′, σ′〉 for
any XV ∈ X , we say that a critical Conf/Deny query occurred. If a critical Conf/Deny
query occurred, then B would have responded incorrectly, and from this point onwards E’s
behaviour is undefined. If no critical Conf/Deny query occurred, then no inconsistency
could have arisen in the way B answered the Conf/Deny queries, so E’s view of the game
would be as in a real game.
Case 1: We assume that no criticalConf/Deny query occurred, and therefore no incon-
sistency in the way B responded to Conf/Deny queries could have occurred. In this case,
with probability at least η/(µ1ρ), E’s output would have been 〈X∗I ,m∗, σ∗〉 = 〈XJ ,m′, σ′〉.
In addition, E would not have made a USign query on XJ ,m′, and would not have made
a Corrupt query on XJ , so B would have not have aborted during the simulation.
In this case, B solves the CDH problem if β = 0 and 〈X∗I ,m∗, σ∗〉 = 〈XJ ,m′, σ′〉, which
occurs with probability at least η/(2µ1ρ) and in time τ .
Case 2: We assume that at some point a critical Conf/Deny query occurred, resulting
in an inconsistency in the way B responded to Conf/Deny queries arose. From this
point onwards E’s behavior is undefined, and we can say nothing about whether E’s
output 〈m∗, σ∗〉 is valid or not. However we do know that in this case, the valid message
signature pair 〈m′, σ′〉 for XJ was queried on Conf/Deny.
In this case, B solves the CDH problem if β = 1, E has produced a valid forgery σ′ for
XJ on m′, and the random Conf/Deny query 〈m′, σ〉 is in fact the critical query 〈m′, σ′〉
on XJ , which occurs with probability at least η/(2µ1ρµc) and in time τ . The only problem
is that if an inconsistency arises, then E may not terminate within time τ . Therefore if
E does not terminate in time τ , then B terminates E and assumes that a critical query
did occur (and so proceeds as if β = 0).
From cases 1 and 2, we can see that B solves the CDH problem in time τ with
probability at least
γ = min{η/(2µ1ρ), η/(2µ1ρµc)} = η/(2µ1ρµc).
This is non-negligible, contradicting the hardness of the CDH problem.
¤
Theorem 4.8 The core signature scheme of Section 4.6.1 is invisible in the random oracle
model assuming the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G.
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Proof: We suppose that H1 and H2 are random oracles, and suppose there exists an
algorithm E in a game with at most ρ participants that makes at most µi queries to the
random oracles Hi, i = {1, 2}, at most µs USign queries, and wins the invisibility game
of Section 4.5.1.2 in time at most τ with probability at least η, where η is non-negligible
in security parameter l.
We show how to construct an algorithm B that uses E to solve the Decision Diffie-
Hellman problem. B will simulate the random oracles and the challenger C in a game with
E. B’s goal is to solve the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem on input 〈g, ga, gb, gc, p, q〉,
that is to decide whether ab = c mod q, where g is of prime order q modulo prime p. If
ab = c then B should output 1 otherwise B should output 0.
Simulation: B initializes the game as in the proof of Theorem 4.7, except that in this
case B is not required to pick a random bit b and integer k.
Phase 1: B simulates the random oraclesH1 andH2 and answers allUSign,Conf/Deny,
FakeConf, FakeDeny and Corrupt queries exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.7.
Once again, B may answer a Conf/Deny query incorrectly, but we deal with this
possible inconsistency later in the proof.
Challenge: Finally, E outputs 〈X∗I ,m∗〉, whereX∗I is uncorrupted and E made noUSign
query on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉 in Phase 1. B queries m∗ on H1 and retrieves the tuple 〈m∗, r〉 on
LH1 . If 〈m∗, r〉 is not the kth tuple on LH1 , or X∗I 6= XJ , then B aborts. Otherwise
B outputs σ∗ = (gc)r = gcr mod p.
Phase 2: E can continue to make USign, Conf/Deny, FakeConf, FakeDeny and
Corrupt queries, and these are answered as in Phase 1. But E cannot make a
Conf/Deny query on 〈X∗I , XV ,m∗, σ∗〉 for any XV ∈ X , and E cannot make a
USign query on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉.
Output: Finally E outputs a bit β.
B outputs β as its solution to the DDH problem on 〈g, ga, gb, gc, p, q〉.
Unless E queries the random oracle H1 on m∗ at some point in the game, then E’s
advantage is negligible. Since E’s probability of winning the game is non-negligible, we
assume that E queries H1 on m∗ at some point during the game.
We note that if ab = c mod q then σ∗ is a valid signature for X∗I , and if ab 6= c mod q,




We note that an inconsistency in B’s simulation of the game could arise if B answers
a Conf/Deny query on input 〈X∗I , XV ,m∗, σ〉 where X∗I = XJ , the tuple 〈m∗, r〉 is the
kth tuple on LH1 , and (m
∗, σ) ∈ L(X∗I ). In this case B responds incorrectly with a
denial (NIDV IDL) proof. But in this case no previous USign query could have been
made on 〈X∗I ,m∗〉, since otherwise B would have aborted. So if (m∗, σ) ∈ L(X∗I ), then
E has successfully forged a signature on m. But by Theorem 4.7, the NIDV undeniable
signature scheme is unforgeable. Therefore such an inconsistency only arises with negligible
probability.
The probability that B does not abort is therefore at least 1/(ρµ1), so B solves the
DDH problem in time τ and with probability η/(ρµ1) which is non-negligible, contradicting
the hardness of the DDH problem. ¤
Theorem 4.9 The NIDV undeniable signature scheme of Section 4.6.1 is secure.
Proof: This result follows immediately from the security of the NIDV EDL (confirmation)
proof and NIDV IDL (denial) proof with which the core signature scheme is composed, as
well as Theorems 4.7 and 4.8. ¤
Alternative constructions for NIDV EDL and IDL proofs may be possible. For example,
it may be the case that the techniques of [46] could yield more general constructions of
such NIDV proofs, although we believe that such general constructions are unlikely to be
more efficient than the concrete examples presented here.
4.8 DV Signatures
We present a formal definition for DV signature schemes. The definition is a mixture of the
definition of NIDV proofs from Section 4.2 and the definition of two-party ring signature
schemes from Section 3.3.
Definition 4.7 A DV signature scheme is defined via the following algorithms:
Setup(l): A probabilistic algorithm which takes a security parameter l as input and returns
the system parameters params. Amongst the public parameters are descriptions of
the following spaces: a public key space PK, a private key space SK, a message
space M and a signature space S.
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KeyGen(params): A probabilistic algorithm which which takes as input the system pa-
rameters params and outputs a public key X ∈ PK and a corresponding private
key x ∈ SK.
DVSign(XS , XV , xS ,m): A (possibly probabilistic) signature generation algorithm which
takes as input the signer’s public key XS ∈ PK, and corresponding private key
xS ∈ SK, the designated verifier’s public key XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XS , and a message
m ∈M, and outputs a signature σ ∈ S.
DVVerify(XS , XV ,m, σ): A verification algorithm which takes as input the signer’s public
key XS ∈ PK, the designated verifier’s public key XV ∈ PK, XS 6= XV , a signature
σ ∈ S and a message m ∈M, and outputs either accept or reject.
We note that some definitions of DV signatures [77, 98] include an algorithm Simulate
which describes how a designated verifier may simulate a DV signature produced by a
signer. However, as for our definition of NIDV proofs, we require the existence of such an
algorithm in the definition of non-transferability, and therefore consider this algorithm to
be necessary for the scheme’s security, rather than part of the scheme’s formal definition.
4.9 Security for DV Signatures
As for the formal definition of a DV signature scheme, we derive the notions of security
for DV signatures from the security notions of NIDV proofs presented in Section 4.3
and the security notions for ring signatures presented in Section 3.4. We say that a DV
signature scheme is secure if it satisfies the notions of correctness, non-transferability and
unforgeability. These are defined as follows.
4.9.1 Correctness
A DV signature scheme is correct if when DVSign is run on any input 〈XS , XV , xS ,m〉 and
outputs a signature σ, then DVVerify on input 〈XS , XV ,m, σ〉 outputs accept.
4.9.2 Non-transferability
We say that a DV signature scheme is non-transferable if there exists a polynomial time
algorithm FakeDVSign that on input a tuple 〈XS , XV , xV ,m〉, where XS is the public key
of the signer, XV 6= XS is the public key of the designated verifier, xV is the private
key of the designated verifier, and m is a message, produces a signature σ′ such that
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〈XS , XV ,m, σ′〉 is accepted by DVVerify and the distributions of signatures σ′ generated
by FakeDVSign are polynomially indistinguishable from those of signatures σ produced by
DVSign when run on input 〈XS , XV , xS ,m〉, even if the private keys xS and xV are known.
4.9.3 Unforgeability
Unforgeability of a DV signature scheme is defined via the following game between a
challenger C and an adversary E:
Initialize: C firstly runs Setup for a given security parameter l to obtain the public
parameters params. C runs KeyGen to generate the public and private keys Xi and
xi for each participant, where the number of participants is bounded by n, where n
is a polynomial function of l. We define the set of all participants’ public keys to be
X . E is given params and X while C retains the private keys.
E can make the following queries to the challenger C:
DVSign Queries: E can request a DV signature on input 〈XS , XV ,m〉 where XS , XV ∈
X , XV 6= XS , and m ∈ M. C runs DVSign(XS , XV , xS ,m) to produce a signature
σ which it outputs.
FakeDVSign Queries: E can request a fake DV signature on input 〈XS , XV ,m〉 where
XS , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XS , and m ∈ M. C runs FakeDVSign as defined in the non-
transferability game of Section 4.9.2 on input 〈XS , XV , xV ,m〉 to produce a signature
σ′ which it outputs.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key Xi ∈
X . C outputs the corresponding private key xi.
Output: Finally E outputs 〈X∗S , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉, where X∗S , X∗V ∈ X , X∗V 6= X∗S , m∗ ∈ M
and σ∗ ∈ S. E wins the game if 〈X∗S , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉 is accepted by DVVerify, no
DVSign query was made on 〈X∗S , X∗V ,m∗〉, no FakeDVSign query was made on
〈X∗S , X∗V ,m∗〉, and neither X∗S nor X∗V have been corrupted.
Definition 4.8 We say that a DV signature scheme is unforgeable if the probability of
success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible (as a
function of the security parameter l).
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4.9.4 Notes on the Security Definitions for DV Signatures
Non-transferability: As we mentioned earlier, the algorithm FakeDVSign corresponds
to the Simulate algorithm that other authors choose to include as part of the for-
mal definition of DV signatures. We choose to define such an algorithm as part of
the security definition of non-transferability. We note that our definition of non-
transferability does not restrict a distinguisher’s access to the private keys xS and
xV , so the signatures should be indistinguishable even with knowledge of the private
keys.
Non-transferability of DV signatures is similar to the anonymity property of ring
signatures although there are some subtle differences. The definition of ring signa-
tures automatically implies that all ring members can create valid ring signatures,
and anonymity simply guarantees that these signatures are indistinguishable, hence
concealing the identity of the true signer. However the definition of a DV signature
scheme does not guarantee the existence of a FakeDVSign algorithm. Instead, this is
guaranteed by the definition of non-transferability. In addition, non-transferability
guarantees indistinguishability between signatures created using FakeDVSign and
signatures created using DVSign.
FakeDVSign queries: The existence of FakeDVSign from Section 4.9.2 enables the chal-
lenger in the game of unforgeability to answer FakeDVSign queries. We consider
it important to model such queries for NIDV undeniable signatures (as in the case
of NIDV proofs) since an adversary may have access to such “fake” DV signatures
that are produced by dishonest verifiers using FakeDVSign.
4.9.5 Comparison to Other Work
The only other work that contains formal security definitions for DV signatures is by
Lipmaa et al. [77]. Therefore we compare our security model to theirs.
Lipmaa et al. also define the notions of correctness, non-transferability and unforge-
ability. These definitions are similar to ours although their models are not fully multiparty
since they only model a single signer interacting with a single designated verifier. By con-
trast, we model a group of interacting participants where each participant can assume the
role of signer or designated verifier at different times.
As in many papers on DV signatures, Lipmaa et al. include a Simulate algorithm as part
of their definition. Their definition of non-transferability is therefore only concerned with
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indistinguishability of signatures generated by DVSign and Simulate. However their model
of unforgeability does grant the adversary access to signatures generated by Simulate,
whereas we permit the adversary to make FakeDVSign queries.
Lipmaa et al. go on to discuss two other security properties for DV signatures, which
they call non-delegatability and non-disavowability.
Informally, a DV signature is delegatable if a signer S can, without disclosing his
private key xS , delegate her signing rights to another entity. For example, S may be
able to disclose some function f(xS) from which it is infeasible to determine xS , but
with which an entity can create valid DV signatures for S. This is a valid concern for
all signature schemes since if a signature is delegatable, a verifier can no longer be sure
that the signature was created by the real signer. However it is unclear how one would
model such an attack. Lipmaa et al. propose a definition for non-delegatability which
involves black-box knowledge extractors, although they do not clarify exactly what access
the adversary has to private keys (or functions of private keys). Moreover, in their proof
of non-delegatability for a concrete scheme, the adversary appears to have the same oracle
access and the same objective as in the unforgeability game, implying that unforgeability
is in fact equivalent to non-delegatability. We do not consider non-delegatability in our
model of security.
Lipmaa et al. call a DV signature scheme non-disavowable if neither the signer nor the
designated verifier can prove to a third party (even if they cooperate) which of them really
created a DV signature. Our definition of non-transferability implies non-disavowability
since we require that signatures created by DVSign and FakeDVSign are indistinguishable,
even if the private keys of the signer and designated verifier are known.
4.10 Concrete DV Signature Schemes
4.10.1 DV Signatures from Ring Signatures
As mentioned earlier, a DV signature scheme may be constructed from a 2-party ring
signature scheme. We refer the reader back to Chapter 3 where we defined ring signature
schemes and their security. We assume that we have a non-separable ring signature scheme
(e.g. the concrete scheme presented in Section 3.5) which has explicit Setup and KeyGen
algorithms.
Theorem 4.10 A secure DV signature scheme may be constructed from a secure non-
separable 2-party ring signature scheme.
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Proof: We provide a sketch of the proof of this theorem. We first show how a DV signature
scheme can be constructed from a secure 2-party ring signature scheme. We then discuss
how the security of the ring signature scheme ensures that the resulting DV signature
scheme is also secure.
The DV signature Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those of the ring
signature scheme. Suppose we have a signer S and a designated verifier V with public and
private key pairs 〈XS , xS〉 and 〈XV , xV 〉 respectively. We relabel the key pairs of S and
V as 〈X1, x1〉 and 〈X2, x2〉 respectively, and set the ring R = {X1, X2}. Now DVSign and
DVVerify are defined as follows.
• DVSign(XS , XV , xS ,m) is defined by running RingSign(m,R, 1, x1), and
• DVVerify(XS , XV ,m, σ) is defined by running RingVerify(m,R, σ).
It is easy to see that the correctness of the ring signature scheme implies correct-
ness of the DV signature scheme. In order to show that the DV signature scheme is
non-transferable, we must define a suitable FakeDVSign. This may be done by letting
FakeDVSign be defined as running RingSign(m,R, 2, x2). It is clear that signatures gen-
erated by FakeDVSign will be accepted by DVVerify. It is now easy to verify that the
anonymity of the underlying ring signature scheme ensures that the DV signature scheme
is non-transferable. It remains to show that the DV scheme is unforgeable.
We notice that the unforgeability games for ring signatures and DV signatures are
identical except for the FakeDVSign queries in the game for DV signatures. However
since FakeDVSign queries are answered by running FakeDVSign, such queries correspond
exactly to RingSign queries for R with sig = 2 which are allowed in the unforgeability
game for ring signatures. Therefore all queries that an adversary in the DV signature
unforgeability game could ask correspond to queries in the ring signature unforgeability
game, so the unforgeability of the ring signature scheme implies unforgeability of the DV
signature scheme.
¤
We note that it is also possible to construct a secure DV signature scheme from a
separable 2-party ring signature scheme, and in this case the DV signature scheme is also
separable.
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4.10.2 DV Signatures from NIDV Undeniable Signatures
It is also possible to construct a DV signature scheme from an NIDV undeniable signature
scheme. In this case, the DV signature Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those
of the NIDV undeniable signature scheme. Suppose we have a signer S and a designated
verifier V with public and private key pairs 〈XS , xS〉 and 〈XV , xV 〉 respectively. Now
DVSign and DVVerify are defined as follows.
• DVSign(XS , XV , xS ,m) is defined by running USign(xS ,m) to produce an undeniable
signature σ, and then ConfGen(XS , XV , xS ,m, σ) to produce an NIDV proof pi. The
output is 〈σ, pi〉
• DVVerify(XS , XV ,m, 〈σ, pi〉) is defined by running ConfVerify(XS , XV ,m, σ, pi).
As in Section 4.10.1, correctness is easy to verify. It can also be shown that the
DV signature scheme is unforgeable if the NIDV undeniable signature scheme is secure.
However the DV signature scheme does not satisfy the definition of non-transferability.
This is because, given a DV signature 〈σ, pi〉 output by the scheme defined above, σ is an
undeniable signature for the signer with public key XS , so the signer can distinguish this
from a random element in the signature space.
We could weaken the definition of non-transferability for DV signatures to say that
the distributions of signatures produced by FakeDVSign should be polynomially indistin-
guishable from the distributions of signatures produced by DVSign without knowledge of
the signer’s private key. In this case, by letting FakeDVSign be defined by running the
FakePGen algorithm corresponding to ConfGen, it is possible to show that the DV signature
scheme defined above satisfies the weaker notion of non-transferability.
4.10.3 A Concrete DV Signature Scheme from an NIDV EDL Proof
Instead of trying to construct a DV signature scheme directly from an NIDV undeniable
signature scheme, it may be possible to modify the NIDV proof system itself to obtain a
DV signature scheme that is fully secure.
As an example, we now show how the NIDV EDL proof of Section 4.6.3 can be con-
verted into a DV signature scheme. The DV signature scheme is defined by the following
algorithms.
Setup(l): For some security parameter l, let p and q be large primes, where q|(p − 1).
Let G be the multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q and let g be a generator of
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G. We also assume that H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq is a cryptographic hash function. We
set PK = G, SK = Z∗q , M = {0, 1}∗ and S = Z4q . The public parameters params
include 〈p, q, g,H〉 as well as the descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M and S.
KeyGen(params): To set up a user I’s public and private keys, the private key xI is chosen
at random from Z∗q , and the public key is XI = gxI mod p.
DVSign(XP , XV , xP ,m): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , xP ∈ SK, and m ∈M, the
algorithm picks random w, r, t ∈ Zq and computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gt mod p
h = H2(c,G,m,XP , XV )
d = t− xP (h+ w) mod q
The algorithm outputs σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉.
DVVerify(XP , XV ,m, σ): On input XP , XV ∈ PK, XV 6= XP , message m ∈ M, and
signature σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉 ∈ S, the algorithm computes:
c = gwXrV mod p
G = gdX(h+w)P mod p
and verifies that h = H2(c,G,m,XP , XV ). If the last equation holds, then the
algorithm outputs accept, otherwise it outputs reject.
4.10.4 Security of our Concrete DV Signature Scheme
We now present some security results for the concrete DV signature scheme. Most of the
security results follow from the security results for the NIDV EDL proof in Section 4.7.1
with some minor modifications.
Theorem 4.11 The DV signature scheme of Section 4.10.3 is correct.
Proof: It is trivial to verify that signatures generated by DVSign will be accepted by
DVVerify.
¤
Theorem 4.12 The DV signature scheme of Section 4.10.3 is non-transferable.
84
4.10 Concrete DV Signature Schemes
Proof: FakeDVSign is defined in an almost identical way to the way NIDV EDL FakePGen
is defined in the proof of Theorem 4.2. On input 〈XP , XV , xV ,m〉, where XP , XV ∈ PK,
XV 6= XP , xV ∈ SK, m ∈M, FakeDVSign produces a σ′ ∈ S as follows.









h′ = H2(c′, G′,m,XP , XV )
w′ = β′ − h′ mod q
r′ = (α′ − w′)x−1V mod q
FakeDVSign outputs σ′ = 〈w′, r′, h′, d′〉. As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, it is easy to
verify that that 〈XP , XV ,m, σ′〉 will be accepted by DVVerify and that σ′ is indistinguish-
able from any σ produced by running DVSign on input 〈XP , XV , xP ,m〉. ¤
In order to analyze the unforgeability of our DV signature scheme, we first need to
introduce a related generic signature scheme, which we call the GDV signature scheme.
Our concrete GDV signature scheme is defined as follows.
• The Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those of the concrete DV signature
scheme.
• The Sign algorithm for a public key X ∈ PK takes as input a message M =
m,XP , XV where m ∈ M, XV ∈ PK, XP = X or XV = X, and the private
key x ∈ SK corresponding to X. If XP = X then the algorithm runs in an iden-
tical way to DVSign(X,XV , x,m) to produce a DV signature σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉. If
XV = X then the algorithm runs in an identical way to FakeDVSign(XP , X, x,m)
to produce a DV signature σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉. The algorithm sets r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and
r1 = gwXrV mod p, g
dXh+wP mod p, and outputs σG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
• The Verify algorithm on input M = m,σ,XP , XV , where XP = X or XV = X, and
a signature σG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈w, r, d〉, sets σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉 and runs in an
identical way to DVVerify(XP , XV , xP ,m, σ).
Theorem 4.13 The DV signature scheme of Section 4.10.3 is unforgeable in the random
oracle model assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in G.
Proof:
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We suppose that H2 is a random oracle and there exists a polynomial time algorithm E
that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracleH2, at most µs PGen and FakePGen
queries, and wins the unforgeability game of Section 4.9.3 in time at most τ with non-
negligible probability η′ (in security parameter l) where the number of participants is
bounded by ρ and η′ > 5ρ(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we divide the proof into two steps. In Step 1, we show
how E can be used to construct an algorithm B that makes at most µ2 queries to the
random oracle H2, at most µs Sign queries to its challenger C, and wins the unforgeability
game of Section 2.3.1 for the GDV signature scheme in time at most τ with non-negligible
probability η = 2η′/ρ > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
In Step 2, we then replace C with an algorithm C ′ that uses B to solve the discrete
logarithm problem in G. Step 2 of the proof will make use of Lemma 2.5, the Forking
Lemma.
Step 1 We will show that there exists an algorithm B that uses E to forge a GDV
signature with non-negligible probability when interacting with a challenger C in the
unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1.
The challenger C initializes the unforgeability game for B and gives B the public key
X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,P, and access
to the random oracle H2.
B can make H2 as well as Sign queries on any message M = m,σ,XP , XV (where
m ∈ M, σ′ ∈ S, XP , XV ∈ PK and XP = X or XV = X). B must eventually output
a message M∗ and a GDV signature σ∗G = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins the game if 〈M∗, σ∗G〉 is
accepted by Verify and no Sign query was previously made on M∗.
In order to win the above game, B in turn simulates an DV signature unforgeability
game for E.
DV Signature Unforgeability Simulation:
B gives the parameters 〈g, p, q〉 and the descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S to E.
B generates a set of participants U , where |U | = ρ(l) and ρ is a polynomial function of
the security parameter l. For some random participant J , B sets XJ = X, and for each
I 6= J , B runs KeyGen to generate a private key xI and public key XI . We define the set
of all participants’ public keys to be X . E is given X .
B now simulates the challenger by simulating all the queries which E can make as
follows:
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H2-Queries: E can query any string str on the H2 oracle. B simulates the H2 oracle by
passing all H2 queries to C and passing C’s response back to E.
DVSign Queries: E can request a DV signature for input 〈XP , XV ,m〉 where XP , XV ∈
X , XV 6= XP and m ∈M.
If XP = XJ then B sets M = m,XP , XV and makes a Sign query to C on M .
C responds with a generic signature σG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈w, r, d〉. B sets
σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉 and outputs σ to E.
If XP 6= XJ then B runs DVSign(XP , XV , xP ,m) to produce a DV signature σ which
B outputs to E.
FakeDVSign Queries: E can request a fake DV signature on input 〈XP , XV ,m〉 where
XP , XV ∈ X , XV 6= XP and m ∈M.
If XV = XJ then B sets M = m,XP , XV and makes a Sign query to C on M .
C responds with a generic signature σG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈w, r, d〉. B sets
σ = 〈w, r, h, d〉 and outputs σ to E.
If XV 6= XJ then B runs FakeDVSign(XP , XV , xV ,m) to produce a DV signature σ
which B outputs to E.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to any public key XI ∈
X . If XI = XJ , then B aborts and terminates E. Otherwise B returns the appro-
priate private key xI .
Output: On termination, E outputs 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉, where X∗P , X∗V ∈ X , X∗V 6= X∗P ,
m∗ ∈ M, σ∗ ∈ S, and X∗P and X∗V are uncorrupted. E wins if 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗, σ∗〉
is accepted by DVVerify, no DVSign query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗〉 and no
FakeDVSign query was made on 〈X∗P , X∗V ,m∗〉.
B takes E’s output σ∗ where σ∗ = 〈w∗, r∗, h∗, d∗〉, and sets M∗ = m∗, X∗P , X∗V and
σ∗G = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉 where
r∗1 = g
w∗X∗V




and r∗2 = 〈w∗, r∗, d∗〉. B outputs M∗ and σ∗G to C.
With probability at least 2/ρ one of the public keys X∗P or X
∗
V is equal to XJ and no
Corrupt query was made on XJ . In this case, B did not abort, and if E wins the DV
signature unforgeability game, then B wins the generic signature unforgeability game. So
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B wins the generic signature unforgeability game, where X∗P or X
∗
V equals XJ , and XJ is
uncorrupted, with non-negligible probability η ≥ 2η′/ρ where η ≥ 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l
and in time τ , with at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2 and µs Sign queries.
Step 2 We now replace B’s challenger C with an algorithm C ′ that uses B to solve
the discrete logarithm problem in G. C ′ will simulate the random oracle H2 and the
challenger in an unforgeability game for the GDV signature scheme with B. C ′’s goal is
to solve the discrete logarithm problem on input 〈g,X, p, q〉, that is to find x ∈ Zq such
that gx = X mod p, where g is of prime order q modulo prime p and generates group G.
Generic Signature Unforgeability Simulation:
The challenger C ′ initializes the unforgeability game for B as follows. C ′ gives B the
public key X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,M,S,
and access to the random oracle H2.
C ′ now simulates the challenger by simulating all the queries which B can make as
follows:
H2-Queries: B can query the random oracle H2 at any time. C ′ simulates the random
oracle by keeping a list LH2 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉. When the oracle is queried with an
input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, C ′ responds as follows:
1. If the string str is already in LH2 in the tuple 〈str = stri, ri〉, then B outputs
ri.
2. Otherwise B selects a random r ∈ Zq, outputs r and adds 〈str, r〉 to LH2 .
Sign Queries: C ′ will also answer B’s Sign queries on any message M = m,XP , XV
where XP = X or XV = X. C ′ picks random w, r, t, h ∈ Zq and computes
r1 = gwXrV mod p, g
dXh+wP mod p.
C ′ constructs the string str = r1,M , and adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 . C ′ then
sets r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and σG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 which it outputs to B.




P = X or X
∗
V =
X and a GDV signature σ∗G = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins the game if 〈M∗, σ∗G〉 is accepted
by Verify and no Sign query was previously made on M∗.
Since H2 is a random oracle, C ′ can simulate GDV signatures that are indistinguishable
from true GDV signatures, so B can detect no inconsistency in the game.
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From Step 1, we know that B that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2,
at most µs Sign queries, and wins the above game in time at most τ with non-negligible
probability η = 2η′/ρ > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
By Lemma 2.5 of Section 2.3.4 (the Forking Lemma), C ′ can rewind B (and therefore
also E) with the same random coins and repeat its simulation with a different random
oracleH2 so that B outputs another GDV signature σG = 〈r∗1, h, r2〉 onM∗ = m∗, X∗P , X∗V ,
where h 6= h∗, r2 = 〈w, r, d〉 and
r∗1 = g
wX∗V
r mod p, gdX∗P
h+w mod p.










(h+w) mod p (4.8)
Now if r∗ 6= r and X∗V = X then C ′ can solve (4.7) for the discrete logarithm of
X∗V = X. The probability that X
∗
V = X is 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen randomly from
X and we know that X∗V = XJ or X∗P = XJ . If r∗ = r, then w∗ = w, and since h∗ 6= h
we have that h∗ + w∗ 6= h + w. So if X∗P = X then C ′ can solve (4.8) for the discrete
logarithm of X∗P = X. The probability that X
∗
P = X is 1/2 since XJ = X was chosen
randomly from X and we know that X∗V = XJ or X∗P = XJ .
Since the Forking Lemma produces a second appropriate signature with expected time
at most τ ′ = 120686µsτ , we find that C ′ can solve the discrete logarithm problem in time
at most τ ′ and with probability at least η/2. If η′ is non-negligible, then η is also non-
negligible, and this contradicts the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore
no such polynomially bounded adversary B can have non-negligible probability of winning
the generic signature unforgeability game, and in turn no polynomially bounded adversary
E can have non-negligible probability of winning the unforgeability game of Section 4.9.3.
¤
4.11 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have presented models of security for NIDV proof systems, NIDV undeniable signatures
and DV signatures and argued that NIDV proofs can have applications outside of the
context of undeniable signatures such as in deniable proofs of knowledge or possession.
We then repaired the original NIDV undeniable signature scheme of [70], producing a
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concrete scheme that is efficient and proven secure. We then showed how secure DV
signature schemes can be constructed from secure 2-party ring signature schemes, and
gave an example of how a secure DV signature scheme can be constructed from an NIDV
proof, using our concrete NIDV EDL proof as an example.
In future work, it would be interesting to investigate how to extend our model to
include strong designated verifier proofs [98, 109, 70]. It would also be interesting to
provide models of security for NIDV versions of confirmer signatures [22, 36, 47, 27] and





The problem of fair exchange of signatures is a fundamental and well-studied problem in
cryptography, with potential application in a wide range of scenarios in which the parties
involved are mutually distrustful. Ideally, we would like the exchange of signatures to be
done in a fair way, so that by engaging in a protocol, either each party obtains the other’s
signature, or neither party does. It should not be possible for one party to terminate the
protocol at some stage leaving the other party committed when they themselves are not.
The literature contains essentially two different approaches to solving the problem of
fair exchange of signatures.
Early work on solving the problem was based on the idea of timed release or timed fair
exchange of signatures [21, 53, 58]. Here, the two parties sign their respective messages
and exchange their signatures “little-by-little” using a protocol. Typically, such protocols
are highly interactive with many message flows. Moreover, one party, say B, may often be
at an advantage in that he sometimes has (at least) one more bit of A’s signature than she
has of B’s. This may not be a significant issue if the computing power of the two parties
are roughly equivalent. But if B has superior computing resources, this may put him at a
significant advantage since he may terminate the protocol early and use his resources to
compute the remainder of A’s signature, while it may be infeasible for A to do the same.
Even if the fairness of such protocols could be guaranteed, they may still be too interactive
for many applications. See [57] for further details and references for such protocols.
An alternative approach to solving the problem of fair exchange of signatures involves
the use of a (semi-trusted) third party or arbitrator T who can be called upon to handle
disputes between signers. The idea is that A registers her public key with T in a one-
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time registration, and thereafter may perform many fair exchanges with other entities.
To take part in a fair exchange with B, A creates a partial signature which she sends to
B. Entity B can be convinced that the partial signature is valid (perhaps via a protocol
interaction with A) and that T can extract a full, binding signature from the partial
signature. However, the partial signature on its own is not binding for A. B then fulfils
his commitment by sending A his signature, and if valid, A releases the full version of her
signature to B. The protocol is fair since if B does not sign, then A’s partial signature
is worthless to B, and if B does sign but A refuses to release her full signature then B
can obtain it from T . The third party is only required in case of dispute; for this reason,
protocols of this type are commonly referred to as optimistic fair exchange protocols. See
[4, 5, 19, 6, 28, 52, 56, 94] for further details of such schemes.
The main problem with such an approach is the requirement for a dispute-resolving
third party with functions beyond those required of a normal Certification Authority. In
general, appropriate third parties may not be available.
It is our belief that the full power of fair exchange is not necessary in many application
scenarios. We therefore introduce a somewhat weaker concept, which we name concurrent
signatures. The cost of concurrent signatures is that they do not provide the full security
guarantees of a fair exchange protocol. Their benefit is that they have none of the dis-
advantages of previous solutions: they do not require a special trusted third party1, and
they do not rely on a computational balance between the parties. Moreover, our concrete
realization is computationally and bandwidth efficient. Informally, concurrent signatures
appear to be as close to fair exchange as it’s possible to get whilst staying truly practical
and not relying on special third parties.
We introduce the notion of concurrent signatures and concurrent signature protocols.
In a concurrent signature protocol, two parties A and B interact without the help of a third
party to sign (possibly identical) messages mA and mB in such a way that both A and
B become publicly committed to their respective messages at the same moment in time
(i.e. concurrently). This moment is determined by one of the parties through the release
of an extra piece of information k which we call a keystone. Before the keystone’s release,
neither party is publicly committed through their signatures, while after this point, both
are. In fact, from a third party’s point of view, before the keystone is released, either party
could have been responsible for producing both signatures, so these initial signatures are
non-transferable (i.e. not binding for the signer).
1Our concurrent signatures will still require a conventional CA for the distribution of public keys, but
not a trusted third party with any other special functions.
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We note that the party who controls the keystone k has a degree of extra power: it
controls the timing of the keystone release, to whom it is released and indeed whether the
keystone is released at all. Upon receipt of B’s signature σB, A might privately show σB
and k to a third party C and gain some advantage from doing so. This is the main feature
that distinguishes concurrent signatures from fair exchange schemes. In a fair exchange
scheme, each signer A should either have recourse to a third party to release the other
party B’s signature or be assured that the B cannot compute A’s signature significantly
more easily than A can compute B’s. With concurrent signatures, only when A releases
the keystone do both signatures become simultaneously binding (i.e. both signers become
publicly committed by their signatures), and there is no guarantee that A will do so.
However, in the real world, there are often existing mechanisms that can naturally be
used to guarantee that B will receive the keystone should his signature be used. These
existing mechanisms can provide a more natural dispute resolution process than reliance
on a special trusted party. We argue that concurrent signatures are suited to any fair
exchange application where:
• There is no sense in A withholding the keystone because she needs it to obtain
a service from B. For example, suppose B sells computers. A signs a payment
instruction to pay B the price of a computer, and B signs that he authorizes her to
pick one up from the depot (B’s signature may be thought of as a receipt). Now
A can withhold the keystone, but as soon as she tries to pick up her computer, the
depot will ask for a copy of B’s signature authorizing her to collect one. In this way
B can obtain the keystone which validates A’s payment instruction. In this example,
the application itself forces the delivery of the keystone to B.
• There is no possibility of A keeping B’s signature private in the long term. For
example, consider the routine “four corner” credit card payment model. Here C
may be A’s acquiring bank, and B’s signature may represent a payment to A that
A must channel via C to obtain payment. Bank C would then communicate with
B’s issuing bank D to obtain payment against B’s signature and D could ensure
that B’s signature, complete with keystone, reaches B (perhaps via a credit card
statement). As soon as B has the keystone, A becomes bound to her signature.
In this application, the back-end banking system provides a mechanism by which
keystones would reach B if A were to withhold them.
• There is a single third party C who verifies both A and B’s signature. Now, if A tries
to present B’s signature along with k to C whilst withholding k from B, B will be
93
5.1 Introduction
able to present A’s signature to C and have it verified. As an application, consider
the (perhaps somewhat artificial) scenario where A and B are two politicians from
different parties who want to form a coalition to jointly release a piece of information
M to the press C in such a way that neither of them is identified as being the sole
signatory to the release. Concurrent signatures seem just right for this task. In
this case A and B both produce initial (non-transferable) signatures on the same
message M . Here the keystone is not necessarily returned to B, but it does reach
the third party C to whom B wishes to show A’s signature.
We also consider an example where concurrent signatures provide a novel solution to
an old problem: that of fair tendering of contracts (our signatures can also be used in a
similar way in auction applications). Suppose that A has a bridge-building contract that
she wishes to put out to tender, and suppose companies B and C wish to put in proposals
to win the contract and build the bridge. This process is sometimes open to abuse by A
since she can privately show B’s signed proposal to C to enable C to better B’s proposal.
Using concurrent signatures, B would sign his proposal to build the bridge for an amount
X, but keep the keystone private. If A wishes to accept the proposal, she returns a payment
instruction to pay B amount X. She knows that if B attempts to collect the payment,
then A will obtain the keystone through the banking system. But A may also wish to
examine C’s proposal before deciding which to accept. However there is no advantage for
A to show B’s signature to C since at this point B’s signature is non-transferable and so
C will not be convinced of anything at all by seeing it. After all, A may have created the
signature herself in an attempt to get a better proposal from C. We see that the tendering
process is therefore immune to abuse of this kind by A. We note that this example makes
use of the non-transferability of our signatures prior to the keystone release, and although
the solution can be realized by using standard fair exchange protocols, such protocols do
not appear to previously have been suggested for this purpose.
Our schemes are not abuse-free in the sense of [6, 56], since the party A who holds the
keystone can always determine whether to complete or abort the exchange of signatures,
and can demonstrate this by showing an outside party C the signature from B with the
keystone before revealing the keystone to B. However the above example shows that abuse




We briefly explain how concurrent signature schemes can be built using (two-party) ring
signature schemes, which were defined in Section 3.3.
A ring signature has the property that it could have been produced by either of two
parties. The anonymity property of the underlying ring signature scheme also ensures that
it is infeasible to determine which of the two possible signers created the signature. These
properties allow both possible signers to deny having produced a specific NT signature.
However, we note that if A creates an NT signature which either A or B could have
created, and sends this to B, then B is convinced of the authorship of the signature since
he knows that he did not create it himself. However B cannot transfer this conviction and
prove A’s involvement to a third party since he could have created the signature himself.
The same situation applies when the roles of A and B are reversed.
When generating a two-party ring signature, a partyA will usually choose some random
bits f to combine with a party B’s public key. A will then use her private key to complete
the signature. Now, if the value f was not chosen randomly but rather was generated
from some preimage k, then A can demonstrate authorship of the signature by revealing
the preimage k of f . The ring signature alone is not binding for A, but the ring signature
together with the preimage k constitutes a binding signature for A. We use this concept
to construct concurrent signatures.
We begin by taking a two-party ring signature scheme of a specific form (i.e. one where
randomness is chosen for combination the public keys of each non-signer) and using it to
construct what we call a non-transferable signature scheme (NT signature scheme). NT
signature schemes are almost identical to ring signature schemes, and are formally defined
as part of a concurrent signature scheme in the sequel.
The general idea is that a party A generates an NT signature σA, using B’s public key
and a preimage k to generate the value f . The value k is called the keystone and is kept
private by A. A sends σA to party B.
Party B can verify that A created the signature σA but cannot demonstrate this to a
third party. Now B generates his own NT signature σB using A’s public key and the same
value f , and sends σB to A.
Now A can verify that B generated σB, but as long as k remains secret, neither
party can demonstrate authorship to a third party. However if A releases the keystone k,
then any third party can be convinced of the authorship of both signatures, since both
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signatures use the value f for which k is a preimage. Thus the pairs 〈k, σA〉 and 〈k, σB〉
amount to a simultaneously binding pair of signatures on A and B’s messages. We call
these pairs concurrent signatures.
We note that Rivest et al. in their pioneering work on ring signatures [97] considered
the situation in which an anonymous signer A wants to have the option of later proving her
authorship of a ring signature. Their solution was to choose the bits hB pseudo-randomly
and later to reveal the seed used to generate hB. Here we use the same trick for a new
purpose: to ensure that either both or neither of the parties can be identified as signers
of messages.
An NT signature scheme is almost identical to a two-party ring signature scheme. The
main difference is that an NT signature scheme needs to be of a specific structure in order
to accommodate a keystone, and the random bits hB are taken as input to the signature
algorithm instead of being chosen randomly within the algorithm.
We point out that any suitable NT signature scheme can be used to produce a concur-
rent signature protocol. We base our concrete scheme on the non-separable ring signature
scheme of Section 3.5, although alternate concurrent signature schemes may be constructed
from other suitable ring signature schemes such as the short ring signature scheme of [19].
It may also be possible to construct a concurrent signature scheme from designated verifier
signatures presented in Chapter 4. However these are often not of the correct form unless
constructed from a 2-party ring signature scheme.
We give generic definitions of concurrent signature schemes and concurrent signature
protocols, define a suitably powerful multi-party adversarial model for this setting, and
give a formal definition of what it means for such schemes and protocols to be secure.
5.1.2 Published Work
An earlier version of this work appears in [41] and forms the basis for this chapter. However
the nomenclature in this chapter differs slightly from the published work. In particular,
what we refer to as non-transferable (NT) signatures in this chapter are referred to as
ambiguous signatures in [41]. This is to avoid confusion between NT signatures and the
security property of anonymity for ring signature schemes. We rename the function that
transforms a keystone k into a suitable h value. In [41] this function was called KGen, but
to avoid confusion with the key generation algorithm KeyGen, we now refer to this function
as KCommit. In [41], the outputs of the function KGen were called keystone footprints.




5.2.1 Concurrent Signature Algorithms
We now give a more formal definition of concurrent signature schemes and the protocol
for exchanging concurrent signatures.
Definition 5.1 A concurrent signature scheme is a digital signature scheme comprised of
the following algorithms:
Setup: A probabilistic algorithm that on input a security parameter l, outputs the public
parameters including descriptions of: the public key space PK, the private key space
SK, the message spaceM, the signature space S, the keystone space K, the keystone
footprint space F , and a function KCommit : K → F .
KeyGen: A probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters and outputs
a public key X ∈ PK and a corresponding private key x ∈ SK.
NTSign: A probabilistic algorithm that on inputs 〈Xi, Xj , xi, hj ,m〉, where Xi, Xj ∈ PK,
Xj 6= Xi, xi ∈ SK is the private key corresponding to Xi, hj ∈ F , and m ∈ M,
outputs a signature σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉 on m, where s ∈ S, hi, hj ∈ F .
NTVerify: An algorithm which takes as input S = 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉, where σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉,
s ∈ S, hi, hj ∈ F , Xi, Xj ∈ PK, and m ∈M, outputs accept or reject.
CSVerify: An algorithm which takes as input 〈k, kpos, S〉 where k ∈ K is a keystone,
kpos ∈ {1, 2}, and S is of the form S = 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉, where σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉 with
s ∈ S, hi, hj ∈ F , Xi, Xj ∈ PK, and m ∈M. If kpos = 1 then the algorithm checks
if KCommit(k)= hi, and if not, it terminates with output reject. If kpos = 2 then the
algorithm checks if KCommit(k)= hj , and if not, it terminates with output reject.
The algorithm then runs NTVerify(S) (in which case the output of CSVerify is just
that of NTVerify).
We call a signature σ that is output by NTSign an NT signature, and if NTVerify(σ,Xi,
Xj ,m) returns accept, then we say that σ is a valid NT signature on m for Xi and Xj .
An NT signature σ on message m for Xi and Xj , together with a keystone k is
called a concurrent signature. The value kpos determines the position of the keystone
footprint within the NT signature. Therefore if CSVerify(k, 2, S = 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉) where
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σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉 returns accept, then we say that the pair 〈k, σ〉 is a valid concurrent sig-
nature on m for Xi. Similarly, if CSVerify(k, 1, S = 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉) where σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉
returns accept, then we say that the pair 〈k, σ〉 is a valid concurrent signature on m for
Xj .
5.2.2 Concurrent Signature Protocol
We now describe a concurrent signature protocol between two parties A and B. Since
one party needs to create the keystone and send the first NT signature, we call this party
the initial signer. A party who responds to this initial signature by creating another NT
signature with the same keystone footprint we call a matching signer. Without loss of
generality, we assume A to be the initial signer, and B the matching signer. From here
on, we will use subscripts A and B to indicate initial signer A and matching signer B.
The signature protocol works as follows:
We assume that Setup has been run to determine the public parameters, and A and B
have run KeyGen to determine their public and private keys. We assume that A’s public
and private keys are XA and xA, and B’s public and private keys are XB and xB.
Step 1: A picks a random keystone k ∈ K, and computes f= KCommit(k). A picks a
message mA ∈M to sign and then computes her NT signature as
σA = 〈sA, hA, f〉 = NTSign(XA, XB, xA, f,mA),
and sends this to B.
Step 2: Upon receiving A’s NT signature σA, B verifies the signature by checking that
NTVerify(〈sA, hA, f〉, XA, XB,mA) returns accept. If not then B aborts, otherwise B picks
a message mB ∈M to sign and computes his NT signature as
σB = 〈sB, hB, f〉 = NTSign(XB, XA, xB, f,mB)
and sends this back to A. Note that B uses the same value f in his signature as A did to
produce σA.
Step 3: Upon receivingB’s signature σB, A verifies that NTVerify(〈sB, hB, f〉, XB, XA,mB)
returns accept, where f is the same keystone footprint as A used in Step 1. If not then A
aborts, otherwise A sends keystone k to B.
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Note that inputs 〈k, 2, SA〉 and 〈k, 2, SB〉 will now both be accepted by CSVerify, where
SA = 〈〈sA, hA, f〉, XA, XB,mA〉 and SB = 〈〈sB, hB, f〉, XB, XA,mB〉.
By following the concurrent signature protocol, the value kpos will only ever be set to
2. However there may be other ways to produce a valid NT signature, where the keystone
corresponds to the first h value, and these signatures should still be considered valid. For
example, if the NT signature scheme is constructed from a ring signature scheme, then a
signer may choose to reverse the order of the public keys and h values, and could produce
a concurrent signature where the value kpos is 1.
5.3 Formal Security Model
Concurrent signatures naturally involve more than one party, and any party may interact
with many other parties and in different roles. Our security model is therefore multiparty
and assumes a system with a number of different participants that is polynomial in the
security parameter l.
We say that a concurrent signature scheme is secure if it satisfies the notions of cor-
rectness, non-transferability, unforgeability and fairness. These are defined as follows.
5.3.1 Correctness
Definition 5.2 We say that a concurrent signature scheme is correct if the following
conditions hold.
If σ = 〈s, hi, f〉 = NTSign(Xi, Xj , xi, f,m), and S = 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉, then NTVerify(S)
returns accept. Moreover, if KCommit(k) = f for some k ∈ K, then CSVerify(k, 2, S)
returns accept.
5.3.2 Non-transferability
We say that a concurrent signature scheme is non-transferable if there exists a polynomial
time algorithm FakeNTSign that on input tuples 〈Xi, Xj , xj ,M〉, whereXi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6=
Xi, xj ∈ SK is the private key corresponding to Xj , and M ∈M, outputs NT signatures
σ′ = 〈s′, h′i, h′j〉 such that 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,M〉 is accepted by NTVerify and the distribution of
σ′ is polynomially indistinguishable from that of signatures σ produced by NTSign when
run on inputs 〈Xi, Xj , xi, f,M〉 where f = KCommit(k) for some random k ∈ K.
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5.3.3 Unforgeability
We give a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a concurrent signature scheme
under a chosen message attack in the multi-party setting. To do this, we extend the
definition of existential unforgeability against a chosen message attack of [63] to the multi-
party setting. Our extension is strong enough to capture an adversary who can simulate
and observe concurrent signature protocol runs between any pair of participants. It is
defined using the following game between an adversary E and a challenger C.
Initialization: C runs Setup for a given security parameter l to obtain the public pa-
rameters and the descriptions of PK, SK, M, S, K, F , and KCommit : K → F . C
also generates the public and private keys Xi and xi for each participant, where the
number of participants is polynomial in l. E is given the public parameters and the
set of public keys {Xi}. C retains the set of private keys {xi}.
E can make the following types of query to the challenger C:
KCommit Queries: E can request that C select a keystone k ∈ K and return the
keystone footprint f = KCommit(k). If E wishes to choose his own keystone, then
he can compute his own keystone footprint using algorithm KCommit directly.
KReveal Queries: E can request that C reveal the keystone k that was used to pro-
duce a keystone footprint f ∈ F in a previous KCommit query. If f was not a
previous KCommit output then C outputs invalid, otherwise C outputs k where
f = KCommit(k).
NTSign Queries: E can request an NT signature for any input of the form 〈Xi, Xj , hj ,m〉
where hj ∈ F , Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6= Xi and m ∈ M. C responds with an NT signa-
ture σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉 = NTSign(Xi, Xj , xi, hj ,m). Note that using NTSign queries in
conjunction with KCommit queries, E can obtain concurrent signatures 〈k, σ〉 for
messages and pairs of users of his choice.
FakeNTSign Queries: E can request an NT signature for any input of the form 〈Xi, Xj ,
m〉 where Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6= Xi and m ∈ M. C responds with an NT signature
σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉 = FakeNTSign(Xi, Xj , xj ,m).
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to the public key of any
participant with public key Xi. In response, C outputs the corresponding private
key xi.
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Output: Finally E outputs a tuple σ = 〈s, hc, f〉 where s ∈ S, hc, f ∈ F , along with
public keys Xc, Xd ∈ PK, Xd 6= Xc and a message m ∈M. The adversary wins the
game if NTVerify(〈s, hc, f〉, Xc, Xd,m) returns accept, no NTSign query was made
on 〈Xc, Xd, f ′,m〉 for any f ′ ∈ F , no FakeNTSign query was made on 〈Xc, Xd,m〉,
no Corrupt query was made on Xc, and if one of the following two cases hold:
1. No Corrupt query was made on Xd, or
2. Either f was a previous output from a KCommit query or E also outputs a
keystone k such that f = KCommit(k).
Definition 5.3 We say that a concurrent signature scheme is unforgeable if the probability
of success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible (as a
function of the security parameter l).
Case 1 of the output conditions in the above game models forgery of an NT signature
in the situation where the adversary does not have knowledge of either of the respective
private keys. This condition is required so that the matching signer B is convinced that
A’s NT signature originated from A. Case 2 models forgery in the situation where the
adversary knows one of the private keys and so applies to the situation where one of
the two parties attempts to cheat the other. More specifically, it covers attacks where
an initial signer forges a concurrent signature of a matching signer, or where a matching
signer has access to an initial signer’s NT signature and keystone footprint (but not the
actual keystone) and forges a concurrent signature of the initial signer.
The challenger in the unforgeability game is able to answer FakeNTSign queries using
algorithm FakeNTSign from Section 5.3.2. We consider it important to model such queries
(as in the unforgeability game for DV signatures in Section 4.9.3) since an adversary may
have access to such “faked” NT signatures that are produced by dishonest entities using
FakeNTSign.
5.3.4 Fairness
We require the concurrent signature scheme and protocol to be fair for both an initial signer
A, and a matching signer B. This concept is defined via the following game between an
adversary E and a challenger C:
Initialization: This is as before in the unforgeability game of Section 5.3.3.
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KCommit, KReveal, NTSign, FakeNTSign and Corrupt Queries: These queries
are answered by C as in the unforgeability game of Section 5.3.3.
Output: Finally E outputs a keystone k ∈ K, and S = 〈σ,Xc, Xd,m〉 where σ = 〈s, hc, f〉,
s ∈ S, hc, f ∈ F , Xc, Xd ∈ PK, Xd 6= Xc and m ∈M, where 〈k, 2, S〉 is accepted by
CSVerify. The adversary wins the game if either of the following cases holds:
1. f was a previous output from a KCommit query and no KReveal query on
input f was made, or
2. E also produces S′ = 〈σ′, Xd, Xc,m′〉, with σ′ = 〈s′, h′c, f〉, s′ ∈ S, h′c, f ∈ F ,
and message m′ ∈ M, where NTVerify(S′) returns accept, but 〈k, 2, S′〉 is not
accepted by CSVerify.
Definition 5.4 We say that a concurrent signature scheme is fair if any polynomially
bounded adversary’s probability of success in the above game is negligible.
Our definition of fairness formalizes our intuitive understanding of fairness for A in the
protocol of Section 5.2.2 (in case 1 of the output conditions), since it guarantees that only
the entity who generates a keystone can reveal it, thereby converting valid NT signatures
into binding concurrent signatures. It also captures fairness for B (in case 2 of the output
conditions), since it guarantees that all valid NT signatures produced using the same
keystone footprint will all become binding. Thus B cannot be left in a position where a
keystone binds his NT signature to him while A’s initial NT signature is not also bound
to A. However we note that our definition does not guarantee that B will ever receive the
necessary keystone.
5.4 A Concrete Concurrent Signature Scheme
We present a concrete concurrent signature scheme which is based on the 2-party version
of the ring signature scheme presented in Section 3.5. The scheme is defined via the
following algorithms:
Setup: For some security parameter l, let p and q be large primes, where q|(p − 1). Let
G be a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q and let g be a generator of G. Two
cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq are also selected and we define
KCommit to be H1. The public parameters are params = 〈p, q, g,H1,H2〉 as well as
descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,S,F ,M,K which are defined as follows: PK = G,
SK = Z∗q , S = F=Zq and M = K={0, 1}∗.
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KeyGen: This algorithm takes as input the public parameters and selects a private key xi at
random from Z∗q , and the corresponding public key is computed as Xi = gxi mod p.
NTSign: This algorithm takes as input 〈Xi, Xj , xi, hj ,m〉, where Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6= Xi,
xi ∈ Zq is the private key corresponding to Xi, hj ∈ F and m ∈ M. The algorithm
picks a random value t ∈ Zq and then computes the values:
h = H2(Xi‖Xj‖m‖gtXjhj mod p),
hi = h− hj mod q,
s = t− xihi mod q.
The algorithm outputs σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉.
NTVerify: This algorithm takes as input 〈σ,Xi, Xj ,m〉 where σ = 〈s, hi, hj〉, s ∈ S, hi, hj ∈
F , Xi, Xj ∈ PK, and m ∈M. The algorithm checks that the equation
hi + hj mod q = H2(Xi‖Xj‖m‖gsXhii Xhjj mod p)
holds, and if so, outputs accept. Otherwise, it outputs reject.
CSVerify: This algorithm is defined in terms of KCommit and NTVerify, as described in
Section 5.2.1.
The NTSign algorithm is almost identical to the RingSign algorithm of Section 3.5 on
input 〈m,R = {Xi, Xj}, i, xi〉 except that hj is taken as an input parameter instead of
being chosen randomly within the signature algorithm. The NTVerify algorithm is identical
to the RingVerify algorithm of Section 3.5. We require that Xj 6= Xi since otherwise the
signature would be a standard Schnorr signature [99] and would not be non-transferable.
A concrete concurrent signature protocol can be derived directly from the algorithms
defined above and the generic protocol described in Section 5.2.2.
5.5 Security of the Concrete Concurrent Signature Scheme
We now present some security results for the concrete scheme of Section 5.4.
Theorem 5.1 The concurrent signature scheme of Section 5.4 is correct.
Proof: This is trivial to verify, and we leave the details to the reader. ¤
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Theorem 5.2 The concurrent signature scheme of Section 5.4 is non-transferable in the
random oracle model.
Proof: We let the algorithm FakeNTSign be defined by running algorithm RingSign of
Section 3.5 on input 〈M,R = {Xi, Xj}, j, xj〉.







′ − h′i mod q
s′ = t′ − xjh′j mod q
The signature is σ′ = 〈s′, h′i, h′j〉. The correctness of the underlying ring signature
scheme guarantees that FakeNTSign outputs an NT signature σ′ = 〈s′, h′i, h′j〉 such that
〈σ′, Xi, Xj ,m〉 is accepted by NTVerify.
The only difference between the NTSign and FakeNTSign algorithms is that NTSign
takes the value f as input, whereas FakeNTSign selects the value h′j randomly from Zq. The
anonymity property of the underlying ring signature scheme therefore guarantee that the
distribution of σ′ is polynomially indistinguishable from that of signatures σ = 〈s, hi, f〉
produced by NTSign(Xi, Xj , xi, f,m) where f = KCommit(k) for some random k ∈ K as
long as h′j and f are indistinguishable. Since f is output by KCommit, which we model
as a random oracle, f is independent of s and hi, and is distributed uniformly at random
in Zq. The algorithm RingSign chooses h′j at random from Zq, so h′j is also independent
of s′ and h′i, and is distributed uniformly at random in Zq. Therefore and f and h′j , and
therefore also σ and σ′, are indistinguishable as required. ¤
In order to analyze the unforgeability of our concurrent signature scheme, we first
need to introduce a related non-generic (NG) signature scheme. We recall that generic
signature schemes are simply digital signature schemes (as defined in Section 2.2.3) that
take a certain form (which is described in Section 2.3.4). In addition, we recall from
Section 2.3.5 that NG signature schemes are identical to generic signature schemes except
that instead of generating signatures on a message M , NG signature schemes take an
additional value T as input when generating or verifying a signature. Security for NG
signature schemes is defined in the same way as security for digital signature schemes (in
Section 2.3.1) except that the model is adapted to accommodate the additional value T .
Our concrete NG signature scheme, which we refer to as the NG CS signature scheme,
is defined as follows.
• The Setup and KeyGen algorithms are identical to those of the concrete NIDV EDL
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scheme except that the keystone space K and the function KCommit are not required.
• The Sign algorithm for a public key X takes as input a message M = Xi, Xj ,m and
a private key xi ∈ SK, where Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xi = X or Xj = X, and m ∈ M, a
value T ∈ F .
If Xi = X then the algorithm runs in an identical way to NTSign(Xi, Xj , xi, T,m)
to produce a signature σ = 〈s, hi, T 〉. The algorithm sets r2 = 〈s, T 〉, h = hi + T ,
r1 = gsXhii X
T
j mod p, and outputs σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
IfXj = X then the algorithm runs in an identical way to FakeNTSign(Xi, Xj , xj , T,m)
except that the value h′i is set to be T instead of being chosen randomly from Zq. This
produces a signature σ = 〈s′, T, h′j〉. The algorithm sets r2 = 〈s′, h′j〉, h = T + hj ,
r1 = gsXTi X
hj
j mod p, and outputs σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉.
• The Verify algorithm on input M = Xi, Xj ,m, where Xi = X or Xj = X, and a
signature σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈s, hj〉, sets σ = 〈s, h−hj , hj〉 and runs in an
identical way to NTVerify(σ,Xi, Xj ,m).
Theorem 5.3 The concurrent signature scheme of Section 5.4 is unforgeable in the ran-
dom oracle model, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Proof:
We suppose that H1 and H2 are random oracles and there exists a polynomial time
algorithm E that makes at most µi queries to the random oraclesHi, i = {1, 2}, at most µn
NTSignGen and µf FakeNTSign queries, and wins the unforgeability game of Section
5.3.3 in time at most τ with non-negligible probability η′ (in security parameter l) where
the number of participants is bounded by ρ and η′ > 10ρ(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l where
µs = µn + µf .
In Step 1 of the proof, we show how E can be used to construct an algorithm B
that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2, at most µs Sign queries to its
challenger C, and wins the NG version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1 for the
NG CS signature scheme in time at most τ with non-negligible probability η = η′/ρ where
η > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
In Step 2 of the proof, we then replace C with an algorithm C ′ that uses B to solve
the discrete logarithm problem in G. Step 2 of the proof will make use of Lemma 2.6, the
NG Forking Lemma.
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Step 1 We will show that there exists an algorithm B that uses E to forge an NG CS
signature with non-negligible probability when interacting with a challenger C in the NG
version of the unforgeability game of Section 2.3.1.
The challenger C initializes the NG unforgeability game for B and gives B the public
key X, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,S,F ,M, and
access to the random oracle H2.
B can make H2 as well as Sign queries on any message M = m,σ,Xi, Xj (where
m ∈ M, σ′ ∈ S, Xi, Xj ∈ PK, and Xi = X or Xj = X), and a value T ∈ F . B must
eventually output a message M∗, a value T ∗, and an NG CS signature σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉.
B wins the game if 〈M∗, σ∗NG〉 is accepted by Verify and no Sign query was previously
made on M∗, T ∗.
In order to win the above game, B in turn simulates a concurrent signature unforge-
ability game for E. CS Unforgeability Simulation:
B gives the parameters 〈g, p, q〉 and the descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,S,F ,M
as well as a description of K={0, 1}∗ to E. B generates a set of participants U , where
|U | = ρ(l) and ρ is a polynomial function of the security parameter l. B sets the public key
of some randomly selected participant to be Xα = X, and for each i 6= α, B runs KeyGen
to generate a private key xi and public key Xi. We define the set of all participants’ public
keys to be X . E is given X .
B now simulates the challenger by simulating all the queries which E can make as
follows:
H1-Queries: E can query the random oracle H1 at any time. B simulates the random
oracle by keeping a list LH1 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉. When the oracle is queried with an
input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, B responds as follows:
1. If the string str is already in LH1 in the tuple 〈str = stri, ri〉, then B outputs
gri mod p.
2. Otherwise B selects a random r ∈ Zq, outputs gr mod p and adds 〈str, r〉 to
LH1 .
H2-Queries: E can query any string str on the H2 oracle. B simulates the H2 oracle by
passing all H2 queries to C and passing C’s response back to E.
KCommit Queries: E can request that the challenger select a keystone k ∈ K and
return a keystone footprint f = H1(k). B maintains a list LK of tuples 〈k, f〉, and
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answers queries by choosing a random keystone k ∈ K and computing f = H1(k).
B outputs f and adds the tuple 〈k, f〉 to LK . Note that LK is a sublist of H1-List,
but is required in order to answer KReveal queries.
KReveal Queries: E can request the keystone of any keystone footprint f ∈ F produced
by a previous KCommit Query. If there exists a tuple 〈k, f〉 on LK , then B returns
k, otherwise it outputs invalid.
NTSign Queries: E can request an NT signature for input 〈Xi, Xj , hj ,m〉 where hj ∈ F ,
Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6= Xi, and m ∈M.
If Xi = Xα then B sets M = Xi, Xj ,m and T = hj and makes a Sign query to C
on M and T . C responds with an NG signature σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈s, T 〉.
B sets σ = 〈s, h− T, T 〉 and outputs σ to E.
If Xi 6= Xα then B runs NTSign(Xi, Xj , xi, T,m) to produce an NT signature σ
which it outputs to E.
FakeNTSign Queries: E can request a fake NT signature on input 〈Xi, Xj ,m〉 where
Xi, Xj ∈ PK, Xj 6= Xi, and m ∈M.
If Xj = Xα then B selects a random value hj ∈ F , sets M = Xi, Xj ,m and T = hj
and makes a Sign query to C on M and T . C responds with an NG signature
σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 where r2 = 〈s, T 〉. B sets σ = 〈s, h− T, T 〉 and outputs σ to E.
If Xj 6= Xα then B runs FakeNTSign(Xi, Xj , xj ,m) to produce an NT signature σ
which it outputs to E.
Corrupt Queries: E can request the private key for any public key Xi. If Xi = Xα,
then B terminates the simulation. Otherwise B returns the appropriate private key
xi.
Output: Finally, with non-negligible probability, E outputs a signature σ = 〈s, hc, f〉
where s ∈ S, hc, f ∈ F , along with public keys Xc, Xd ∈ PK, Xd 6= Xc, and a mes-
sage m ∈M, where NTVerify(〈s, hc, f〉, Xc, Xd,m) returns accept, σ was not output
by any NTSign query on 〈Xc, Xd, f,m〉 or FakeNTSign query on 〈Xc, Xd,m〉, no
Corrupt query was made on Xc, and one of the following two cases holds:
1. No Corrupt query was made on Xd, or
2. Either f was a previous output from a KCommit query or E also outputs a
keystone k such that f = KCommit(k).
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B takes E’s output σ where σ = 〈s, hc, f〉, and sets M∗ = Xc, Xd,m, T ∗ = f , h∗ =
hc+f and σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉 where r∗1 = gsXhcc Xfd mod p and r∗2 = 〈s, f〉. B outputs M∗,
T ∗ and σ∗NG to C.
Since E never made any NTSign queries on 〈Xc, Xd, f,m〉 or FakeNTSign queries
on 〈Xc, Xd,m〉, B never made any Sign queries on M∗ = Xc, Xd,m and T ∗ = f .
The probability that B does not have to abort, E wins the game, and that either
XV = XJ , or XP = XJ , is η′/ρ, which is non-negligible in security parameter l if η is. In
this case, B would not have had to abort, and B wins the NG unforgeability game with
probability η = η′/ρ making at most µ2 queries to the random oracle H2, and at most
µs = µn + µf Sign queries to C.
Step 2 We now define an algorithm C ′ that replaces B’s challenger C and uses B to
solve the discrete logarithm problem in G. C ′ will simulate the random oracle H2 and
the challenger in an NG unforgeability game with B. C ′’s goal is to solve the discrete
logarithm problem on input 〈g,X, p, q〉, that is to find x ∈ Zq such that gx = X mod p,
where g is of prime order q modulo prime p and generates group G.
NG Unforgeability Simulation:
The challenger C ′ initializes the NG unforgeability game for B as follows. C ′ gives B
the public keyX, the public parameters 〈p, q, g〉, descriptions of the spaces PK,SK,S,F ,M,
and access to the random oracle H2.
C ′ now simulates the challenger in an NG unforgeability game by simulating all the
queries which B can make as follows:
H2-Queries: B can query the random oracle H2 at any time. C ′ simulates the random
oracle by keeping a list LH2 of tuples 〈stri, ri〉. When the oracle is queried with an
input str ∈ {0, 1}∗, C ′ responds as follows:
1. If the string str is already in LH2 in the tuple 〈str = stri, ri〉, then B outputs
ri.
2. Otherwise B selects a random r ∈ Zq, outputs r and adds 〈str, r〉 to LH2 .
Sign Queries: C ′ will also answer B’s Sign queries on any messages M = Xi, Xj ,m
where Xi = X or Xj = X, and values T ∈ F . C ′ picks random s, h ∈ Zq and
computes
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C ′ constructs the string str = M, r1, and adds the tuple 〈str, h〉 to LH2 . C ′ then
sets r2 = 〈s, T 〉 and σNG = 〈r1, h, r2〉 which it outputs to B.
Output: Finally B should output a message M∗ a value T ∗ and an NG CS signature
σ∗NG = 〈r∗1, h∗, r∗2〉. B wins the game if 〈M∗, σ∗NG〉 is accepted by Verify and no Sign
query was previously made on M∗, T ∗.
Since H2 is a random oracle, C ′ can simulate NG CS signatures that are indistinguish-
able from true NG CS signatures, so B can detect no inconsistency in the game.
From Step 1, we know that B that makes at most µ2 queries to the random oracle
H2, at most µs = µn + µf Sign queries, and wins the above game in time at most τ with
non-negligible probability η = η′/ρ > 10(µs + 1)(µs + µ2)/2l.
By Lemma 2.6 of Section 2.3.5, (the NG Forking Lemma), C ′ can rewind B (and
therefore also E) with the same random coins and repeat its simulation with a different
random oracle H2 so that B outputs another NG CS signature σNG = 〈r∗1, h, r2〉 on M∗ =




This means that B in fact obtained two valid NT signatures σ = 〈s, hc, f〉 and σ′ =
〈s′, h′c, f ′〉 from E where the set of public keys and message for each signature are identical





f ′ = gsXchcXdf mod p. (5.1)
We now need to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether E wins the CS
unforgeability game (simulated by B) by satisfying output condition 1 or 2. If E wins the
game by satisfying condition 1, then we say that E is a Type-1 adversary, otherwise we
say that E is a Type-2 adversary.
Case 1. We suppose that E is a Type-1 adversary. In this case, Xc and Xd were both
uncorrupted in the NIDV soundness game, and we could have that Xc = X or that
Xd = X. If hc 6= h′c and Xc = Xα, then C ′ can solve equation 5.1 for the discrete
logarithm of Xc = Xα. The probability that Xc = Xα is 1/2 since Xα = X was chosen
randomly from the set of participants and we know that Xc = Xα or Xd = Xα. If hc = h′c
then f 6= f ′. In this case, if Xd = Xα then C ′ can solve equation 5.1 for the discrete
logarithm of Xd = Xα. The probability that Xd = Xα is 1/2 since Xα = X was chosen
randomly from the set of participants and we know that Xc = Xα or Xd = Xα.
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Case 2. We suppose that E is a Type-2 adversary. In this case, we know that Xc is
uncorrupted (and we could have that Xc = X) and either f was a previous output from
a KCommit query or E also outputs a keystone k such that f = KCommit(k).
If hc = h′c, then f 6= f ′, so the values hc and f (similarly h′c and f ′) must have
been computed after the H2 query which resulted in h (or h∗), and satisfy the equations
f = h−hc and f ′ = h′−h′c. But we know that f is also an output of H1 in the concurrent
signature unforgeability game, either from a direct H1 query, or via a KCommit query,
and the probability that an output from an H1 query matches (some function of) an
output from an H2 query is at most µ2µ1/q. This is negligible, so we assume that f = f ′,
and therefore that hc 6= h′c.
Since hc 6= h′c, if Xc = Xα = X then C ′ can now solve equation 5.1 for x, the discrete
logarithm of Xc = Xα = X. The probability that Xc = Xα is 1/2 since Xα = X was
chosen randomly from the set of participants and we know that Xc = Xα or Xd = Xα.
From Cases 1 and 2 we find that the probability that C ′ can solve equation 5.1 for the
discrete logarithm of X is at least
γ = min{η/2, η(q − µ1µ2)
2q
} = η(q − µ1µ2)
2q
which is non-negligible in security parameter l.
Since the NG Forking Lemma produces a second appropriate signature with expected
time at most τ ′ = 120686µsτ , we find that C ′ can solve the discrete logarithm problem in
expected time τ ′/γ = 120686µsτ/γ.
This contradicts the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore no such
polynomially bounded adversary B can have non-negligible probability of winning the NG
signature unforgeability game, and in turn no polynomially bounded adversary E can have
non-negligible probability of winning the unforgeability game of Section 5.3.3.
¤
Theorem 5.4 The concurrent signature scheme of Section 5.4 is fair in the random oracle
model.
Proof: We suppose that H1 and H2 are random oracles, and suppose that there exists
an algorithm E that with non-negligible probability wins the fairness game of Section
5.3.4. At the end of the game, we assume that E outputs outputs a keystone k ∈ K, and
S = 〈σ,Xc, Xd,m〉 where σ = 〈s, hc, f〉, s ∈ S, hc, f ∈ F , Xc, Xd ∈ PK, Xd 6= Xc and
m ∈M, where 〈k, 2, S〉 is accepted by CSVerify and one of the following cases holds:
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1. f was a previous output from a KCommit query and no KReveal query on input
f was made, or
2. E also produces S′ = 〈σ′, Xd, Xc,m′〉, with σ′ = 〈s′, h′c, f〉, s′ ∈ S, h′c, f ∈ F , and
message m′ ∈ M, where NTVerify(S′) returns accept, but 〈k, 2, S′〉 is not accepted
by CSVerify.
We show that such an E cannot exist.
Suppose case 1 of the output conditions occurs. Then E has found a keystone k and
an output of a KCommit query f such that f = H1(k), but without making a KReveal
query on input f . Since H1 is a random oracle, E’s probability of producing such a k is
at most µ1µ2/q, where µ1 is the number of H1 queries made by E and µ2 is the number
of KCommit queries made by E. Since both µ1 and µ2 are polynomially bounded in
the security parameter l and q is exponential in l, this probability is negligible. This
contradicts our assumption that E wins the game with non-negligible probability, so Case
1 cannot occur.
Suppose case 2 of the output conditions occurs. Since 〈k, 2, S〉 is accepted by CSVerify,
we must have that NTVerify(S) returns accept and KCommit(k)=f . But then, since S and
S′ share the value f and NTVerify(S′) returns accept, we must also have that 〈k, 2, S′〉 is
accepted by CSVerify. This is a contradiction, so Case 2 cannot occur. ¤
5.6 Extensions and Open Problems
5.6.1 The Scheme Can Use a Variety of Keys
Our concurrent signature scheme can be based on any ring signature scheme, as long as
it is of the correct form and compatible with the keystone idea. Thus it is feasible to
build concrete concurrent signature schemes using a variety of key types. The security of
such schemes could then be based on a variety of underlying hard problems. Furthermore,
the key pairs in a single concurrent signature scheme may be of different types if the
concurrent signature scheme is constructed using a separable ring signature scheme which
is compatible with the keystone idea.
5.6.2 The Multi-party Case
It would be interesting to see if concurrent signatures could be extended to the multi-party
case, that is, where many entities can fairly exchange signatures concurrently. The existing
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two party scheme can trivially be extended to include multiple matching signers by using
a ring signature scheme with the appropriate number of signers. However it appears to be
difficult to construct an appropriate model of security for fairness in the multiparty case.
We illustrate some of these issues by an example.
In the 2-party case, the matching signer is convinced of the initial signer’s participation
before responding. In the multiparty case, an intermediate signer may like assurance that
the following signers will be committed before the keystone is revealed. However this
release may be under the control of the initial signer, requiring the intermediate signers
to trust the initial signer more than is necessary in the 2-party case. It would therefore be
interesting to investigate methods whereby the revelation of keystones does not depend
entirely on the initial signer, but on the other signing parties as well.
Susilo et al. propose a solution for the tripartite case in [107], however so far there have
been no proposals extending the notion of concurrent signatures to the general multiparty
case.
5.6.3 Extensions to Concurrent Signatures
A few authors have extended the idea of concurrent signature schemes (as was presented
in [41]). In [108], Susilo et al. present the notion of perfect concurrent signatures. This
paper improves the notion of ambiguity in [41] (or non-transferability as we refer to it in
this chapter) by ensuring that even if both signers are known to be trustworthy, it is still
infeasible to determine which ambiguous (NT) signature corresponds to which signer. By
contrast, our ambiguous (NT) signatures use a common value, so if two signers are known
to have followed the protocol, then the position of the common value indicates the position
of the keystone which in turn indicates the true authorship of each signature. However
concurrent signatures are designed to be used in environments where signers do not trust
each other, so the value of the improvements made in [108] are questionable.
In parallel work to [108], Nguyen also presents a proposal to improve the ambiguity
(or non-transferability) properties of concurrent signatures in [89]. The goals of the two
papers appear to be very similar, although the solutions are slightly different.
The original work of [41] in fact briefly discusses the extension of concurrent signature
schemes to the identity-based setting, and argues that the extension is trivial. Neverthe-




We introduced the notion of concurrent signatures, presented a concurrent signature
scheme and related its security to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in an
appropriate security model. We have also discussed some applications for concurrent signa-
tures, and the advantages they have over previous work. In particular, we have compared
concurrent signatures to techniques for fair exchange of signatures, and presented some
applications in which the full security of fair exchange may not be necessary and the more






Introduction to Key Agreement
6.1 Basic Concepts
We start by defining some fundamental concepts that will be necessary for our discussions
on key agreement protocols.
A protocol in which a shared secret intended for cryptographic use becomes available
to two or more parties is called a key establishment protocol. Key establishment protocols
result in shared secrets which are typically called session keys. A session key is usually
intended to be an ephemeral secret, i.e., a secret value which will only be used for a short
time period or session, after which it is securely erased.
The class of key establishment protocols may be subdivided into key transport protocols
and key agreement protocols which are defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 [87] A key transport protocol is a key establishment protocol where one
party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s).
Definition 6.2 [87] A key agreement protocol is a key establishment technique in which a
shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information contributed
by, or associated with, each of these, (ideally) such that no party can predetermine the
resulting value.
In this thesis we are concerned with key agreement rather than key transport, therefore
we focus on key agreement from now on.
When discussing communications on a channel, we require the following terminology:
Passes: The number of passes in a protocol is the total number of messages exchanged
in the protocol.
115
6.2 The Diffie-Hellman Protocol
Broadcast: A broadcast message is a message that is sent to every party in a protocol.
Rounds: A round consists of all the messages that can be sent and received in parallel
in a protocol.
These notions can be affected by the type of network in which the protocol is operating.
For example, not all networks allow messages to be broadcast, and in this case, a separate
message must be sent to all parties.
We occasionally call a generic execution of a protocol between two or more participants
a run of the protocol.
6.1.1 Adversarial Assumptions
As in Section 2.3, we define an adversary or attacker of a cryptographic protocol to be
an entity which tries to defeat the intended security objective of the protocol. A passive
adversary is one which only monitors communication channels. An active adversary is one
which attempts to delete, add, or in some way modify the transmissions on a channel. We
call such attacks made by an active adversary active attacks.
It is typically assumed that protocol messages are transmitted over channels or net-
works which are unprotected against attacks by an active adversary. When analyzing the
security of a protocol, we therefore assume that the adversary has complete control over
the network, with the ability to record, alter, delete, insert, redirect, reorder, replay past
messages, and inject new messages. In addition, it is common to assume that an adver-
sary is also capable of engaging unsuspecting authorized parties by initiating new protocol
executions.
6.2 The Diffie-Hellman Protocol
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [50] revolutionized cryptography by introduc-
ing a fundamental technique for constructing key agreement protocols. Diffie-Hellman
key agreement provided the first practical solution to the key distribution problem, allow-
ing two parties who previously had no shared secret to establish such a shared secret by
exchanging messages over an open channel.
Protocol 1 defines the original Diffie-Hellman protocol between two entities A and B.
Intuitively, the security of Protocol 1 appears to be related to the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem (defined in Section 2.1.3) since a passive adversary would have
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Protocol 1: The Diffie-Hellman protocol (original version).
A and B begin by selecting an appropriate (large) prime p and a generator g of Z∗p.
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 2,
2. B selects an ephemeral random integer b, 1 ≤ b ≤ p− 2.
A and B then exchange the following messages, in either order:
A −→ B : ga mod p
B −→ A : gb mod p
On receipt of the message gb mod p, A computes KA = (gb mod p)a mod p, and on
receipt of the message ga mod p, B computes KB = (ga mod p)b mod p. We find
that KA = KB = K = gab mod p which can be used as a secret session key shared
between A and B. The ephemeral values a and b should be erased on completion of
the protocol.
to solve the CDH problem in order to determine the session key. In fact, when analyzed
in an appropriate security model in which the adversary’s task is to distinguish session
keys from random strings, the security of this protocol is related to the decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem (also defined in Section 2.1.3), and only provides secrecy of the resulting
key against passive adversaries.
The original Diffie-Hellman protocol is in fact insecure against active adversaries since
neither A nor B have any assurance of the source of the messages they receive or the
identity of the party with whom they share the resulting key. This is demonstrated by a
well-known attack on the original Diffie-Hellman protocol, known as a man-in-the-middle
attack.
6.2.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The man-in-the-middle attack on Protocol 1 works as follows.
As for Protocol 1, we assume that A and B have selected an appropriate (large) prime
p and a generator g of Z∗p, and the following steps have been performed:
1. A selects an ephemeral random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 2,
2. B selects an ephemeral random integer b, 1 ≤ b ≤ p− 2.
If an adversary E wishes to launch a man-in-the-middle attack on this protocol run,
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E selects ephemeral random integers a′, b′, 1 ≤ a′, b′ ≤ p− 2. A and B then transmit the
following messages, which E intercepts and replaces as follows:
A E B
ga mod p −→ ga′ mod p −→
←− gb′ mod p ←− gb mod p
On receipt of the message gb
′
mod p, A computes KA = (gb
′
mod p)a mod p, and E
computes KEA = (ga mod p)b
′
mod p.
On receipt of the message ga
′
mod p, B computes KB = (ga
′
mod p)b mod p, and E
computes KEB = (gb mod p)a
′
mod p.
Although A and B believe that they share a key, they do not since KA 6= KB. Instead,
A shares a key KA = KEA with E, and B shares a key KB = KEB with E.
Now when A sends a message to B encrypted with KA, E can decipher it with KEA,
re-encrypt it with KEB, and send it to B. Similarly, E can decrypt messages sent by B
to A with KEB, re-encrypt them with KEA, and send them to A. In this way, A and B
believe that they share a secure channel, while in fact E controls all the communication
between them.
6.3 Authenticated Key Agreement
Protocol 1 is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack since it not authenticated. By
this we mean that entities who participate in the protocol have no way of verifying the
identities of other entities with whom they may share the resulting key.
We now informally define some notions of authentication for key agreement protocols.
Although the following notions apply to key establishment protocols in general, we are
concerned only with key agreement protocols and therefore restrict our definitions to this
case. The following definitions are formalized later in the thesis.
Definition 6.3 [87] Key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured that
no other party aside from a specifically identified second party (and possibly additional
identified trusted parties) may gain access to a particular secret key.
Definition 6.4 An authenticated key agreement protocol is a key agreement protocol
which provides key authentication.
We suppose that entity A runs an authenticated key agreement protocol Π. The key
authentication property of Π does not guarantee that the second party (B, say) actually
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possesses the secret key, or that B was even involved in the protocol run. However it does
guarantee that if any entity other than A can compute the secret key, then that entity
must be B. For this reason, key authentication is sometimes referred to more precisely as
(implicit) key authentication.
Definition 6.5 [87] Key confirmation is the property whereby one party is assured that
a second (possibly unidentified) party actually has possession of a particular secret key.
In practice, there are various ways to demonstrate possession of a key, including pro-
ducing a one-way hash of the key itself or encrypting a known value using the key. The
disadvantage of such methods is that some information about the value of the key is
revealed, even if the information is not useful to a computationally bounded adversary.
Alternatively, zero-knowledge techniques [34, 59, 62] may be employed to demonstrate
possession of a key while providing no additional information regarding its value.
Definition 6.6 [87] Explicit key authentication is the property obtained when both (im-
plicit) key authentication and key confirmation hold.
Definition 6.7 [87] Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured
(through the acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party in-
volved in a protocol and that the second party actually participated in the protocol.
The guarantee that the second party actually participated in the protocol ensures
that the corroborative evidence that the first party receives is fresh, meaning that it is
new evidence and has not simply been replayed (by some unauthorized entity) from some
previous interaction with the second party.
Entity authentication is not a requirement in all protocols, although it can be used
as a tool to construct authenticated key agreement protocols. However in this case, it is
critical that in such a protocol, the party whose identity is corroborated is the same party
with which the key is agreed.
There are many ways in which a key agreement may be authenticated. For example,
entities that share a long-term secret may wish to generate an ephemeral secret session
key. In this case, the entities may make use of the long-term shared secret in order to
authenticate a key agreement protocol. An alternative approach is to use public key cryp-
tography (where each entity has a long-term public and private key pair) to authenticate
the key agreement protocol. In this case, certificates (or some PKI) would be required to
authenticate the public keys. We examine this approach in more detail in the next section.
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6.3.1 Security Attributes
There are a number of ways in which an attacker can attempt to break a key agreement
protocol, and when constructing a key agreement protocol, the designer must consider
what types of attack the protocol must resist.
Such analysis has let to the development of various desirable security attributes for key
agreement protocols. We list the most common ones as described in [16, 76, 87]. These
attributes can be vital in excluding certain realistic attacks.
Known session key security: A protocol has known session key security if knowledge
of previous session keys does not allow an adversary to compromise other previous
session keys or future session keys.
(Perfect) forward secrecy: A protocol has forward secrecy if the compromise of the
long term private keys of one or more entities does not lead to the compromise of
previously agreed session keys in the presence of a passive adversary. Perfect forward
secrecy refers to the scenario when the long term private keys of all participating
entities are compromised.
No key-compromise impersonation: When an adversary compromises an entity A’s
long-term private key, then an adversary can of course impersonate A. However a
protocol is resistant to key compromise impersonation attacks if, after capturing A’s
long-term private key, an adversary cannot impersonate other entities to A in a key
agreement protocol and obtain the resulting session key.
No unknown key-share: A key agreement protocol is resistant to unknown key-share
attacks if an entity cannot be coerced into sharing a session key with a different party
to the one intended without their knowledge. For example, A cannot be coerced into
sharing a key with B when in fact A believes the key is shared with C. Unknown
key-share attacks may lead to confusion when the key is applied. In such attacks,
the adversary may even be one of the parties A, B or C.
No key control: A key agreement protocol has no key control if none of the participants
(or an adversary) can force the session key to be a preselected value (or to lie within
a small set of values), or predict the value of the session key. Mitchell et al. [88]
discuss how the responder in a protocol almost always has an unfair advantage
in controlling the value of the established session key. This can be avoided by
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the use of commitments, although this seems to always require an extra round of
communication.
Other attributes that are often desirable for key agreement protocols include:
Key freshness: A key is fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new (i.e. it is not an old key
being reused). This is related to key control.
Efficiency: A protocol is efficient if its computational and communication complexity
is minimized. Computational complexity is affected by the cost of the computa-
tions required by the protocol and the amount of precomputation that is possible.
Communication complexity is affected by the number of passes and rounds that the
protocol requires and the type of network being used.
Role symmetry: A protocol has role symmetry when the messages transmitted and the
computations performed by all entities have the same structure.
Role symmetry is often a desirable attribute since it can simplify the implementation
of a key agreement protocol. However, as we shall see in Chapter 7, role symmetry is in
fact disallowed by many security models.
6.3.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocols
We present some examples of simple protocols which provide implicit authentication for
the original Diffie-Hellman protocol (Protocol 1) using public key techniques. We describe
two of the authenticated key agreement protocols presented by Blake-Wilson et al. [16].
We start by describing [16, Protocol 3]. As in Protocol 1, we define the protocol
between entities A and B who can communicate over an open channel and who wish
to generate a shared secret session key. Since the protocol uses public key techniques
for authentication, A and B require public and private key pairs 〈XA, xA〉 and 〈XB, xB〉
respectively.
We assume that p and q are large primes where q|(p − 1), and g is an element of Z∗p
of order q. We also assume that H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a cryptographic hash function for
a fixed value l (usually the security parameter). We assume that xA and xB are chosen
randomly from Z∗q and that XA = gxA mod p and XB = gxB mod p.
The next protocol we describe is [16, Protocol 4]. It is very similar to Protocol 2
above except that the session key is generated in a slightly different way. Although the
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Protocol 2: Protocol 3 of [16].
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random integer a ∈ Zq,
2. B selects an ephemeral random integer b ∈ Zq.
A and B then exchange the following messages, in either order:
A −→ B : TA = ga mod p
B −→ A : TB = gb mod p
On receipt of the message gb mod p, A computes
KA = H(T aB mod p,X
xA
B mod p),
and on receipt of the message ga mod p, B computes
KB = H(T bA mod p,X
xB
A mod p).
We find that KA = KB = K = H(gab mod p, gxAxB mod p) which can be used as a
secret session key shared between A and B. The ephemeral values a and b are
erased on completion of the protocol.
change seems to be a minor one, the resulting protocol, Protocol 3, has different security
properties to Protocol 2 as will be discussed in Section 6.3.3.
We assume once again that p and q are large primes where q|(p − 1), and g is an
element of Z∗p of order q. We also assume that A and B have public and private key pairs
〈XA, xA〉 and 〈XB, xB〉 respectively which are generated as in Protocol 2.
We notice that in Protocol 3, the order of the message flows is important in computing
the key. The initiator of the protocol (in this case the initiator is A since she sent the first
message in the protocol) computes the session key in a different way to the responder (B
in this case). If there is confusion about who initiated the protocol (e.g. A and B both
believe that they initiated the protocol) then A and B will not generate the same session
key.
6.3.3 Security Attributes of Protocols 2 and 3
We now informally examine whether Protocols 2 and 3 appear to have the security at-
tributes of known-key security, (perfect) forward secrecy and resistance to key compromise
impersonation attacks. Despite the apparent similarity between Protocols 2 and 3, the
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Protocol 3: Protocol 4 of [16].
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random integer a ∈ Zq,
2. B selects an ephemeral random integer b ∈ Zq.
A and B then exchange the following messages, in the following order:
A −→ B : TA = ga mod p
B −→ A : TB = gb mod p






and on receipt of the message ga mod p, B computes
KB = H(XbA mod p, T
xB
A mod p).
We find that KA = KB = K = H(gxAb mod p, gxBa mod p) which can be used as a
secret session key shared between A and B. The ephemeral values a and b are
erased on completion of the protocol.
results of this analysis clearly illustrate some of the differences between the two protocols.
We give informal arguments why each protocol does or does not not appear to have each
of the security attributes considered.
Known session key security: Protocols 2 and 3 both appear to have known key secu-
rity since it does not seem to be feasible for an adversary to gain knowledge of a
new session key given knowledge of previous session keys. The main reason for this
is that session keys are generated as outputs of a cryptographic hash function, and
the inputs to this hash function change for each new session key established. If we
assume that the hash function is one-way, then the adversary cannot determine the
inputs to the hash function from the output. The adversary therefore does not learn
any information from previous session keys that may be useful in determining the
value of a new session key.
(Perfect) forward secrecy: Protocol 2 appears to have perfect forward secrecy. This is
because even if an adversary knows the private keys xA and xB, the adversary cannot
compute gab mod p from the values TA and TB if we assume that the computational
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
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On the other hand, Protocol 3 does not have perfect forward secrecy since given the
private keys xA and xB and the values TA and TB the adversary can compute the
session key. However Protocol 3 does appear to have what might be called partial
forward secrecy, since an adversary would need both private keys to compute the
session key. With only one private key, the adversary would only be able to compute
one of the inputs to the hash function, not both.
No key-compromise impersonation: Protocol 2 is not resistant to key compromise
impersonation attacks. Given A’s private key xA, an adversary E could pretend to
be B by choosing a value b ∈ Zq, computing TB = gb mod p, and sending this to
A. E would receive A’s value TA in response. Now E can compute the value KA as
H(XxAB mod p, T
b
A mod p), and E now shares a key with A, while A believes her key
is shared with B.
On the other hand, Protocol 3 appears to be resistant to key compromise imperson-
ation attacks since it appears to be infeasible for an adversary to compute a session
key from the values xA, XB, TA and b.
It can be seen from the three security attributes analyzed above that Protocols 2 and
3 do indeed provide different security guarantees, despite their similarity. We do not
consider whether Protocols 2 and 3 are resistant to unknown key-share attacks and key
control since these properties require more complex analysis to establish.
The question of whether Protocols 2 and 3 should be considered secure depends on
one’s definition of security. Constructing a good definition of security for authenticated
key agreement protocols is not a trivial task, and is the subject of Chapter 7.
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Models of Security for Key
Agreement Protocols
7.1 Introduction
The design and analysis of key agreement protocols has proven to be a non-trivial task.
Since the pioneering paper by Diffie and Hellman [50] which presented a solution for
unauthenticated key agreement based on asymmetric techniques, many attempts have been
made to construct key agreement protocols that provide implicit or explicit authentication.
Initially, protocol analysis was heuristic, and protocols were evaluated against known
attack methods and recommended security attributes such as those listed in Section 6.3.1.
However this was no guarantee that a given protocol would not fall prey to some new form
of attack.
In 1993 Bellare and Rogaway [12] proposed the first formal treatment for the analysis
of security of authenticated key agreement protocols. Their aim was to provide better
security guarantees than are attainable from heuristic analysis. They proposed defini-
tions for secure authenticated key agreement protocols as well as secure authenticated key
agreement protocols with key confirmation using an appropriate security model. We refer
to the model of Bellare and Rogaway [12] as the BR model.
Their model of security assumes that any two communicating parties have a shared
long-term secret which can be used for authentication within the protocol. They also
model multiple communicating parties who can participate in concurrent protocol runs.
In their model the adversary is assumed to have complete control over the network.
Shortly after this work, Bellare and Rogaway adapted their original model of secu-
rity to the 3-party case, in which a trusted authority participates in the key agreement
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protocol [13] Other works [9, 16, 17] adapted the original BR model to the public key
setting. Further extensions of the BR model include adaptations to the smart-card based
setting [102], the identity-based setting [39], the tripartite key agreement setting [3], and
adaptations to model dictionary attacks (in the password-based setting) [78, 10, 64].
Since the work in this thesis focusses on key agreement protocols in the public key
setting, we present the security model of Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes [16] (which
we call the BJM model). This is possibly the most well-known adaptation of the BR model
to the public key setting. In this model, each participant is assumed to possess a public
and private key pair (where the public key is authenticated via some PKI), and these keys
are used to provide authentication within the key agreement protocol.
7.2 The BJM Model
As in the original paper by Bellare and Rogaway [12], Blake-Wilson et al. [16] provide
definitions of security for authenticated key agreement protocols (which they call AK
protocols) and authenticated key agreement protocols with key confirmation (which they
call AKC protocols). Although much of the notation we use follows that in [16], we change
some of the notation to be consistent with subsequent models presented in this chapter.
This will simplify comparisons between the models. We also present some aspects of the
security model slightly differently to the way in which they are presented in [16], but this
does not affect the functionality of the security model or the definition of security.
In the BJM model, all communication between protocol participants is controlled by
the adversary. This is achieved by modeling protocol participants by oracles, who com-
municate only with the adversary. Oracles therefore never communicate directly with
one another, only indirectly via the adversary. The adversary can read messages sent by
oracles, provide its own messages, modify messages and delay or erase messages. The
adversary may also initiate protocols, modeling the ability of parties to engage in many
sessions of the protocol in parallel.
Although not usually made explicit in security models for key agreement, we assume
that the key agreement protocol Π being run has some algorithm Setup. On input a
security parameter l, Setup generates the public parameters params for the protocol. We
also assume that there is a key generation algorithm KeyGen which on input params
generates a public and private key pair 〈PK,SK〉 for a given protocol participant.
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7.2.1 Protocol Participants
The model includes a set U of participant identifiers (IDs), and each instance of a partic-
ipant is modeled by an oracle, e.g. ΠiU,V would model a participant U ∈ U carrying out
a protocol session in the belief that it is communicating with another participant V ∈ U ,
which we call U ’s intended partner, for the ith time (i.e. the ith run of the protocol be-
tween U and V ). Each oracle ΠiU,V keeps a public transcript T
i
U,V which records messages
that it has sent or received as a result of queries it has answered. Participant oracles are
modeled by probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines.
Each participant U ∈ U has a public and private key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉 which we
assume is authenticated by some CA (or via some PKI), and each oracle instance of U
has access to these keys.





according to the protocol. If the oracle produces some output, then this is also recorded
on T iU,V .
At any stage, ΠiU,V may be in one of three states. The state of Π
i
U,V is denoted δ
i
U,V
and can be set to one of the following:
undecided: This is the initial state of the oracle and means that ΠiU,V has not yet termi-
nated the protocol.
accepted: This is the state of the oracle if it has successfully terminated the protocol
holding some session key skiU,V .
rejected: This is the state of the oracle if it has terminated the protocol without holding
a session key.
Upon termination, the oracle state (but not the session key if any) is recorded on the
transcript T iU,V
The model also includes an adversary, E, who is not a participant. E is modeled by a
probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machine and can interact with all the participants’
oracles via queries. In addition E has access to the transcript of each oracle. Participant
oracles only respond to queries by the adversary and do not communicate directly amongst
themselves.
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7.2.2 Oracle Queries
In attacking a key agreement protocol, we allow an adversary E to interact with a chal-
lenger C that simulates a set of participant oracles running the protocol. E can interact
with the oracles by making various queries, and the responses are simulated by C.
For some security parameter l, C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public
parameters params. C also generates a set of participant IDs U , where |U|=nP and nP
is a polynomial function of l. For each participant U ∈ U , C runs the KeyGen algorithm
to generate a public and private key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉. In addition, we assume that each
participant U ∈ U can engage in at most nS sessions with any other participant V ∈ U
where nS is a polynomial function in l.
The set of oracles with which E can interact is
{ΠiU,V : U, V ∈ U , i ∈ {1, ..., nS}}
where each oracle ΠiU,V has access to the public and private keys of participant U , the
public parameters, and the public keys of all the other participants. E is given params, U
and all the public keys. In addition, E has access to the oracle transcripts and can make
the following queries:
Send(ΠiU,V ,M): E can send message M to Π
i
U,V . M is recorded on T
i
U,V and C (simu-
lating ΠiU,V ) responds according to the protocol. Any output is recorded on T
i
U,V .
If M = λ, then ΠiU,V initiates a protocol run (with intended partner V ). An oracle
ΠiU,V is called an initiator oracle if the first message it has received is λ. If Π
i
U,V did
not receive a message λ as its first message, then it is called a responder oracle.
Reveal(ΠiU,V ): E may request the session key held by Π
i
U,V . If Π
i
U,V has accepted (i.e.
δiU,V=accepted) and holds a session key sk
i
U,V , then this is output. An oracle Π
i
U,V
is called revealed if it has responded to a Reveal query.
Corrupt(U,PK ′U , SK
′
U): E may request the long-term private key of participant U , or
may choose to replace U ’s key pair with the key pair 〈PK ′U , SK ′U 〉. C outputs
SKU , and replaces U ’s key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉 with 〈PK ′U , SK ′U 〉. All corresponding
participant oracles are updated with the new key pair. A participant U is called
corrupted if U has responded to a Corrupt query.
We say that E has revealed an oracle if it has issued a Reveal query to that oracle,
and E has corrupted a participant if it has issued a Corrupt query to that participant.
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7.2.3 Matching Conversations
The BJM model defines the notion of a matching conversation, which is used to reason
about two oracles that have engaged in communication (via the adversary).
In order to determine whether two oracles have had a matching conversation, we
examine the transcripts of the oracles in the presence of an adversary. For any oracle
ΠiU,V , its conversation is captured on its transcript T
i
U,V , which can be represented by a
sequence:
T iU,V = (τ1, α1, β1), (τ2, α2, β2), ..., (τm, αm, βm)
This sequence records that at time τ1, oracle ΠiU,V received α1 and output β1, then at
time τ2 > τ1, the oracle received α2 and output β2, and so on, until at time τm, the oracle
received αm and output βm.
In a particular execution of a protocol, the adversary’s i-th query to an oracle is said
to occur at time τ = τi. We do not specify an exact value for a given time τi, but we
demand that τi < τj when i < j. Notions of time that satisfy these requirements include
“abstract time” where τi = i, or “Turing machine time” where τi is the i-th step in the
adversary’s computation.
We notice that if α1 = λ, then ΠiU,V is an initiator oracle, otherwise Π
i
U,V is a responder
oracle. In what follows, we assume that the number of message passes R in the protocol
is odd, so R = 2γ + 1 for some γ ∈ N. The case for R even is analogous.
Definition 7.1 [16] Consider two oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U who run Π in the presence of
an adversary E, where ΠiU,V is an initiator oracle with transcript T
i
U,V , and Π
j
V,U is a




(τ0, α0 = λ, β0), (τ2, β1, β2), ..., (τR−1, βR−2, βR−1)
and T jV,U is prefixed by
(τ1, β0, β1), (τ3, β2, β3), ..., (τR, βR−1, ∗)
then we say that ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U have engaged in a matching conversation.
We note that in T jV,U , the value ∗ means that any entry, possibly none, is allowed here.
The definition of matching conversations models the situation where a participant
U believes he is communicating with a participant V (and vice versa), one of them is
the initiator and the other is the responder, and the adversary acts like a wire, and
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simply passes messages unaltered to and fro between the participants. We refer to such
an adversary as a benign adversary.
If an oracle ΠiU,V has had a matching conversation with one of its intended partner’s
(V ’s) oracles ΠjV,U , then we say that Π
j
V,U is the matching oracle of Π
i
U,V (and vice versa).
7.2.4 Freshness
The adversary can learn information about various session keys through its queries, since
it can obtain session keys of any oracle that has accepted a session key via aReveal query,
and it can obtain the long-term private key of any participant via a Corrupt query.
However in order to model the security of a key agreement protocol, we need to identify
oracles about whose session keys the adversary should not have learned any information.
Such oracles are called fresh.
Definition 7.2 An oracle ΠiU,V is called fresh if it has accepted (and therefore holds a
session key skiU,V ), it is not revealed, neither U nor V has been corrupted, and there is no
revealed oracle ΠjV,U with which it has had a matching conversation.
It is important to note that an oracle ΠiU,V may be fresh but may not have had a
matching conversation with any oracle at all (i.e. it may not have a matching oracle).
This is possible since all oracles communicate only with the adversary and never directly
between themselves. Indeed, the adversary may be able to format its messages to ΠiU,V in
such a way that ΠiU,V accepts, but no other oracle is involved in the protocol run.
7.2.5 The BJM Game and Test Query
The security of a key agreement protocol is modeled via the following game between a
challenger C and an adversary E.
Initialization(l): On input a security parameter l, C runs the Setup algorithm to gen-
erate the system parameters params. C also generates a set of participant IDs U ,
where |U| = nP and nP is a polynomial function of l. For each participant U ∈ U , C
runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a public and private key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉.
Each oracle ΠiU,V for any V ∈ U and i ∈ {1, ..., nS} will have access to the private
key SKU . In addition, we assume that each participant U ∈ U can engage in at
most nS sessions with another participant V ∈ U where nS is a polynomial function
in l. E is given params, U and all the public keys.
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Phase 1: C simulates a set of oracles
{ΠiU,V : U, V ∈ U , i ∈ {1, ..., nS}}.
to which E can make Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries as were defined in Section
7.2.2.
Test(ΠiU∗,V ∗): At some point, E may make a Test query to some fresh oracle Π
i
U∗,V ∗ . C
randomly selects a bit b. If b = 1, then C outputs the session key skiU∗,V ∗ , otherwise
C outputs a randomly chosen element from the session key space.
Phase 2: E can continue making Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries to the oracles,
except that E is forbidden from revealing ΠiU∗,V ∗ or its matching oracle (if any), and
E cannot corrupt U∗ or V ∗.
Output: Finally E outputs a bit b′.
E wins the game if b = b′, and we define E’s advantage in winning the game as
AdvantageE(l) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|.
We note that the original game in [16] was not adaptive, i.e. the Test query was the
final query that the adversary could make, so there was no Phase 2. However the non-
adaptive model was shown to be insufficiently powerful by Rackoff, and the model was
fixed in [9]. We have adopted this fix here, and have presented the adaptive version of the
model of [16].
7.2.6 AK security
We now present the definition of an authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol, as given
in [16].
Definition 7.3 A protocol Π is a secure AK protocol if the following two conditions hold:
1. In the presence of the benign adversary, oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U always accept holding
the same session key sk = skiU,V = sk
j
V,U , and sk is distributed uniformly at random
over the session key space.
2. For every adversary E:
(a) If oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U have matching conversations and U and V are uncor-
rupted, then both oracles accept holding the same session key sk;
(b) AdvantageE(l) is negligible in l.
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7.2.6.1 Notes on AK Security
Conditions 1 and 2(a) in the definition of AK security simply guarantee that the protocol
is correct and achieves its goal when not under attack. In fact, conditions 1 and 2(a) are
almost identical and indeed condition 1 may be discarded if we include the session key
uniformity in 2(a).
The condition 2(b) guarantees that an adversary cannot distinguish a fresh oracle’s
session key from random, i.e. an adversary can learn no information about a fresh oracle’s
session key, even by making Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries to any oracles (except
the fresh oracle and its intended partner).
A condition that is not immediately obvious, but which is implied by the model, is
that if an adversary E can, with non-negligible probability, make any two oracles running
protocol Π accept and hold the same session key sk, where the oracles are not matching
oracles, then E can win the game with non-negligible probability. In this instance, Π is
not a secure AK protocol.
This property is best illustrated by the following example. Suppose that with non-
negligible probability η, E can make ΠiU,V and Π
j
K,L accept, holding the same session key
sk, but where ΠiU,V and Π
j
K,L are not matching oracles (since they did not have a matching
conversation). Then E can reveal the session key sk held by ΠjK,L, and can select Π
i
U,V
for the Test query (this is allowed because ΠiU,V is still considered to be fresh). E can
now win the game with probability η since it knows the session key sk of ΠiU,V .
This condition implies that for any secure AK protocol, if oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
K,L
accept holding the same session key, then with overwhelming probability they are matching
oracles (i.e. they have had a matching conversation). This result, together with condition
2(a) of the security definition means that, with overwhelming probability, two oracles ΠiU,V
and ΠjK,L running a secure AK protocol accept holding the same session key if and only
if they are matching oracles.
7.2.7 AKC security
In order to define security for authenticated key agreement protocols with key confirma-
tion, we require one further notion.
We consider an adversary E interacting with a challenger C simulating a set of oracles
{ΠiU,V : U, V ∈ U , i ∈ {1, ..., nS}} running protocol Π. As in the game above, we allow
the adversary to make Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries to the oracles. We then let
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No-MatchingE(l) denote the event that at some point during the interaction between the
oracles and E, there exists an oracle ΠiU,V which has accepted (and which holds a session
key skiU,V ), where U and V are uncorrupted, but where Π
i
U,V did not have a matching
conversation with any other oracle ΠjV,U .
We now present the definition of an authenticated key agreement protocol with key
confirmation (AKC protocol), as given in [16].
Definition 7.4 A protocol Π is a secure AKC protocol if the following two conditions
hold:
1. In the presence of the benign adversary, oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U always accept holding
the same session key sk = skiU,V = sk
j
V,U , and sk is distributed uniformly at random
over the session key space;
2. For every adversary E:
(a) If oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U have matching conversations and U and V are uncor-
rupted, then both oracles accept holding the same session key sk;
(b) The probability of No-MatchingE(l) is negligible;
(c) AdvantageE(l) is negligible in l.
7.2.7.1 Notes on AKC Security
Conditions 1, 2(a) and 2(c) of the AKC definition are the same as those in the AK
definition, so a secure AKC protocol is a secure AK protocol. However the definition of
AKC security has the additional No-Matching condition 2(b).
The No-Matching condition means that in a secure AKC protocol, the only way for an
adversary to get an uncorrupted entity to accept in a run of the protocol with any other
uncorrupted entity is by allowing it to have a matching conversation with another oracle
(i.e. relaying communications like a wire).
The No-matching condition together with condition 2(a) ensures that in a secure AKC
protocol, an oracle ΠiU,V will accept if and only if it had a matching conversation with
some other oracle ΠjV,U . In addition, condition 2(a) ensures that if two oracles have had a
matching conversation, then they both accept holding the same session key. Therefore no
oracle ΠiU,V will accept unless it has indeed communicated with an oracle Π
j
V,U and the
two oracles share the same key. This provides the property of key confirmation.
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7.2.8 Security Attributes of the BJM Model
We recall the security attributes presented in Section 6.3.1 which are commonly required of
authenticated key agreement protocols. We consider which of these attributes are implied
by the above definitions of secure AK or AKC protocols.
Known-key security: The property of known-key security is implied by the definitions
of AK and AKC security. This can be seen by the following two properties of the
model:
1. E is allowed to make Reveal queries to any oracles except for ΠiU∗,V ∗ and its
matching oracle ΠjV ∗,U∗ to obtain any session keys except for the session key
skiU∗,V ∗ .
2. Even with the knowledge of many other session keys, E’s ability to distinguish
between skiU∗,V ∗ and a random number is still negligible if Π
i
U∗,V ∗ is fresh.
Unknown key-share: We recall that a key agreement protocol is resistant to unknown
key-share attacks if an entity cannot be coerced into sharing a session key with a
different party to the one intended without that entity’s knowledge.
Suppose that two oracles ΠiU,V and Π
t
K,L share a session key. Then with overwhelm-
ing probability, we have that ΠtK,L = Π
j
V,U for some j ∈ {1, ..., nS}. This is because,
as was pointed out in Section 7.2.6.1, the definitions of AK and AKC security imply
that if any two oracles share a session key, then with overwhelming probability, they
must have had matching conversations.
So U can only share a key with his intended partner (in this case V ), and no unknown
key-share attack can succeed. Hence the definitions of AK and AKC security imply
resilience to unknown key-share attacks.
We note that the definitions of AK and AKC security do not imply that a secure
protocol has forward secrecy or is resistant to key compromise impersonation attacks.
In order to model these attacks, we would have to allow E to corrupt the participant
corresponding to the oracle on which it makes the Test query (or its intended partner),
and the definition of freshness in the BJM model does not allow this.
Moreover, the definitions of AK and AKC security do not imply resistance to key
control attacks that are launched by one of the protocol participants (although key control
attacks launched by an outside adversary are captured by the BJM model). In the BJM
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model, all participants are assumed to be honest participants unless they are corrupted
(in which case E can impersonate a participant). But the BJM model does not allow E to
corrupt the participant corresponding to the oracle on which it will make a Test query (or
that oracle’s intended partner). However we do know that if the participants are honest
and the protocol is not attacked, then the session key established is distributed uniformly
at random in the session key space.
7.3 A Modified BJM Model
The BJM approach provides a reasonable model of security for authenticated key agree-
ment protocols. However it does not capture certain security attributes (such as forward
secrecy and resilience to key compromise impersonation attacks), and in some ways it ap-
pears to be unnecessarily complex. For example, the definition of matching conversations
is very complicated, and the notation ΠjU,V for oracles can be rather confusing, especially
since ΠjU,V may not be communicating with participant V at all.
We therefore present a modification of the BJM model (which we call the mBJM
model) which captures more attacks than the BJM model and which we believe simplifies
some of the concepts in the BJM model. Our modifications of the BJM model are inspired
largely by the model of Bellare et al. [10], which, although developed in the password-
based setting, addresses many of the issues of the BJM model. We will use our mBJM
model in the next chapter to examine the security of some concrete protocols.
The mBJM model presented in this chapter is based on the mBR model presented in
[73]. We have changed the name since the model is more closely related to the BJM model
than to the BR model.
Our model includes a set of participant IDs U , where each participant U ∈ U has a
long-term public key PKU and a long-term private key SKU . We use ΠiU to denote an
oracle modeling the ith instance of participant U .
Oracles follow the rules of the protocol, responding to input messages. Each oracle
maintains a public transcript T iU which records all messages they have sent or received as
a result of queries they have answered.
At any stage ΠiU may be in one of three states. The state of Π
i
U is denoted δ
i
U and can
be set to one of the following:
undecided: This is the initial state of the oracle and means that ΠiU has not yet terminated
the protocol.
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accepted: This is the state of the oracle if it has successfully terminated the protocol
(accepted) holding some session key skiU .
rejected: This is the state of the oracle if it has terminated the protocol without holding
a session key.
An oracle ΠiU may accept at any time, and once accepted it should hold a role role
i
U ∈
{initiator, responder}, a partner ID pidiU ∈ U (this corresponds to the intended partner
in the BJM model and is the ID of the oracle with which it assumes it is communicating),
a session ID sidiU and a session key sk
i
U . We note that the value i in Π
i
U is not the same
as the sidiU but rather an internal session counter for each oracle. This may act as an
internal identifier for the session until sidiU is established, and thereafter the session is
(uniquely) identified by sidiU . By the end of the protocol, the role, partner ID, session ID
and oracle state (but not the session key if any) are recorded on T iU .
As in the BJM model, the mBJM model includes an adversary E that is modeled by
a probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machine. E can interact with all the participants’
oracles via queries and has access to the transcript of each oracle. Participant oracles only
respond to queries by the adversary and do not communicate directly amongst themselves.
7.3.0.1 Partners







ΠjU ′ holding (sk
j
U ′ , sid
j
U ′ , pid
j
U ′) have both accepted and the following conditions hold:
1. sidiU = sid
j




U ′ , pid
i
U = U
′ and pidjU ′ = U ,
2. roleiU = initiator and role
j
U ′ = responder or vice versa,
3. No oracle in E’s game besides ΠiU or Π
j
U ′ accepts with session ID equal to sid
i
U ,
then ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ are said to be partners.
This definition roughly corresponds to the definition of matching oracles in the BJM
model, and will be used to define freshness of an oracle in the mBJM game.
7.3.1 Oracle Queries
As in the BJMmodel, the security of a key agreement protocol is modelled via the following
game between a challenger C and an adversary E.
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For some security parameter l, C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system
parameters params. C also generates a set of participant IDs U , where |U|=nP and nP
is a polynomial function of l. For each participant U ∈ U , C runs the KeyGen algorithm
to generate a public and private key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉. In addition, we assume that each
participant U ∈ U can engage in at most nS sessions with any other participant V ∈ U
where nS is a polynomial function in l.
The set of oracles with which E can interact is
{ΠiU : U ∈ U , i ∈ {1, ..., nS}}
where each oracle ΠiU has access to the public and private keys of participant U , the public
parameters, and the public keys of all the other participants. E is given params, U and
all the public keys. In addition, E has access to the oracle transcripts and can make the
following queries:
Send(ΠiU ,M): E can send the oracle Π
i





responds according to the protocol. Any output is recorded on T iU . If M = λ
and M is the first message received by ΠiU , then Π
i
U initiates a protocol run (with
some intended partner pidiU ), sets role
i
U = initiator. In this case Π
i
U is called an
initiator oracle. If ΠiU did not receive a message λ as its first message, then it sets
roleiU = responder and is called a responder oracle.
Reveal(ΠiU): E may request the session key held by Π
i
U . If Π
i
U has accepted and holds
a session key skiU , then this is output. An oracle Π
i
U is called revealed if it has
responded to a Reveal query.
Corrupt(U): E may request the long-term private key of participant U , and may choose
to replace U ’s key pair with the key pair 〈PK ′U , SK ′U 〉. C outputs SKU , and replaces
U ’s key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉 with 〈PK ′U , SK ′U 〉. All corresponding participant oracles
are updated with the new key pair. A participant U is called corrupted if U has
responded to a Corrupt query.
We say that E has revealed an oracle if it has issued a Reveal query to that oracle,
and E has corrupted a participant if it has issued a Corrupt query to that participant.
7.3.2 Freshness
The definition of freshness serves the same purpose as in the BJM model, i.e. to identify
oracles about whose session keys the adversary should have learned no information.
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Definition 7.6 An oracle ΠiU is called fresh if it is not revealed, it does not have a revealed
partner, and if the participant pidiU is uncorrupted.
We note that, unlike in the BJM model, an oracle ΠiU may still be considered fresh if U
is corrupted. This will be important for modeling key compromise impersonation attacks.
7.3.3 The mBJM Game and the Test Query
As in the BJM model, the security of a key agreement protocol in our mBJM model is
modeled via a game between a challenger C and an adversary E. This game is as follows:
Initialization(l): On input a security parameter l, C runs the Setup algorithm to gen-
erate the system parameters params. C also generates a set of participant IDs U ,
where |U| = nP and nP is a polynomial function of l. For each participant U ∈ U , C
runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a public and private key pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉.
Each oracle ΠiU for any i ∈ {1, ..., nS} will have access to the public and private key
pair 〈PKU , SKU 〉, as well as the public parameters and the public keys of all other
participants. In addition, we assume that each participant U ∈ U can engage in
at most nS sessions with any other participant U ′ ∈ U , where nS is a polynomial
function in l. E is given params, U and all the public keys.
Phase 1: C simulates a set of oracles
{ΠiU : U ∈ U , i ∈ {1, ..., nS}}.
to which E can make Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries as were defined in Section
7.3.1.
Test(ΠiU∗): At some point, E may make a Test query to some fresh oracle Π
i
U∗ . C
randomly selects a bit b. If b = 1, then C outputs the session key skiU∗ , otherwise C
outputs a randomly chosen element from the session key space.
Phase 2: E can continue making Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries to the oracles,
except that E is forbidden from revealing ΠiU∗ or its partner oracle (if any), and E
cannot corrupt participant pidiU∗ .
Output: Finally E outputs a bit b′.
E wins the mBJM game if b = b′, and we define E’s advantage in winning the game as
AdvantageE(l) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|.
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7.3.4 Definition of security
A benign adversary is defined as in the BJM model and is one who simply relays messages
between parties without modification. We then define the notion of a secure authenticated
key agreement protocol as follows:
Definition 7.7 A protocol is an mBJM-AK secure protocol if the following two conditions
hold:
1. In the presence of a benign adversary, two oracles running the protocol both accept
holding the same session key and session ID, and the session key is distributed
uniformly at random on the session key space.
2. For any adversary E, AdvantageE(l) is negligible.
We say that protocol Π is mBJM-AK insecure if it is not mBJM-AK secure. That is,
there exists an adversary E which, with non-negligible probability (in l), wins the mBJM
game against challenger C. We say that such an adversary E can successfully mBJM
attack protocol Π.
7.3.4.1 Notes on mBJM-AK Security
Our definition of mBJM-AK security is similar to the definition of AK security in the BJM
model. We recall that in the BJM model, the definition of AK security guaranteed that
if two oracles shared the same session key, then with overwhelming probability, they were
matching oracles. The analogous result for mBJM-AK security in the mBJM model is
that if two oracles running a secure mBJM-AK protocol accept holding the same session
key, then with overwhelming probability, they are partners. We recall that the converse
must be true since, by Definition 7.5, two oracles must share the same session key to be
partners.
Our model is very similar to the BJM model except that we work with partners instead
of matching oracles, we use the notion of partner IDs instead of the notation ΠiU,V , and we
allow a corrupted participant’s oracle to still be considered fresh. We allow this because
corruption in our mBJM model is simply a query to a participant which reveals the long-
term secret key of the participant. The adversary does not learn any other internal state of
the participant’s oracles and does not gain control of these oracles. Therefore a corrupted
participant’s oracle may still be considered to be fresh and can therefore still be chosen as
a Test oracle. This allows us to model key compromise impersonation attacks.
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Most of these deviations from the BJM model are inspired by the model of Bellare et al.
[10]. The main difference between our mBJM model and that of [10] is that our model is in
the public key setting. In addition we do not explicitly distinguish between acceptance and
termination as is done in [10], and we do not model perfect forward secrecy. The perfect
forward secrecy property can be added as is done in [10] by permitting the adversary to
corrupt both participants of the Test session on the condition that the adversary does not
alter the massages transmitted in the Test session in any way.
7.3.5 Security Attributes of the mBJM Model
We recall that the definition of AK security ensured that a key agreement protocol has
known-key security and resistance to unknown key-share attacks. Using similar arguments
to Section 7.2.8, the same can be shown for key agreement protocols that are mBJM-AK
secure.
In addition, the definition of mBJM-AK security also ensures resistance to key com-
promise impersonation attacks. We recall from Section 6.3.1 that a key compromise im-
personation attack on an entity A has occurred if an adversary is able to impersonate some
other entity (say B) to A in a key agreement protocol and obtain the resulting session key
by compromising A’s long-term private key (but not B’s long-term private key). Such at-
tacks are captured by our model since the adversary is permitted to corrupt a participant,
continue to interact with the corrupted participant’s oracles, and then select one of these
oracles for a Test query.
Our definition of mBJM-AK security does not model perfect forward secrecy. However
as mentioned before, our model can be extended (as is done in [10]) to model perfect
forward secrecy as well.
We direct the reader to [8, 10, 12, 16, 32, 101] for details of alternative models illus-
trating different approaches to dealing with partnering, corruptions and freshness.
7.3.6 mBJM-AKC Security
The definition of mBJM-AK security can be extended to a definition of security in the
mBJM model for authenticated key agreement protocols with key confirmation (AKC)
protocols as is done in [16].
As for the definition of AKC security in Section 7.2.7, we require an additional condi-
tion, which we call No-Partnering. This is closely related to the No-Matching condition
in Definition 7.4. We let No-PartneringE(l) denote the event that at some point during
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the interaction between the oracles and E, there exists an oracle ΠiU which has pid
i
U = V
where V is uncorrupted, which has accepted (and which holds a session key skiU ), but
where ΠiU has no partner.
Definition 7.8 A protocol is an mBJM-AKC secure protocol if the following three con-
ditions hold:
1. In the presence of a benign adversary, two oracles running the protocol both accept
holding the same session key and session ID, and the session key is distributed
uniformly at random on the session key space.
2. The probability of No-PartneringE(l) is negligible;
3. For any adversary E, AdvantageE(l) is negligible.
7.4 Identity-based Models
The BJM and mBJM models are suitable for protocols in the standard public key setting.
However the models do need to be modified slightly in order to model protocols which use
identity-based long-term public and private keys. This is because identity-based public
keys can be derived from any identifying string in a dynamic way by the adversary. A
security model in an identity-based environment should adequately model such features
of the identity-based environment.
In the usual public key setting, the challenger determines the set of public keys at the
beginning of the game. By contrast, in the identity-based setting we allow the adversary
to generate identity-based public keys dynamically during the attack game.
Since public keys can always be derived from identifiers, when modeling protocols in
the identity-based setting, we therefore only need to work with the identifiers (IDs) of
protocol participants, and not their actual public keys.
We now consider how the BJM model can be adapted to the identity-based (ID-based)
setting. We call the identity-based version of the BJM model the ID-BJM model, and this
model will be required in the next chapter to examine the security of specific identity-based
key agreement protocols.
We note that similar changes would be required to adapt the mBJM model to the




7.4.1 The ID-BJM model
The ID-BJM model is very similar to the BJM model, with each participant having a
unique identifier U , and instances of U are modeled as oracles ΠiU,V , where this represents
participant U communicating with intended partner V for the i-th time. Each oracle main-
tains a transcript T iU,V and state δ
i
U,V as in the BJM model, and matching conversations
are defined as before.
However in the ID-based setting, a participant’s public key is generated directly from
his identifier U . This means that the adversary E can generate new public keys from any
identifier of its choice. In order to model this, we therefore modify the oracle queries that
E can make.
As in the BJM model, E can make various queries to a challenger C that simulates a
set of oracles (or participants) running the protocol. However in the ID-based setting, C
does not generate a set of participant IDs beforehand. Rather, C sets U to be the ID space
(usually U = {0, 1}∗). The specific participant IDs will be chosen by E in the game itself,
and C will initialize new participants and their oracle instances as required. However the
number of new participant IDs that E can generate is bounded by some value nP , and
we also still assume that each participant U can engage in at most nS sessions with any
other participant V ∈ U , where nP and nS are polynomial functions in l.
C also simulates the trusted authority (TA) in this environment, and therefore gen-
erates the public parameters of the TA and gives these to E. C also generates a master
secret s from which it can generate a private key SKU from any given ID U . C keeps s
private. E can make the following queries:
Send(U, V, i,M): Message M is sent to ΠiU,V . If participants U and V do not yet exist,
then C firstly initializes these participants (and their oracle instances) and generates
their public and private keys using their IDs U and V and the master secret s. M
is recorded on T iU,V and Π
i
U,V responds according to the protocol. Any output is
recorded on T iU,V . If M = λ and M is the first message received by Π
i
U,V , then Π
i
U,V
initiates a protocol run (with intended partner V ). In this case oracle ΠiU,V is called
an initiator oracle. If ΠiU,V did not receive a message λ as its first message, then it
is called a responder oracle.
Reveal(ΠiU,V ): E may only request the session key held by an existing oracle Π
i
U,V . If
ΠiU,V has accepted and holds a session key sk
i
U,V , then this is output. An oracle
ΠiU,V is called revealed if it has responded to a Reveal query.
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Private key extract(U): E may request the private key corresponding to ID U . If
participant U does not yet exist, then C firstly initializes this participant (and its
oracle instances) and generates its public and private keys using its ID U and the
master secret s. C outputs the private key SKU . The private key of U is said to
have been extracted if U has responded to a Private key extract query.
The definition of freshness is then modified appropriately to be:
Definition 7.9 An oracle ΠiU,V is called fresh if it has accepted (and therefore holds a
session key skiU,V ), it is not revealed, the private keys of neither U nor V has been extracted,
and there is no revealed oracle ΠjV,U with which it has had a matching conversation.
The ID-BJM game and definitions of AK and AKC security are identical to the BJM
game and definitions of AK and AKC security, except that Corrupt queries are replaced
by Private key extract queries, and the Send, Reveal and Private key extract
queries are answered as described above.
7.5 A Modular Approach to the Construction of KA Pro-
tocols
The above definitions of security for key agreement protocols provide a strong security
guarantee for a key agreement protocol, provided a proof of security can be constructed.
However in general it appears to be rather difficult to prove efficient key agreement pro-
tocols secure in these models, and therefore relatively few protocols have full proofs of
security in these models.
To address this problem, a more “modular” approach to constructing key agreement
protocols was advocated by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [8]. Instead of designing a key
agreement protocol and then attempting to prove its security in a suitable model, Bellare
et al. proposed an approach by which secure protocols can be constructed.
The approach entails constructing a basic protocol which is secure given communication
over ideally authenticated channels. These are called authenticated links. In other words,
the basic protocol should be secure against a passive adversary.
This basic protocol then needs to be transformed into a protocol which is secure given
unauthenticated links (or insecure channels). This is achieved by applying what are called




Informally, if an authenticator is secure, then the origin of each authenticated message
is verifiable and no adversary can forge the origin of a message or alter the message contents
without detection. Therefore if the underlying unauthenticated protocol is secure against
passive attacks, then the authenticated protocol is secure against all (active and passive)
adversaries.
The advantage of such an approach is that the basic protocol and the authenticator may
be constructed and proven secure independently, and the resulting protocol is guaranteed
to be secure. In fact, libraries of basic protocols and authenticators may be built up
(as is done in [8, 23, 32, 67, 110, 111]), from which many different secure key agreement
protocols may be constructed. Such a modular approach greatly simplifies the protocol
design process, thereby reducing the risk of errors.
The disadvantage of using this modular approach is that it is only useful for con-
structing new protocols, and results in protocols of a specific form. However this modular
approach sheds no light on how to evaluate the security of the many existing protocols in
the literature that have not been constructed in this modular way.
In addition, cryptographic primitives such as encryption, signatures or MACs are usu-
ally required to build secure authenticators, and the application of these authenticators
often increases the computational and communication complexity of a protocol. Therefore
the modular method of construction advocated by Bellare et al. [8] generally does not re-
sult in the most efficient key agreement protocols. Of course protocols constructed using
this modular approach may be modified to be more efficient using various techniques, but
then the security proof may no longer be valid.
7.6 Universal Composability
A proof that a particular protocol Π is secure in some security model (such as the BJM
model) ensures that if Π is exposed to attacks of the type captured by the security model,
then it remains secure. However the proof of security does not provide us with any
guarantees of what will happen if our protocol is exposed to attacks or influences outside
of the security model (i.e. events that are not captured by the security model).
The security models that we have considered so far generally model a set of participants
which only run the protocol Π. Therefore, a proof of security in such a model guarantees
that the protocol is secure against adversaries with capabilities specified by the model
and in an environment in which participants run only the protocol Π. However in today’s
world, protocols are very rarely run in isolation. A single machine may be running many
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different protocols concurrently with many other entities or machines, and these other
interactions may be related to the key agreement protocol Π. We would like to know that
even in such an environment, where our protocol Π is composed with many other protocols
or processes, it will remain secure.
Recent developments in provable security for key agreement protocols [29, 30, 32,
33, 31] have therefore been concerned with whether such protocols remain secure when
composed with an unbounded number of unknown (and perhaps even malicious) protocols,
or more generally, when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary distributed
system. This has resulted in the development of what is called the universal composition
framework (UC framework). For completeness, we give a brief overview of this framework.
The UC framework [29, 30] attempts to model protocols running in an arbitrary en-
vironment. It is claimed by Canetti and Krawczyk that a proof of security for a protocol
Π in the UC framework guarantees that Π may be composed in an arbitrary distributed
system and will still achieve its goals.
A definition of security of a protocol in the UC framework is formulated in a slightly
different way to the way in which it is formulated in models such as the BJM model.
In the UC framework, we ascertain the goals or functionality of a protocol in order to
construct an ideal process which achieves the goals of the protocol in a secure way. In the
ideal process, all parties usually interact with a trusted third party or ideal functionality
which performs the function of the protocol. The ideal process can therefore be thought
of as a formal specification of the goals and security requirements of the protocol.
As in previous models (such as the BJM model), a protocol instance in the UC frame-
work is modeled by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, and interacts with
an adversary which is also modeled by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.
However unlike in previous models, an additional machine called the environment is added
to the model of computation. The environment can interact with the protocol being run
as well as the adversary. This environment machine represents everything that is external
to the current protocol execution.
Informally, a protocol is then considered to be secure if it securely realizes its goals, or
emulates the ideal process from the point of view of the environment. The environment
therefore serves as an interactive distinguisher between the protocol and the ideal process.
This means that an adversary interacting with the protocol has the same affect as (and
can cause no more damage than) an adversary interacting with the ideal process.
We remark that the UC framework has been used to model not only key agreement
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protocols, but also many other cryptographic primitives and protocols (such as public key
encryption, digital signatures and protocols involving more than two parties). However
since we are only concerned with key agreement protocols at this stage, we have only
presented an informal description of the UC framework in the context of key agreement
protocols.
The UC framework provides a very strong definition of security. But it appears to be
even more difficult to construct protocols that realize UC security than it is to construct
protocols that realize other definitions of security (e.g. AK security in the BJM model).
Various relaxations of the UC model have been proposed, although these result in a loss
of security, particularly with respect to composability. Canetti and Krawczyk [33] present
certain key agreement protocols that achieve UC security as well as protocols that achieve
a relaxed version of UC security. However all the protocols that have been shown to
achieve this level of security are constructed using the modular approach of Bellare et al.
[8]. It is not known whether simpler, more efficient protocols that are not constructed
using the modular approach can be shown to be UC secure.
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Modular Security Proofs for Key
Agreement Protocols
8.1 Introduction
It is becoming increasingly common for designers of key agreement protocols (and indeed
designers of all cryptographic primitives) to have to provide proofs of security for their
protocols in appropriate security models before their protocols will be considered for prac-
tical use. However at the same time, protocol designers are also under pressure to provide
protocols that are optimized for efficiency.
The modular approach of [8] for constructing key agreement protocols (which was
described in Section 7.5) can be employed to construct secure protocols, and if the protocol
designer has access to libraries of secure basic protocols and authenticators, the protocol
designer may have a large number of secure protocols from which to choose. However, as
was pointed out in Section 7.5, protocols generated in such a manner are often not the
most efficient.
In many environments, the benefits of being able to easily design secure protocols
outweigh the possible disadvantages. However there exist environments in which efficiency
is of utmost importance, and most key agreement protocols optimized for efficiency are
not constructed in a modular way. Indeed we can find several efficient key agreement
protocols in the literature which do not have formal proofs of security (such as protocols
in [16, 51, 76, 79, 103]) or have only proofs of security in weakened security models (such
as protocols in [3, 39, 83]. Since the structure of these protocols is not compatible with
the modular approach in [8], complete proofs of security for such protocols still appear to
be difficult to construct.
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In this chapter, we consider protocols which are not designed in a modular way but
which we nevertheless wish to prove secure in an appropriate security model. Since this
type of protocol is not designed in a modular way, typical proofs of security are often
complicated and error-prone. We therefore develop a technique by which the proof process
for a large class of key agreement protocols can be simplified.
Informally, our technique for proving the security of a protocol Π works as follows.
The first step is to prove that protocol Π has a property that we call strong partnering
(which is defined in Section 8.3.1). The second step is to prove that a related protocol pi
is secure in a highly reduced security model. Finally, as the main result of the chapter, we
show how the proof of security of pi in the reduced model can be translated into a proof
of security for Π in the full security model using a Gap assumption.
Each step above is far simpler than a single proof of security in the full security model.
The result is a modular technique for constructing proofs of security for a large class of
key agreement protocols which are not constructed using the modular approach of [8].
We then use this technique to consider certain key agreement protocols in the literature
that were previously without proofs or that only had incomplete proofs of security. Using
our techniques, full proofs of security can be generated for protocols in [16, 39, 103]
(possibly after slight modifications to the protocols if necessary). We focus in detail on
Protocol 3 in Section 6.3.2 (originally presented in [16, Protocol 4]), and the identity-based
key agreement (AK) protocols of [39] and [103].
We also hope that our methods will aid future designers of lightweight key agreement
protocols in the formal analysis of their protocols in simplifying their task by breaking it
up into components.
8.1.1 Published Work
An earlier version of this work appears in [73] and forms the basis for this chapter. The
nomenclature in this chapter differs slightly from the published work. In particular, what
we refer to here as the mBJM model is referred to as the mBR model in [73].
8.2 Gap Assumptions
Our technique makes use of Gap assumptions, as defined by Okamoto and Pointcheval
[93]. Informally, a Gap problem is usually the problem of solving some computational
problem (e.g. computational Diffie-Hellman) with the help of a corresponding decisional
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oracle (in this case a decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle). The decisional problem may be
easy or hard; irrespective of this a Gap problem may still be defined.
Gap assumptions have recently found several applications in cryptography. In par-
ticular, Gap assumptions have been used in [1, 69, 110] to prove the security of certain
key agreement protocols. However we show how Gap assumptions can be systematically
applied to a class of protocols in order to obtain proofs of security, whereas previous works
applied Gap assumptions in an ad-hoc manner.
Following the notation of Okamoto and Pointcheval [93], we informally define a family
of Gap problems.
Let f : X × Y → {0, 1} be any relation on sets X and Y . The computational problem
(or inverting problem in the language of [93]) of f is, given x ∈ X, to compute any y ∈ Y
such that f(x, y) = 1 if such a y exists, or to return Fail otherwise.
The decisional problem of f is, given (x, y) ∈ X × Y , to decide whether f(x, y) = 1 or
not.
Definition 8.1 The Gap problem of f is to solve the computational problem of f using
an oracle which solves the decisional problem of f .
We always refer to Gap problems in terms of computational and decisional problems.
Although the definition of Gap problems in [93] is not restricted to this case, we only
present this scenario since we will only use Gap problems in this context. As an example,
we define the computational, decisional and Gap Diffie-Hellman problems.
Let p and q be primes where q|p − 1. Let G be a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p, of
order q, and let g ∈ G generate G. We denote by DL(g, h) ∈ Zq the discrete logarithm of
h ∈ G with respect to base g. So gDL(g,h) = h mod p.
Given a, b, c ∈ Zq, we define the Diffie-Hellman relation fDH as follows:
fDH : (G×G)×G→ {0, 1}, where fDH(ga, gb, gc) =
{
1 if gab = gc mod p
0 otherwise
We can now define the computational, decisional and Gap problems of fDH , better
known as the computational, decisional and Gap Diffie-Hellman problems, respectively.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given ga, gb ∈ G, where a, b ∈R
Zq, compute gc ∈ G, such that fDH(ga, gb, gc) = 1. That is, compute gc = gab mod p.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem: Given ga, gb, gc ∈ G, where a, b ∈R Zq,
determine fDH(ga, gb, gc). That is, determine whether c = ab mod q or not.
149
8.3 Modular Security Proofs in the mBJM Model
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Problem: Given ga, gb ∈ G where a, b ∈R Zq, as well as
an oracle that solves the DDH problem in G, compute gab mod p.
The corresponding assumptions are that the above problems are hard, that is, they are
infeasible to solve in polynomial time in a security parameter used to define the problem
instances.
8.3 Modular Security Proofs in the mBJM Model
The model of security in which we work in this chapter is the mBJM model presented in
Section 7.2. However analogous versions of our results also hold in the models of [12, 16, 32]
and the ID-BJM model of Section 7.4.1. We refer the reader back to Chapter 7 for details
of the mBJM security model.
From now on, we assume that we are only dealing with key agreement protocols that
produce a hashed session key on completion of the protocol. By this we mean that the key
agreement protocol Π specifies that the session key be computed as the hash H of some
string.
Definition 8.2 Suppose Π is a protocol in the mBJM model that produces a hashed ses-
sion key using the cryptographic hash function H. Then the session string for a particular
oracle ΠiU is denoted ssΠiU , and is defined to be the string which is hashed to produce the





This reliance on hashing to produce a session key does not seem to be too strong a
restriction since it is fairly common to use a key derivation function to obtain a session key
from a secret value established during a key agreement protocol, and this key derivation
function is usually implemented via a hash function.
We make this restriction since our modular proof technique will only work on key
agreement protocols that produce hashed session keys. It will also require that we model
the hash function by a random oracle in the proof of security.
8.3.1 Protocol Partnering
When trying to establish that a protocol Π is secure in the mBJM model, we need to
ensure that an adversary cannot trivially win the game defined in Section 7.3.3 by an
attack on the partnering properties of Π.
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Definition 8.3 Suppose Π is a key agreement protocol. If there exists an adversary E,
which when attacking Π in an mBJM game defined in Section 7.3.3 and with non-negligible
probability in the security parameter l, can make some two oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ accept
holding the same session key when they are not partners, then we say that Π has weak
partnering. If Π does not have weak partnering, then we say that Π has strong partnering.
If a protocol Π had weak partnering, then there would exist an adversary E that could
make oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ accept holding the same session key but without being partners.
The rules of the mBJM game would then allow the adversary to reveal the session key held
by ΠiU , and then choose Π
j
U ′ for the Test query, allowing E to trivially win the security
game.
Therefore, for Π to be a secure key agreement protocol as defined in Definition 7.7, Π
must have strong partnering. This can be ensured by including appropriate “partnering
information” in the session string ssΠiU (and therefore in the computation of the session
key skiU ), where partnering information is information from which it can be established
whether the two session participants are partners or not. If appropriate partnering in-
formation is included in the session string, then weak partnering (i.e. where two oracles
generate equal session keys with different partnering information) implies a collision in
the hash function H. Since H is modeled as a random oracle, this occurs with negligible
probability, so the protocol has strong partnering. In fact, we only really require H to be
collision resistant to ensure strong partnering.
In the mBJM model, partnership is defined via session keys, session IDs and partner
IDs. For oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ to accept holding the same (unique) session key but without
being partners, they must have different sids and/or pids. To guarantee that protocol Π
has strong partnering in the mBJM model, we must therefore ensure that the session IDs
are unique to each session and that (with overwhelming probability) skiU = sk
j
U ′ only if
roleiU 6= rolejU ′ , sidiU = sidjU ′ , pidiU = U ′ and pidjU ′ = U . In this case we can use the
values sidiU , U and pid
i
U (if U is the initiator and pid
i





and U (if U is the responder and pidiU is the initiator) as the partnering information, and
the inclusion of this information in the session string will ensure strong partnering.
The idea of including appropriate partnering information in the session string to en-
sure strong partnering applies equally to our mBJM model as it does to the BR, BJM
and ID-BJM models, even though the concept of partnering is slightly different in each of
these models. For example, in the models of [12, 13, 16], partnering is defined via match-
ing conversations, or matching transcripts, and where each participant believes they are
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communicating with the other. Therefore a key agreement protocol secure in these models
can never allow two oracles to share the same key without having matching transcripts
and corresponding intended partners. Strong partnering in these models can therefore be
ensured by including the identities of the two participants (starting with the initiator) as
well as the protocol message flows (obtained from the protocol transcripts) in the session
string of each oracle.
8.3.2 Reduced Games
We now consider two reduced mBJM games. The first game is identical to the mBJM game
defined in Section 7.3.3 except that the adversary E is not allowed to make any Reveal
queries. We call this reduced game a No-Reveals mBJM (NR-mBJM) game. The second
game is identical to the NR-mBJM game, except that the adversary no longer makes the
normal Test query. Instead, to win the game, the adversary must select an accepted and
fresh oracle on which to make a (modified) Test query at the end of its computation and
output the session key held by this oracle. Since the adversary in this game must actually
compute the session key of an oracle (instead of having to decide between a session key
and a random value from the key space), we call this game a computational NR-mBJM
(cNR-mBJM) game. We define E’s advantage, denoted AdvantageE(l), in the cNR-mBJM
game to be the probability that E outputs a session key sk such that sk = skΠiU where
ΠiU is the oracle selected by the adversary for the (modified) Test query.
We define NR-mBJM (and cNR-mBJM) security as follows:
Definition 8.4 A protocol Π is a (c)NR-mBJM-secure key agreement protocol if:
1. In the presence of the benign adversary, two oracles running the protocol both accept
holding the same session key and session ID, and the session key is distributed
uniformly at random on {0, 1}l; and
2. For any adversary E, AdvantageE(l) in the (c)NR-mBJM game is negligible.
We say that protocol Π is (c)NR-mBJM-insecure if it is not (c)NR-mBJM-secure.
That is, there exists an adversary E which, with non-negligible probability (in l), wins
the (c)NR-mBJM game against challenger C. We say that such an E can successfully
(c)NR-mBJM-attack protocol Π.
As part of our modular proof technique for a given protocol Π which produces hashed
session keys on completion of the protocol, we will consider a related protocol pi. When it
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is not clear from the context, we will use use the notation ΠiU for an oracle running Π and
skΠiU
, sidΠiU
and pidΠiU for the session key, session ID and partner ID of Π
i
U . Similarly, we
will use the notation piiU for an oracle running pi and skpiiU , sidpiiU and pidpiiU for the session
key, session ID and partner ID of piiU . When it is clear which protocol we are referring to,
we will revert back to the simpler notation introduced in Section 7.3.
Protocol pi is defined in the same way as Π except that the session key generated by
pi is defined to be the session string of Π rather than the hash of this string. That is,
skpiiU
= ssΠiU . As part of our proof technique it will be necessary to prove that protocol pi
is cNR-mBJM secure. Since the cNR-mBJM game is a highly reduced game, it is usually
fairly easy to establish a protocol’s security in this model. Although it may not be obvious
how a proof of security in this reduced model may be helpful, in Section 8.3.3 we present
a theorem which shows how a proof of cNR-mBJM security for pi can be transformed into
a proof of mBJM security for Π using a Gap assumption, provided that Π has strong
partnering.
The reason that we defined NR-mBJM security when cNR-mBJM security is our main
focus is that, although it is a more complex game than the cNR-mBJM game, a number
of recent papers presenting new key agreement protocols prove that the protocols meet
such a weakened definition of security [3, 16, 39, 83]. That is, they take an appropriate
security model, and prove the security of their protocols in the No-Reveals (NR) variant
of the security model.
It is trivial to see that if protocol Π is NR-mBJM secure, then it is also cNR-mBJM
secure. We also have the following result relating the NR-mBJM security of Π and the
cNR-mBJM security of the related protocol pi.
Theorem 8.1 If protocol Π produces a hashed session key via hash function H and is
NR-mBJM secure, then the related protocol pi is cNR-mBJM secure.
Proof: We provide a sketch of the proof of this theorem. The details are left to the reader.
We show that if there exists an adversary E that can cNR-mBJM-attack pi, then we can
build an adversary A that can NR-mBJM-attack Π.
Suppose that an adversary E wins the cNR-mBJM game for protocol pi with non-
negligible probability η. Suppose also that A runs an NR-mBJM game with challenger C.
A in turn acts as a challenger for E in a cNR-mBJM game. A passes all E’s queries to
C and returns all C’s outputs to E. Finally E will output the session key skpiiU of some
fresh oracle piiU . Recall however that skpiiU = ssΠiU .
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A then chooses ΠiU for the Test query and receives a key sk. If sk = H(skpiiU ) then
A outputs 1, otherwise A outputs 0. It is easy to see that A wins the NR-mBJM game
against Π with probability η. ¤
We note that in the proof of the above theorem, no assumption is required concerning
the properties of H.
8.3.3 Handling Reveal Queries using Gap Assumptions
We now consider a protocol Π which has strong partnering and for which the related
protocol pi is known to be cNR-mBJM secure. Our aim is to translate these results into a
proof of mBJM security for Π. In order to do this, we will need to be able to construct a
challenger C in an mBJM game for Π which can answer an adversary E’s Reveal queries.
At first glance, it seems that C needs to be able to compute the session key skU for
any oracle ΠiU that E may wish to reveal during the mBJM game. However this is not
the case if Π produces a hashed session key (via hash function H) and if H is modelled as
a random oracle. We will see below in Theorem 8.2 that in this case, C only needs to be
able to solve the following decisional problem:
Given the public parameters, the transcript T iU of oracle Π
i
U in an mBJM game,
as well as PU and PU ′ (the public keys of U and U ′ where pidiU = U
′) and s,
where s is a string, decide whether s = ssΠiU , where ssΠiU is the session string
of oracle ΠiU .
We call this decisional problem the session string decisional problem for protocol Π.
We note that the corresponding computational problem is to compute the session string
of Π, which is the same as computing the session key of pi.
We now present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 8.2 Suppose that key agreement protocol Π produces a hashed session key on
completion of the protocol (via hash function H) and that Π has strong partnering. If the
cNR-mBJM security of the related protocol pi is probabilistic polynomial time reducible
to the hardness of the computational problem of some relation f , and the session string
decisional problem for Π is polynomial time reducible to the decisional problem of f , then
the mBJM security of Π is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the
Gap problem of f , assuming that H is a random oracle.
Proof:
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Since the cNR-mBJM security of pi is probabilistic polynomial time reducible (in secu-
rity parameter l) to the hardness of the computational problem of some relation f , there
exists an algorithm A that, on input a problem instance of the computational problem
of f and acting as a challenger for an adversary E which has non-negligible probability
η of winning the cNR-mBJM game for pi in time τ , is able to solve the computational
problem of f with some non-negligible probability g(η) and in time h(τ), where g and h
are polynomial functions.
We now define an algorithm B which, given an adversary D which has non-negligible
probability η′ of winning the mBJM game for Π in time τ ′, is able to solve the Gap
problem of f with some non-negligible probability g′(η′) and in time h′(τ ′) where g′ and
h′ are polynomial functions. B will act as a challenger for D. B will also run algorithm
A and will simulate an adversary for A. Since B attempts to solve the Gap problem of f ,
B will also have access to a decisional oracle for f .
Since Π has strong partnering, we know that if two oracles inD’s attack share the same
session key, then they must be partners (with overwhelming probability). We therefore
know that D will never reveal a session key sk where sk is equal to the Test query oracle
ΠiT ’s session key skΠiT . This is because D is not permitted to reveal the session key of the
oracle on which a Test query was made or its partner (if it exists).
We also assumed that the session string decisional problem for Π is polynomial time
reducible to the decisional problem of f . That is, there exists some algorithm C which,
given a decisional oracle for f , is able to solve the session string decisional problem for Π
in polynomial time τ ′′ (and with probability 1).
Since B’s goal is to solve the Gap problem of f , B is initialized with an instance of the
computational problem of f . B then runs A on the instance of the computational problem
of f and simulates an adversary E for A. A sets up a cNR-mBJM game for B and gives
all the public parameters to B. B in turn passes these public parameters to adversary D.
B now answers all of D’s queries as follows.
B passes all D’s queries besides Reveal and H queries to A. Since, in any session,
protocol pi is identical to protocol Π until the session is completed and the session key is
computed, these queries will all be answerable by A. B passes A’s responses back to D.
In order for B to answer D’s Reveal queries, B maintains a Guess session key list
(G-List). Each element on the G-List is a tuple of the form (T jV , PV , PV ′ , R
j
V ) where T
j
V




= V ′, and RjV is a random guess for the session key sk
j
V of oracle Π
j
V . Initially the
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G-List is empty.
In order for B to answer E’s H queries, B maintains an (initially empty) H-List
containing tuples of the form (si, ski, str). For each H query on string s that D makes,
B checks whether s is on the H-List as the first component in some tuple (si, ski, str).
If it is, then B outputs ski. If s is not on the H-List then B uses the algorithm C to
determine whether s is a valid session string for any oracle ΠjV on the G-List. If s = ssΠjV
is the session string for some oracle ΠjV on the G-List, then B outputs R
j
V and adds the
tuple (s,RjV , str) where str=“V,j” to the H-List. Otherwise B selects a random sk from
the session key space, adds the tuple (s, sk, str) (where str is the empty string λ) to the
H-List, and outputs sk.
When D makes a Reveal query on any oracle ΠiU which has accepted, B proceeds as
follows. If ΠiU has an entry on the G-List of the form (T
i
U , PU , PU ′ , R
i
U ), B outputs the
value RiU . Otherwise B checks whether any entry on the H-List of the form (si, ski, str)
where str = λ has si = ssΠiU using algorithm C. If such an entry (si, ski, str) exists, then
str is set to “U,i” on the H-List and the entry (T iU , PU , PU ′ , R
i
U ) is added to the G-List,
where RiU = si, T
i
U is the transcript of Π
i
U , PU is the public key of U and PU ′ is the public
key of U ′ where pidΠiU = U
′. Otherwise a random session key RiU is selected and the entry
(T iU , PU , PU ′ , R
i
U ) is added to the G-List. To answer the Reveal query, B outputs the
value RiU in every case.
In this way, B can consistently answer D’s Reveal and H queries. At some point D
selects an oracle ΠiT for the Test query. B selects a random element sk from the session
key space and gives this to D.
Since Π has strong partnering, skΠiT will not be equal to any other revealed session
key, so the only way that D could distinguish (with non-negligible probability) whether
sk = skΠiT , would be to query the session string ssΠiT on H.
If D does not query H on the Test query oracle’s session string ssΠiT , then D can
only win with probability 1/SH where SH is the size of the output space of H, which we
assume is negligible in security parameter l. If D wins the game, then with overwhelming
probability 1 − 1/SH , D queries H on ssΠiT . B can detect this value by checking which
of the tuples (si, ski, str) on the H-List with str = λ has si = ssΠiT using algorithm C. B
gives this si to A as A’s adversary E’s output of the Test query.
Since ssΠiT = skpiiT , B has simulated a valid adversary E for A which has non-negligible
success probability η = η′ · (1 − 1/SH) and which runs in polynomial time τ = τ ′ + τ ′′ ·
NH · (NR+1). Here NH and NR are the number of H and Reveal queries that D makes,
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respectively. So A outputs the solution to the instance of the computational problem of
f with non-negligible probability g(η) and in time h(τ).
Therefore B solves the Gap problem of f with non-negligible probability g(η) and in
time h(τ).
¤
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Analogous results to the ones in Section 8.3 can be obtained for the security models of
[10, 12, 13, 16, 32] and the ID-BJM model of Section 7.4.1.
For each of these models, an equivalent definition of strong partnering can be made.
In the models of [10, 32], partnering is defined in a similar way to the way it is defined in
our mBJM model, but in the models of [12, 13, 16] partnering is defined via the concept
of matching conversations, so strong partnering would be defined in this context as well.
NR and cNR versions of the security model can also be defined in the same way as for
the mBJM model, and the definition of the related protocol pi is independent of the model
used. It is then possible to prove analogous versions of Theorem 8.2 (and Theorem 8.1)
for these models. These in turn illustrate how proofs in these models can be constructed
in a modular way.
As an example, we present the analogous version of Theorem 8.2 for the BJM model
of Section 7.2.
We consider a protocol Π in the BJM model. We can define the NR-BJM and cNR-
BJM games in exactly the same way as the NR-mBJM and cNR-mBJM games were defined
in Section 8.3.2. The session string decisional problem and the related protocol pi can also
be defined exactly as before. It remains to show how strong partnering is defined in the
BJM model.
Definition 8.5 Suppose Π is a key agreement protocol. If there exists an adversary E,
which when attacking Π in a BJM game defined in Section 7.2.5 and with non-negligible
probability in the security parameter l, can make any two oracles ΠiU,V and Π
t
K,L accept
holding the same session key when they are not matching oracles, then we say that Π
has weak partnering. If Π does not have weak partnering, then we say that Π has strong
partnering.
To ensure that the protocol Π has strong partnering, we must ensure that (with over-
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whelming probability) skiU,V = sk
t





are matching oracles (or partners). If a protocol Π does not have strong partnering, then
this can be ensured by modifying the protocol slightly to include the partnering informa-
tion in the computation of the session key. In the BJM model, the partnering information
is the information required to determine whether two oracles had matching conversations
or not.
We recall from Definition 7.1 that in order to have matching conversations, each mes-
sage that one oracle sends must be received by the other without modification, and in the
correct order. Moreover, there can also be no confusion as to which oracle is the initiator
and which is the responder.
Suppose that in a protocol run between oracles ΠiU,V and Π
j
V,U , oracle Π
i
U,V sends
and receives a sequence of messages β0, .., βn where this does not include the initializing
message λ or the termination output ∗. If the IDs of the initiator and responder (in
that order) as well as the sequence β0, .., βn are included in the session string ssΠiU,V (and
therefore in the computation of the session key skiU,V ), then strong partnering can be
guaranteed.
We now state versions of Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 adapted to the BJM model.
Theorem 8.3 If a protocol Π produces a hashed session key via hash function H and is
NR-BJM secure, then the related protocol pi is cNR-BJM secure.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem is identical to the proof of Theorem 8.1 except that
references to NR-mBJM and cNR-mBJM games (and the resulting notation) are replaced
by NR-BJM and cNR-BJM games (and the resulting notation). ¤
Theorem 8.4 Suppose that key agreement protocol Π produces a hashed session key on
completion of the protocol (via hash function H) and that Π has strong partnering. If
the cNR-BJM security of the related protocol pi is probabilistic polynomial time reducible
to the hardness of the computational problem of some relation f , and the session string
decisional problem for Π is polynomial time reducible to the decisional problem of f , then
the BJM security of Π is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the
Gap problem of f , assuming that H is a random oracle.
Proof:
The proof of this theorem is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 8.2 except that
references to mBJM, NR-mBJM and cNR-mBJM games (and the resulting notation) are
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replaced by BJM, NR-BJM and cNR-BJM games (and the resulting notation), and the
term partners is replaced by matching oracles. The changes to the security model otherwise
have no effect on the proof of the theorem. ¤
The ID-BJM model is identical to the BJM model except for the way that participants
in the game are initialized and private keys are extracted. Therefore NR-ID-BJM and
cNR-ID-BJM games can be defined in exactly the same way as the NR-BJM and cNR-
BJM games are defined, and the session string decisional problem, the related protocol pi
and strong partnering can all be defined exactly as in the BJM model.
It is therefore easy to see that Theorems 8.3 and 8.4 apply equally well to the ID-BJM
model as they do to the BJM model.
8.5 Applying the Technique to Existing Protocols
We now consider Protocol 3 from Section 6.3.2 (originally presented in [16, Protocol 4]).
This protocol was conjectured to be secure in [16] but this has never been proven. In fact
there is not even a partial proof of security for this protocol.
However, when modified to ensure strong partnering, the protocol can be proven secure
in the mBJM model. We now present the modified version of Protocol 3 which we refer
to as Protocol 4.
As in Section 6.3.2, the modified key agreement protocol requires a Setup algorithm
which generates large primes p and q where q|p − 1. The group G is chosen to be a
multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p, where G has order q, and element g ∈ G generates G. A
cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l for a fixed value l (usually the security
parameter) is also selected.
Suppose that A and B are participants with public and private key pairs 〈XA, xA〉 and
〈XB, xB〉 respectively, where xA and xB are chosen randomly from Z∗q , XA = gxA mod p
and XB = gxB mod p. A and B run Protocol 4 to generate a shared session key.
It is easy to see that in Protocol 4 we have
KA = KB = K = H(gxAb mod p, gxBa mod p,A,B, TA, TB).
So K can be used as a secret session key shared between A and B. The ephemeral values
a and b are erased on completion of the protocol.
The modified version of Protocol 4 in which the session key is equal to the session
string of Protocol 4 is denoted by Protocol 4′.
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We now establish the security of Protocol 4 in the mBJM model using Theorem 8.2.
To do this we need to establish a pair of lemmas.
Protocol 4: Modified from Protocol 3 to ensure strong partnering.
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A initiates session ΠiA, setting pid
i
A = B and role
i
A = initiator. A selects an
ephemeral random value a ∈ Zq,
2. B initiates session ΠjB setting pid
j
B = A and role
j
B = responder. B selects an
ephemeral random value b ∈ Zq.
A and B then exchange the following messages, in the following order:
A −→ B : TA = ga mod p
B −→ A : TB = gb mod p
On receipt of the message gb mod p, A checks that XB, TB ∈ G and computes




B mod p, sid
i
A)
and accepts with session key skiA = KA. On receipt of g
a mod p, B checks that
XA, TA ∈ G and computes
sidjB = A,B, TA, TB and KB = H(X
b
A mod p, T
xB
A mod p, sid
j
B)
and accepts with session key skjB = KB.
Lemma 8.5 The cNR-mBJM security of Protocol 4′ is probabilistic polynomial time
reducible to the hardness of the CDH problem in G.
Proof: We assume that for security parameter l there exists an adversary E for Protocol 4′
that can win the cNR-mBJM game with non-negligible advantage η and in polynomial time
τ . Suppose that the number of participants in E’s game is nP and that the maximum
number of sessions each participant may be involved in is nS , where nP and nS are
polynomial functions of l.
We now construct from E an algorithm F which solves the CDH problem in G with
non-negligible probability. That is, given as input elements g, gx, gy ∈ G, F ’s task is to
compute and output the value gxy mod p.
F simulates a challenger in a cNR-mBJM game with E. F sets up the game with the
group G and generator g ∈ G. F generates a set of participants of size nP . For each
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participant I, F sets I’s private key to be a randomly chosen xI ∈ Zq and sets I’s public
key to be XI = gxI mod p. However for some randomly selected participant P , F sets
P ’s public key to be XP = gx. F also picks a random participant Q 6= P , and a random
session number t ∈ {1, .., nS}. F starts E and answers E’s queries as follows.
Send: E may make a special Send query ΠsI which sets pidI = XI′ and instructs I to
initiate a protocol run with its partner I ′. E can also send any oracle ΠsI a message
M , and the oracle responds according to the protocol. However if E initializes or




Corrupt(U): If E corrupts participant P , then F aborts. Otherwise F gives E the long-
term private key of the participant.
The probability that E chooses oracle ΠtQ for the Test query and that pidQ = XP is
at least 1
n2P .nS
. In this case, we note that E could not have corrupted participant P , and
so F would not have aborted.
E finally outputs a session key of the form (a, b, c) where a, b ∈ G and c ∈ G4. If
ΠsI was an initiator, then F outputs b as its guess for the value g
xy mod p, otherwise F
outputs a as its guess. It is now easy to see that F solves the CDH problem on input
g, gx, gy with probability at least η′ = η.( 1
n2P .nS
) (which is non-negligible in l), and in time
τ . ¤
It is interesting to note how short the proof of this theorem is; this is due to the
simplicity of the cNR-mBJM model.
We note that a common error when proving that a protocol Π is mBJM-secure (or even
NR-mBJM or cNR-mBJM secure) is to make the assumption that the Test query oracle
ΠiU has a partner, and that the input to Π
i
U comes from this partner. In fact the challenger
has no control over the input to ΠiU since the adversary controls all communications
between oracles. This error can be seen in papers such as [40, 84] where proofs of security
were attempted in the full security model. Their corrected versions [39, 83] only provide
proofs in the NR versions of the original models.
Lemma 8.6 Protocol 4 has strong partnering in the random oracle model.
Proof: With overwhelming probability, the session ID is unique to each session since it
includes the values TA and TB which are randomly chosen by each oracle. It is also trivial
to verify that appropriate partnering information is included in the session string, and
therefore strong partnering is guaranteed. We leave the details to the reader. ¤
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Corollary 8.7 Protocol 4 is secure in the random oracle model assuming the hardness of
the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem in G.
Proof: This result comes immediately from Theorem 8.2, and Lemmas 8.5 and 8.6, and
the simple observation that the session string decisional problem for Protocol 4 is reducible
to the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (in linear time).
¤
8.5.1 Notes on Protocol 4
We note that Protocol 4 can easily be extended to have perfect forward security by in-
cluding the value gab mod p in the session string. This extended Protocol 4 can then be
proven secure in an extended mBJM model which models perfect forward secrecy.
In Protocol 4, each participant sets their pid at the start of the protocol. However
without some prior communication, there may be confusion as to the identity of the
protocol participants. In this case, the participants may have incorrect pid values, even in
a protocol run between two honest participants, and the participants will fail to generate
the same session key.
This does not affect the security of the protocol in the mBJM model, but it is not
an acceptable situation in practice. It is therefore advisable to include the participant
identities in the message flows and for the responder’s pid to be set after receipt of the
message from the initiator.
In the mBJM security model, it is assumed that public keys are properly authenticated,
and a participant’s identity is securely bound to their public key via some PKI. However
in reality, we may not be able to make this assumption, and this can lead to attacks such
as unknown key-share attacks [72, 85]. It may therefore also be advisable to include the
identities of the protocol participants as well as their public keys in the computation of
the session key.
8.6 Applying the Technique to Protocols with Partial Proofs
Our technique can also be applied to key agreement protocols in the literature with only
partial proofs. We find numerous protocols [16, 39, 83] which use a hash function to
derive a session key and which have proofs of security reducing to the hardness of some
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computational problem f , but only in the NR version of the security model used1. If
the necessary conditions are met for such protocols, full proofs of security in the relevant
model can be obtained as follows.
1. It must be shown that the protocol Π has strong partnering. If Π does not have strong
partnering, this can be achieved by modifying the protocol to include the appropriate
partnering information (for the security model used) in the session string. It should
be checked that such modifications do not affect the existing proof of security.
2. The appropriate version of Theorem 8.1 can now be applied to Π to guarantee that
the related protocol pi is secure in the cNR version of the security model used.
3. It must be shown that a decisional oracle for f can be used to solve the session string
decisional problem of Π.
4. The appropriate version of Theorem 8.2 may now be used to obtain a complete
security proof for Π in the full version of the security model used. Security will
depend on the hardness of the Gap problem of f .
The proof of security for [16, Protocol 3] can be completed in the manner described
above, although the protocol does require some modifications to achieve strong partnering.
A suitably modified version of this protocol is in fact presented in [71] together with a proof
of security. Interestingly, [16, Protocol 3] and the modified version in [71] are vulnerable to
a key compromise impersonation attack. However this does not affect the proof of security
since the model of [16] does not capture security against these attacks.
Unfortunately, the partial proofs for the protocols in [39, 83] cannot be completed
using our modular technique. This is because the partial proof of security in [83] is in
fact incorrect, and the session string decisional problem is not reducible to the decisional
problem of f in [39]. In the next section we show how to adapt our modular technique to
the protocol of [39].
8.7 When the Modular Technique Cannot be Used
When applying the modular technique to prove the security of a given protocol, various
conditions must hold in order to obtain a full proof of security. However the protocol under
1A proof for the protocol of [39] appearing in [43] allows the adversary to make some but not all Reveal
queries
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consideration may not satisfy these conditions, and in such circumstances the modular
technique cannot be applied. However it may still be possible to obtain a full proof of
security for the protocol using similar ideas.
As examples, we consider the AK protocol of Chen and Kudla (Protocol 2 in [39, 40])
which is proven secure in the NR-ID-BJM model, and the AK protocol of Smart [103],
which until now has not been proven secure.
In order to define these two protocols, we first need to introduce some mathematical
background. We introduce the notion of bilinear maps (or pairings) on elliptic curves.
Pairings have been used extensively in the construction of identity-based cryptographic
primitives, and they are required for both the protocols of Chen and Kudla and Smart.
8.7.1 Pairings and Related Problems
Let G1 and G2 denote two groups of prime order q, where G1, with an additive notation,
denotes a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve; andG2, with a multiplicative
notation, denotes a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field. A pairing is a
bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 between these two groups. The map must satisfy the
following properties:
Bilinear: Given P,Q,W ∈ G1 then
eˆ(P +Q,W ) = eˆ(P,W ) · eˆ(Q,W ), and eˆ(P,Q+W ) = eˆ(P,Q) · eˆ(P,W ),
and consequently for any a ∈ Zq, eˆ(aP,Q) = eˆ(P, aQ) = eˆ(P,Q)a.
Non-degenerate: There exists a P ∈ G1 such that eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1.
Computable: If P,Q ∈ G1, then eˆ(P,Q) ∈ G2 is efficiently computable.
A bilinear map satisfying the above properties is called an admissible bilinear map.
An admissible bilinear map can obtained by modifying either the Weil pairing [86] or the
Tate pairing [54].
The main computational problem associated with pairings is the computational bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem (CBDH problem), and is defined as follows.
Definition 8.6 Let G1 and G2 denote two groups of prime order q, let P be a generator
of G1, and let eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 be an admissible bilinear map. The CBDH problem
in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉 is as follows: Given P, xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 for some x, y, z ∈ Z∗q , compute
W = eˆ(P, P )xyz ∈ G2.
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We say that algorithm A has advantage ² in solving the CBDH Problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉
if
Pr[A(P, xP, yP, zP ) = eˆ(P, P )xyz] ≥ ²
This probability is measured over the random choices of P, xP, yP, zP ∈ G and the random
inputs of A, if any.
The decisional problem arising from the CBDH problem is the decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem (DBDH problem), and is defined as follows.
Definition 8.7 Let G1 and G2 denote two groups of prime order q, let P be a generator
of G1, and let eˆ : G1×G1 → G2 be an admissible bilinear map. Given P, xP, yP, zP ∈ G1
for some x, y, z ∈ Z∗q , as well asW ∈ G2, the DBDH problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉 is to determine
if eˆ(P, P )wxy =W .
The CBDH and DBDH problems can be used to define a related Gap problem.
Definition 8.8 Let G1 and G2 denote two groups of prime order q, let P be a generator
of G1, and let eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be an admissible bilinear map. The Gap bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (GBDH) problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉 is as follows: Given P, xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 for some
x, y, z ∈ Z∗q , as well as an oracle that solves the DBDH problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉, compute
W = eˆ(P, P )xyz ∈ G2.
Informally, the computational, decisional and Gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions
are that no polynomially bounded adversary has non-negligible advantage in solving the
computational, decisional and Gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems, respectively.
8.7.2 The Chen-Kudla Protocol
We start by considering the AK protocol of Chen and Kudla (AK-CK protocol) [39,
Protocol 2]. Although this protocol has a partial proof of security, the session string
decisional problem is not reducible to the appropriate decisional problem. This obstacle
prevents us from applying the identity-based version of Theorem 8.4 to obtain a full proof
of security. However, after slight modifications to ensure strong partnering, it is still
possible to obtain a full proof of security for this protocol.
The identity-based AK-CK protocol [39, 40] requires a trusted authority (TA) from
which each protocol participant can acquire their private identity-based key.
To provide a private key generation service, the TA selects groups G1 and G2 of prime
order q, a generator P of G1, and an admissible map eˆ : G1×G1 → G2. The TA selects a
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master private key s chosen randomly from Z∗q . The TA also selects a cryptographic hash
function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The public parameters of the TA are descriptions of G1, G2
and 〈P, sP, eˆ,H1〉. When a user A requests the private key for their identity A, the TA
issues a private key SA = sH1(A).
If two participants with identities A and B (we refer to these participants simply as
A and B) wish to share a session key, they obtain the public parameters of the TA and
select an additional cryptographic hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l for a fixed value
l (usually the security parameter). We assume that A and B have corresponding private
keys SA and SB that are issued by the TA. The AK-CK protocol (modified for strong
partnering) is shown in Protocol 5.
Protocol 5: A Modification of the AK-CK Protocol to ensure strong partnering.
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random value a ∈ Z∗q ,
2. B selects an ephemeral random value b ∈ Z∗q .
A and B then exchange the following messages, in the following order:
A −→ B : TA = aH1(A)
B −→ A : TB = bH1(B)
On receipt of TB, A checks that TB ∈ G1 and computes
KA = H2(eˆ(SA, TB + aH1(B)), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skiA,B = KA. On receipt of TA, B checks that TA ∈ G1
and computes
KB = H2(eˆ(TA + bH1(A), SB), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skjB,A = KB.
It is easy to see that in Protocol 5 we have
KA = KB = K = H2(eˆ(H1(A),H1(B))s(a+b), A,B, TA, TB))
which can be used as a secret session key shared between A and B. The ephemeral values
a and b are erased on completion of the protocol.
Protocol 5 differs from the AK-CK protocol in that the values A,B, TA and TB are
included in the session string to ensure that the protocol has strong partnering.
Lemma 8.8 Protocol 5 has strong partnering in the random oracle model.
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Proof: It is trivial to verify that this condition holds because the ordered protocol tran-
script and participant IDs (partnering information) are included in the session string. We
leave the details to the reader. ¤
Although we cannot use our modular technique to prove the security of Protocol 5, we
can still obtain a proof of security for Protocol 5 in the ID-BJM model. To do this, we use
some of the techniques used in the proof of Theorem 8.2, and the security of the protocol
relies on the hardness of the GBDH assumption.
Theorem 8.9 Protocol 5 is ID-BJM AK secure, assuming the hardness of the Gap bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉, and assuming that H1 and H2 are random
oracles.
Proof:
Conditions 1 and 2(a) of Definition 7.3 are trivial to verify. It remains to prove that
condition 2(b) holds.
We assume that there exists an adversary E who can win the ID-BJM game with non-
negligible advantage η(l) (where l is the security parameter), making at most µ1 queries
to the H1 random oracle, µ2 queries to the H2 random oracle, and where E initiates at
most µS sessions (i.e. for any oracle ΠnI,J , n ∈ {1, ..., µS}).
We now construct from E an algorithm F which solves the CBDH problem with non-
negligible probability. F takes as input descriptions of the two groups G1, G2, the bilinear
map eˆ, a generator P of G1, and a triple of elements xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 with x, y, z ∈ Z∗q
where q is the prime order of G1 and G2. In addition, F has access to a DBDH oracle,
which on input any 〈aP, bP, cP,W 〉 outputs 1 if W = eˆ(P, P )abc and 0 otherwise. F ’s task
is to compute and output the value gxyz ∈ G2 where g = eˆ(P, P ).
Using similar techniques to the proof of Theorem 8.2, F will use the DBDH oracle
to ensure consistency between the way that the H2 oracle is simulated and the way that
Reveal queries are answered. Due to the way that F simulates the game, F will not able
to compute the session keys of all oracles, and E may be able to detect this by making
H2 queries on the appropriate session strings. However F will use the DBDH oracle to
detect such session strings, and will therefore be able to answer Reveal and H2 queries
in a consistent manner.
F chooses distinct random integers u and v from {1, ..., µ1} and a value p ∈ {1, ..., µS}.
F gives E the public parameters consisting of the descriptions of the groups G1, G2, the
parameters 〈P, xP, eˆ〉, and access to the random oracles H1 and H2. F will simulate all
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oracles required during the game and answers all E’s queries as follows.
H1 queries: F simulates the random oracle H1 by keeping a list of tuples 〈I, rIQI〉 which
is called the H1-List. When the H1 oracle is queried with an input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, F
responds as follows. If I is already on the H1-List in the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉, then F
outputs QI . Otherwise:
1. If I is the v-th distinct H1 query, then the oracle outputs QI = yP and adds
the tuple 〈I,⊥, QI〉 to the H1 list. Otherwise F selects a random rI ∈ Z∗q and
outputs QI = rIP , and then adds the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉 to the H1 list.
2. In addition, F sets up a new participant I with public key QI and private key
SI = rIxP .
We assume that U was the u-th distinct identity to be queried on H1, and that V
was the v-th distinct identity to be queried on H1. We note that for participant V ,
where QV = yP , F is unable to compute the private key SV .
As in the proof of Theorem 8.2, F maintains a guess session key list, called the
G-List. For each oracle of the form ΠnV,J (for any participant J) there is an entry
on the G-List of the form 〈n, J, sknV,J〉 where sknV,J is the session key of oracle ΠnV,J .
Initially the session keys on the list are set to ⊥.




U,V , then F
retrieves the value rU on the H1 List such that H1(U) = rUP and outputs zH1(U) =
rUzP . Otherwise F chooses a random α ∈ Z∗q and outputs αH1(I).
H2 queries: E can query any string s on the H2 random oracle. In order to answer these
queries, F maintains an H2-List of tuples 〈s, t〉 where t ∈ {0, 1}l.
If s is already on the H1-List in the tuple 〈s, t〉, then F outputs t. Otherwise if s
is not of the form g, V, J, TV , TJ or g, J, V, TJ , TV for some participant J and some
g ∈ G2, then F selects a random t ∈ {0, 1}l, adds the tuple 〈s, t〉 to the H2-List and
outputs t.
Suppose that s is of the form g, V, J, TV , TJ or g, J, V, TJ , TV for some participant J
and some g ∈ G2. Then for each oracle ΠnV,J for any n ∈ {1, ..., µS} on the G-List
with sknV,J 6=⊥, F proceeds as follows. If ΠnV,J received a message TJ and output
TV = αQV , then F submits the tuple 〈yP, αH1(J) + TJ , xP, g〉 to the DBDH oracle
and receives a response b.
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If, for any of these queries to the DBDH oracle, b = 1, then F outputs sknV,J .
Otherwise F outputs a random t ∈ {0, 1}l, adds the tuple 〈s, t〉 to the H2-List and
outputs t.
Reveal queries: E can request the session key of any oracle ΠnI,J that has accepted.
If ΠnI,J = Π
p
U,V then F terminates E and aborts. If Π
n
I,J 6= ΠnV,J (for all J), then




V,J for some participant J , and
we assume that ΠnV,J received a message TJ and output TV = αQV . F proceeds as
follows.
F considers each tuple 〈s, t〉 on the H2-List where s is of the form g, V, J, TV , TJ or
g, J, V, TJ , TV for some g ∈ G2. For each such tuple on the H2-List, F submits the
tuple 〈yP, αH1(J) + TJ , xP, g〉 to the DBDH oracle and receives a response b.
If, for any of these queries to the DBDH oracle, b = 1, then F sets sk = t where
t = H2(s). Otherwise F selects a random sk ∈ {0, 1}l. F then sets the value
sknV,J = sk on the G-List and outputs sk.
Private Key Extract queries: On input an identity I, F queries I on the H1 oracle.
If I 6= V then F retrieves the value rI from the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉 on the H1 list, and
outputs SI = rIxP . Otherwise F terminates E and aborts.
Test query: At some point in the simulation, E will ask a Test query of some oracle.
If E does not choose the oracle ΠpU,V for the Test query, then F aborts. F simply
outputs a random session key sk∗ ∈ {0, 1}l.
Output: When E has finished querying oracles, E outputs a bit b′.
The probability that F does not abort at some point in the simulation is 1/µ21µS since u and
v were chosen randomly from {1, ..., µ1}. In this case, E cannot detect any inconsistency
in F ’s simulation, and has probability η of winning the game where oracle ΠpU,V was chosen
for the Test query.
If E wins the game where oracle ΠpU,V was chosen for the Test query, then with over-
whelming probability 1− 1/2l, E queried the session string sspU,V on H2. If this is not the
case, then E cannot distinguish between a random key and the true session key for the Test
session. F therefore picks a random tuple 〈s, t〉 on the H2 List where s = g, U, V, TU , TV
(if ΠpU,V is an initiator oracle) or s = g, V, U, TV , TU (if Π
p
U,V is a responder oracle) and
guesses that s = sspU,V (this occurs with probability at least 1/µ2).
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F retrieves the value rU on the H1 List such that H1(U) = rUP and computes
SU = rUxP . We recall that H1(V ) = yP and TU = rUzP , so if s = ss
p
U,V then
g = eˆ(SU , TV + zyP ) = eˆ(rUxP, TV ) · eˆ(rUxP, zyP ). F therefore outputs (g/δ)1/γ as
its guess for eˆ(P, P )xyz, where δ = eˆ(rUxP, TV ) and γ = rU .
F solves the CBDH problem with probability η/µ21µ2µS(1−1/2l) which is non-negligible
in l, contradicting the hardness of the CBDH problem.
¤
8.7.3 Smart’s Protocol
The setup procedure for Smart’s AK protocol is identical to the setup for the AK-CK
protocol. The public parameters of the TA, as before, are descriptions of G1, G2 and
〈P, sP, eˆ,H1〉. When a user A requests the private key for their identity A, the TA issues
a private key SA = sH1(A).
As before, we assume that A and B have corresponding private keys SA and SB that
are issued by the TA. Smart’s AK protocol (modified for strong partnering) is shown in
Protocol 6.
Protocol 6: A Modification of Smart’s AK Protocol to ensure strong partnering.
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random value a ∈ Z∗q ,
2. B selects an ephemeral random value b ∈ Z∗q .
A and B then exchange the following messages, in the following order:
A −→ B : TA = aP
B −→ A : TB = bP
On receipt of TB, A checks that TB ∈ G1 and computes
KA = H2(eˆ(aH1(B), sP ) · eˆ(SA, TB), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skiA,B = KA. On receipt of TA, B checks that TA ∈ G1
and computes
KB = H2(eˆ(bH1(A), sP ) · eˆ(SB, TA), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skjB,A = KB.
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It is easy to see that in Protocol 6 we have
KA = KB = K = H2(eˆ(bH1(A) + aH1(B), sP ), A,B, TA, TB))
which can be used as a secret session key shared between A and B. The ephemeral values
a and b are erased on completion of the protocol.
We can show that Protocol 6 has strong partnering, and it is possible to obtain a
proof of security of Smart’s protocol in the cNR-ID-BJM model assuming the hardness
of the CBDH problem. Unfortunately, as with Protocol 5, we cannot apply the modular
technique because the session string decisional problem is not reducible to the DBDH
problem.
Despite the fact that we cannot make us of the modular technique for Protocol 6, as
with Protocol 5, we can still obtain a full proof of security for Protocol 6 in the ID-BJM
model using the proof techniques of Theorem 8.2. This proof is very similar to the proof
of Theorem 8.9.
However if we make a small modification to Protocol 6, we find that the session string
decisional problem is reducible to the DBDH problem, and we can obtain a full proof of
security for the resulting protocol using our modular technique. The modified version of
Protocol 6 requires exactly the same setup as Protocol 6 and is shown in Protocol 7.
We notice that the only difference between Protocols 6 and 7 is in the generation of
the key. In Protocol 6, the outputs of the pairing computations are multiplied together,
whereas in Protocol 7, the outputs of the pairing computations are concatenated.
The modified version of Protocol 7 in which the session key is equal to the session
string of Protocol 7 is denoted by Protocol 7′.
We now establish the security of Protocol 7 in the ID-BJM model using the identity-
based version of Theorem 8.4. To do this we need to establish a pair of lemmas.
Lemma 8.10 The cNR-ID-BJM security of Protocol 7′ is probabilistic polynomial time
reducible to the hardness of the CBDH problem in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉.
Proof: We assume that for security parameter l there exists an adversary E for Protocol
7′ that can win the cNR-ID-BJM game with non-negligible advantage η(l) (where l is the
security parameter), making at most µ1 queries to H1, µC Private Key Extract queries,
and where E initiates at most µS sessions (i.e. for any oracle ΠnI,J , n ∈ {1, ..., µS}).
We now construct from E an algorithm F which solves the CBDH problem with non-
negligible probability. F takes as input descriptions of the two groups G1, G2, the bilinear
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Protocol 7: A Modification of Protocol 6 to allow modular proofs.
The following steps must be taken each time a session key is required:
1. A selects an ephemeral random value a ∈ Z∗q ,
2. B selects an ephemeral random value b ∈ Z∗q .
A and B then exchange the following messages, in the following order:
A −→ B : TA = aP
B −→ A : TB = bP
On receipt of TB, A checks that TB ∈ G1 and computes
KA = H2(eˆ(aH1(B), sP ), eˆ(SA, TB), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skiA,B = KA. On receipt of TA, B checks that TA ∈ G1
and computes
KB = H2(eˆ(bH1(A), sP ), eˆ(SB, TA), A,B, TA, TB)
and accepts with session key skjB,A = KB.
map eˆ, a generator P of G1, and a triple of elements xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 with x, y, z ∈ Z∗q
where q is the prime order of G1 and G2. F ’s task is to compute and output the value
gxyz ∈ G2 where g = eˆ(P, P ).
F simulates a challenger in a cNR-ID-BJM game with E. F chooses distinct random
integers u and v from {1, ..., µ1} and a value p ∈ {1, ..., µS}. F gives E the public param-
eters consisting of the descriptions of the groups G1, G2, the parameters 〈P, xP, eˆ〉, and
access to the random oracle H1. F will simulate all oracles required during the game and
answers all E’s queries as follows.
H1 queries: F simulates the random oracle H1 by keeping a list of tuples 〈I, rIQI〉 which
is called the H1-List. When the H1 oracle is queried with an input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, F
responds as follows. If I is already on the H1-List in the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉, then F
outputs QI . Otherwise:
1. If I is the v-th distinct H1 query, then the oracle outputs QI = yP and adds
the tuple 〈I,⊥, QI〉 to the H1 list. Otherwise F selects a random rI ∈ Z∗q and
outputs QI = rIP , and then adds the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉 to the H1 list.
2. In addition, F sets up a new participant I with public key QI and private key
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SI = rIxP .
We assume that U was the u-th distinct identity to be queried on H1, and that V
was the v-th distinct identity to be queried on H1. We note that for participant V ,
where QV = yP , F is unable to compute the private key SV .




U,V , then F
outputs zP . Otherwise F chooses a random α ∈ Z∗q and outputs αP .
Private Key Extract queries: On input an identity I, F queries I on the H1 oracle.
If I 6= V then F retrieves the value rI from the tuple 〈I, rI , QI〉 on the H1 list, and
outputs SI = rIxP . Otherwise F terminates E and aborts.




case, we note that E could not have made a Private key extract query on V , so F
would not have aborted.
E finally outputs a session key of the form (a, b, I, J, c, d) where a, b ∈ G2, I, J ∈ {0, 1}∗
and c, d ∈ G1. If ΠpU,V was an initiator, then F outputs a as its guess for the value gxyz ∈ G2
where g = eˆ(P, P ), otherwise F outputs b as its guess. It is now easy to see that F solves
the CBDH problem on input xP, yP, zP ∈ G1 with probability at least η′ = ηµ21·µS (which
is non-negligible in l). ¤
Lemma 8.11 Protocol 7 has strong partnering in the random oracle model.
Proof: It is trivial to verify that this condition holds because the ordered protocol tran-
script and participant IDs (partnering information) are included in the session string. We
leave the details to the reader. ¤
Corollary 8.12 Protocol 7 is secure in the ID-BJM model assuming that H1 and H2 are
random oracles, and assuming the hardness of the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
in 〈G1, G2, eˆ〉.
Proof: This result comes immediately from the identity-based version of Theorem 8.4,
and Lemmas 8.10 and 8.11, and the simple observation that the session string decisional
problem for Protocol 7 is reducible to the DBDH problem (in constant time). ¤
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8.8 Special Gap Groups
The Gap assumptions may not be acceptable to all, since in developing security proofs,
one must assume the use of an oracle which is not known to exist: a decisional oracle.
For instance, for Protocol 1, the proof of security ultimately requires an oracle which
solves DDH in the group G. This is thought to be a hard problem, so there is no known
method of constructing such an efficient oracle. Nevertheless, the security proof still gives
a concrete basis for assessing the security of the protocol.
However there do exist groups in which the computational problem is thought to be
hard but where the decisional problem is known to be easy, for instance, groups of points
on an elliptic curve on which an efficient bilinear map (or pairing operation) is defined. In
such groups, the pairing operation can be used to construct an efficient DDH oracle, and
the Gap problem is in fact equivalent to the computational problem. Therefore if Protocol
1 had been defined over such a group, then its security would in fact reduce to the CDH
problem in that group.
Of course, one may object to using a group in which the decisional problem is known
to be easy since this may indicate other, yet to be discovered weaknesses of the group.
8.9 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have presented a modular technique that makes use of Gap assumptions for simplifying
proofs of security for key agreement protocols which are not built using the modular
approach of [8]. Protocols of this type have traditionally been notoriously hard to prove
secure, and we have indicated how the proofs of security of many such protocols in the
literature may be constructed or completed using our technique. Our technique works not
only with the model presented in this chapter, but also with the models of [12, 13, 16, 32].
We considered in detail a long-standing protocol presented in [16] which previously
lacked a proof of security. We then provided a full proof of security for a slightly modified
version of this protocol using the techniques introduced in this chapter. We also considered
protocols in [16, 39, 103] which up till now had only partial proofs of security or no security
proofs at all. For such protocols we indicated how full proofs of security may be constructed
(either using our modular technique, or the proof techniques used in this chapter), and we
provide full proofs of security for the (slightly modified) AK protocols of [39] and [103].
In future work, it would be interesting to extend the idea of modular proofs to multi-
party protocols as well as other types of key agreement protocols such as key agreement
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protocols with key confirmation. It would also be interesting to investigate the use of Gap
assumptions in other cryptographic primitives, such as encryption or signature schemes,
and extend the idea of modular proof techniques to these primitives.
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